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## Introduction

In November, 1975, the Organization of Mojahedeen of the People of Iran published the *Manifesto of the Ideological Positions of the OMPI* and thus revealed the great upheaval in its world outlook. The ideological transformation of the OMPI -- its adoption of Marxism-Leninism -- is a historic event born out of the concrete conditions of classes and class struggles in Iran; it has all-embracing effects on the Iranian communist and revolutionary movements.

The OMPI was formed in 1965 as an organization with Islamic ideology, embodying the revolutionary aspirations and interests of a large section of Iranian traditional petit bourgeoisie. The ideological transformation was accomplished after ten years of underground revolutionary struggle, four years of armed struggle and two years of fierce ideological struggle within the organization. In the course of the revolutionary struggle against the blood-thirsty dictatorship of Iran's comprador bourgeoisie, represented by the fascist Shah's regime, many honest revolutionaries were sacrificed, others fell into the hands of the enemy and the organization received severe blows. But it was this revolutionary practice which paved the road to the OMPI's discovery of the specific laws of struggle in the concrete conditions of Iran, and made its ideological transformation possible.

At the same time, the ideological transformation of the OMPI must be viewed in the light of the changes in class structure of Iran in the 1960's and 70's. The imperialist plan of "White Revolution", devised and instigated by the United States in early 1960's to further its plunder and exploitation through expanding capitalist relations of production in Iran, has led to a sharp growth of the comprador bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. It has also meant the expropriation of vast sections of Iran's traditional petit bourgeoisie, who are being increasingly pushed towards the working class under the devastating pressure of monopoly capital.

"This [ideological] upheaval has taken place in the heat of revolutionary struggle in its different forms, and along with infrastructural changes of society -- the growth of the comprador bourgeoisie, intensification of exploitation, quantitative and qualitative growth of the proletariat, trans-

formation of the society's class structure and the transition toward a new structure." (*Mojahed*, publication of the foreign organ of the OMPI, #6, August 1976, p. 10)

Of course, these objective changes in socio-economic conditions were *not* reflected *automatically* in the outlook and positions of the OMPI. Rather, it was these objective changes, coupled with the *conscious activities* of revolutionaries who "were at any moment willing to put the fundamental interests of the masses ahead of [their] own individual or group interests" (*Manifesto*, p. 65), and who were able to correctly conduct the intra-organizational ideological struggle, which produced this historic upheaval. Herein lie the great lessons to be learned from the ideological transformation of the OMPI.

"Ideological struggle within an organization, contrary to the belief of many forces abroad, is not solely or primarily a struggle between the philosophical viewpoints of two schools... Ideological struggle begins from the criticism of political-organizational activities of members or the organization, and in its course will attack those tendencies and views which negate the content of the organization's revolutionary advance or prevent its growth in the direction of fulfilling its revolutionary goals. But since these counter-revolutionary and reactionary tendencies in the base are justified and strengthened by their specific philosophy and world outlook in the superstructure, the struggle against them and their political-organizational manifestations will, in the course of its development, inevitably and naturally attack the philosophical stronghold of these tendencies." (*Mojahed*, op. cit., pp. 20-21). Thus at every stage of the ideological struggle the move toward genuine Marxism-Leninism is inseparable from the attempt to solve specific problems of the organization and the movement in the very process of struggle. "Therefore genuine ideological struggle is not carried out in a vacuum, divorced from revolutionary practice, on paper, or from behind microphones or tribunes. It is meaningful only in the realm of revolutionary practice and in the great process of changing the world." (*ibid*, p.21)

The ideological transformation of the OMPI as reflected in the *Manifesto* has had an important role in clarifying many questions confronting the Iranian communist and revolutionary movements. A scientific analysis of the concrete conditions of Iran is made in the *Manifesto* and expanded in the subsequent works of the OMPI, based on which the principal task of Iran's communist movement in the present stage is formulated: linking the revolutionary communist vanguard with the spontaneous struggle of the working class.

The OMPI's ideological struggle, while aimed mainly at the religious form of idealism, also struck other forms of bourgeois and petit bourgeois thinking and theories, including modern revisionism. The OMPI has drawn a clear line of demarcation with and exposed modern international revisionism, headed by USSR social imperialists, and its main representative in Iran -- the revisionist clique of the "Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran."

While exposing the idealism of Islam, the *Manifesto* also analyzes the role of non-proletarian revolutionary forces in Iranian society whose interests are expressed in the form of Islamic ideology. It thus provides genuine grounds for the political and practical unity of revolutionary communist and non-communist forces.

The reaction of different forces in the Iranian movement to the OMPI's ideological transformation clarified some middle-of-the-road positions and created new polarizations. This is also true regarding radical circles and groups abroad.

The Iranian Communist Students Group believes that the Iranian groups and organizations abroad, being away from the main arena of revolutionary practice and class struggle in Iran, play a secondary role in the Iranian revolutionary and communist movements. Recognizing the OMPI as the only Iranian communist organization with a correct political line and program for the present stage of the Iranian communist movement, the ICSG believes it can best serve the interests of that movement through its commitment to the ideological stand and political line of the OMPI.

Iranian Communist  
Students Group

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## Note

*The Manifesto of the Ideological Positions of the OMPI, Volume I, is composed of three basic parts. One, a preface to the Manifesto the translation of which appears in the following pages of this pamphlet. Two, the main body of the Manifesto consisting of three chapters: 1) a study of the development of the progressive and revolutionary currents of thought in Iran in the past thirty years; 2) new social conditions in Iran, the rule of the comprador bourgeoisie, the growth of the proletariat; 3) a study of different political-organizational and ideological stages of development of the OMPI, the 1965-68 and the 1969-70 periods. Three, four appendices titled: an Introduction to the 'Declaration of Unity of Latin American Revolutionary Organizations'; an Introduction to the second edition of 'the Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchov's Revisionism'; the Social Base and the Class Character of the Idealism Existing on our Organization's Outlook'; Idealist Morality and Communist Morality.*

The following text has been translated from the third Persian edition of the *Manifesto*, published November, 1976. The two types of footnotes, those designated by \* at the bottom of pages and those designated by numbers at the end of the text, correspond to the original. Some translator's notes, designated by brackets, have been added in the text.

**Preface to**  
*Manifesto of the Ideological Positions  
of the Organization of Mojahedeen  
of the People of Iran*

## **The Reasons for the Delay in Publication of the Manifesto**

It has been nine months since the decision to write the *Manifesto of the Ideological Positions of the Organization of Mojahedeen of the People of Iran* was made; and even now, five months after we started, it is still not complete. Many things have not been said and there are problems and shortcomings in what has been written. In fact, a document which under normal circumstances would have taken one or two months to assemble and write, has not been finished after several months. What is the reason?

Those who are even remotely involved in the revolutionary struggle of our people in Iran are well aware of what a dangerous, treacherous and bloodthirsty enemy confronts our people and their militant revolutionaries. The dependent bourgeoisie of Iran, headed by the harsh and repressive family oligarchy of the Court and co., is experiencing a cancerous growth and a feverish prosperity. This feverish prosperity is based on their plunder of enormous sources of our national wealth -- especially the savage plunder of billions of dollars of oil revenue -- at the expense of brutal exploitation of the labor of millions of our country's laboring masses, and is maintained through their utilization of the most oppressive atmosphere of repression and terror.

Although this growth and prosperity will soon put a noose of fatal contradictions and crises around the neck of the dependent bourgeoisie -- the present astronomical inflation is just one of its first symptoms -- they have nevertheless enabled it, presently, to carry out its strongest political, military and police repressive measures against revolutionary forces and different classes of people, to suppress more severely than before the spontaneous movement of the middle and lower urban and rural masses and to push back this movement by relying on the regime's economic growth and political-military might, and at the same time to expose the vanguard armed movement to the strongest political obstacles and the most barbaric police and military actions.

Thus the Iranian regime is not, at this stage, a decayed and weak regime or a dying pawn of imperialism, despite all its historical and social decadence (i.e., the historical doom of this system and its lack of a mass base), despite its extremely reactionary intrinsic elements that will rapidly --

much more rapidly than the classical capitalist regimes -- bring its decadence and inherent crises to an explosive level.\* Our revolutionaries are not facing the weakest link in the chain of world imperialism, but one of its strongest links in the region<sup>+</sup>. Such a dominant position allows the enemy to

(\*) The reactionary intrinsic elements of the ruling capitalist system in Iran means:

1) The bourgeoisie in Iran came to power not as a result of a period of progressive struggle against feudalism, but through collusion with feudal forces at the initiative of U.S. Imperialism and under the direct influence of its interests. Today, this bourgeoisie is tied with a thousand strings to the dominant imperialist economy and, therefore, cannot even have the progressive role of a natural and usual capitalist system. Economic development in countries such as Iran is defective, lop-sided and unnatural because basically it is influenced not by internal economic necessities, but rather by the needs of the dominant imperialist economy. Thus in this type of dependent system the movement of the productive forces, which usually grow considerably in the period of capitalism, soon reaches a dead end. These regimes will be more quickly and intensely affected by capitalist crises and their political vulnerability will immensely increase due to their lack of a sound and natural economic base. These regimes rapidly age without a period of youth. For example, if it took 100 to 150 years for the first economic -- and therefore political -- crises of English capitalism, and if English capitalism withstood another 150 years by adopting an imperialist policy before reaching the present decadence and misery, such a fate is well predictable for a regime such as Iran in the next 10, 20 or at most 30 years, even though capitalist rule in Iran is hardly ten or fifteen years old!

2) The existence of a dictatorship which, on the one hand, is essential for the survival of a reactionary system such as Iran and, on the other hand, is a factor contributing to the deepening of social contradictions, rise of revolutionary struggles, and intensification of the critical situation stemming from both the struggle of progressive social forces and internal crises of capitalism.

(+) A glance at the situation in other dominated countries of the region will show Iran's difference with those countries. Today the Iranian regime has attained a dominant position in the region economically, militarily, and therefore politically. Of course one must set the complexity and development of existing revolutionary forces and the political upsurge of the mass movement against this reactionary force -- and they are not comparable with the situation of revolutionary forces and existing conditions in those countries.

deliver its most severe political and propaganda blows and its most savage police and military attacks against revolutionary organizations and groups as long as the broad popular forces have not entered or united in political struggle -- which definitely and principally is armed struggle in Iran. Our organization, too, because it has dealt the most severe and painful political-military blows at the enemy, and because it reflects the most violent aspirations of the laboring masses against the regime, is subjected to its most severe and savage attacks.

This explanation makes clear the difficulties of theoretical work under these horrible conditions -- full of direct and bloody confrontations and without a tranquil day, hour or even moment. During the period that this manifesto was being prepared we were forced, time and again, to burn documents, change places and evacuate houses. On several instances the continuity of its preparation and writing was broken due to more immediate tactical necessities. Some comrades who had carried on the struggle, not only since the beginning of armed struggle but also in all the tumultuous stages of ideological rectification and re-education of the cadres, and who had assumed responsibilities in preparing this manifesto in addition to all the other great responsibilities that they were meeting with unmatched patience and sincerity, either fell in direct confrontations with the enemy, shedding their blood for the cause of people's revolution, or are presently under tortures of the criminal Shah's executioners. These are problems and obstacles which make the delay in publication of this manifesto understandable.

But the subject matter and content of our theoretical works, including those of this manifesto, can definitely not be separated from the conditions and motivations that make struggling against these problems and obstacles, enduring such difficult situations and resisting the most painful incidents, necessary and possible for us. For this reason our principled beliefs, political views, theoretical deductions and analyses and interpretations of conditions, etc., are not categories separate from our lives and practice. The essential quality of these beliefs, views and conclusions is that they stem directly from revolutionary action, from the rich practice and the genuine content of the bloody struggle going on between our people's revolutionary forces and the puppet regime of Iran; the justness and correctness of these theories, views and deductions are immediately tested on the testing ground of revolutionary action. It is precisely this quality -- that they are deduced from the process of revolutionary action and are immediately put at its service -- which distinguishes revolutionary laws and theories from the so-called laws of armchair theorists, and which gives them justness guaranteed by practice.



## Our Aims in Publishing this Manifesto

Why did we write and publish this manifesto under such conditions? Why did we commit ourselves to publish this document among all the existing political and theoretical problems and grant it special priority?

Although ideological problems are always important in all movements and in the final analysis every political-strategic deviation, every tactical or practical mistake, and conversely every correct political guideline and strategic line, or every live tactical initiative is explained by its ideological base, under the present situation in Iran, the importance of ideological problems is not just a corollary of this general law of social struggle. Our society and our people's revolutionary culture and thought are entering one of their most important chapters: the fate of the ideological struggle that has been going on, sometimes weakly, sometimes strongly, among different social forces is at last nearing its outcome and its determining orientation.

This manifesto reflects this ideological struggle in our organization and its outcome. This manifesto shows how we have risen up to struggle against wrong ideas and incorrect styles of work in our organization, how we have been able to establish honesty and a deeper ideological unity in the organization, and how we have been able to reach the truth of Marxism-Leninism in the process of antagonistic struggle against the puppet regime and in the course of the most sincere efforts for resolving the fundamental problems of revolution. The publication of this manifesto shows also our response to the revolutionary duty that commits us to put forth these truths -- truths that have become known to us in the course of two years of relentless ideological struggle, four years of participation in armed struggle, and ten years of experience in underground political work -- to our people and to the progressive and revolutionary forces of our society.

Of course there were many individuals, circles and groups around the armed movement who advised us patronizingly (!) not to fulfill the duty to put forth the new ideological positions of the organization. Assuming the emotions, interests and inclinations of the people to be the same as their own emotions and interests, they admonished us that we would lose the people's support! They told us at least to

refrain from publicly declaring these positions\*, thus recommending compromise in principles. When they saw our steadfastness and solid determination, they easily said that they would stop supporting the organization and the movement! What could be our answer when they wanted us to cover up truth? If we have faith in a certain truth and if we, as revolutionaries, consider our duties to be the enthusiastic defense of this truth and the hard struggle for its propagation and triumph, then why fear putting forth that truth? And what other truth can be compromised? Can the fewness of the people who understand truth and bravely defend it be a reason for shirking this duty? If so, all the truth-seeking fighters, all reformers, all revolutionaries and all prophets throughout history have been mistaken! When the prophet of Islam started his social struggle only two persons followed him, and after three years of persistent work only eight persons believed in him; only a few people mourned Emilio Giordano, the Italian scientist, when he was burned alive for his new scientific ideas.

Thus, not only we could not submit to such shaky and wavering consciences, but we were determined to declare this truth with a resounding cry, even if the echo of our cry was to be our only answer.

## Ideological Struggle and its Different Stages

A little over two years ago, when ideological struggle was put on the agenda of the organization as the main content of the new movement for *reform and education*, nobody thought that the dimensions of this struggle would spread to such an extent and its effects and results would transform all theoretical and practical aspects of our organization so rapidly. During this time we have succeeded in struggling against many wrong viewpoints and many incorrect methods of work, in discovering their ideological origins in the idealism deeply

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(\*) We were confronted with such wise (!) advice not only from religious individuals and circles, but even some "left" groups and circles, though for other reasons, prohibited us from doing this. The main positions of the latter group were important particularly because they advised against our taking a clear and decisive ideological stand and recommended "equivocal" methods. They forgot this basic Marxist-Leninist teaching that "only after clear and decisive class demarcations can one talk about any political tactic," and thus recommended us another kind of compromise in principles.

rooted in the organization's thinking, and in mobilizing the revolutionary forces of the organization for its destruction.

The movement for *reform and education* and re-education of cadres was started from the top down in the organization. The organization's leadership began criticizing itself and initiated a sum-up of the criticisms of previous periods, and the highest cadres were gradually subjected to past and present criticisms. Many cadres reformed their views and habits with revolutionary enthusiasm. Deeper and more revolutionary methods of criticism and self-criticism were introduced in the organization; old and dull criteria were replaced by new ones. Those cadres who were ready to reform and change themselves got the best results from such education by reforming themselves and their views; they became revolutionary reserves of the organization for the continuance and spread of ideological struggle. The die-hards and incorrigibles who persisted in their incorrect and deviationist positions, and who clinging to their personal interests, and thoughts and actions which justified those interests, were not willing to correct their shortcomings and faults despite all the favorable educational conditions, were decisively separated from the organization. All these accomplishments were due to the deep transformations that the principal viewpoints and the world outlook of the organization were undergoing. These transformations, which were precisely products of our understanding of new historical-political-social necessities and the most fundamental interests of the laboring people at any moment, gave us deeper insight into intra-organizational problems and into the class nature of intra-organizational contradictions; they thus allowed us to carry out a more principled and consistent struggle against our own incorrect viewpoints and non-revolutionary habits, which arose from our past petit bourgeois life and beliefs. Reciprocally, this struggle had immediate and important effects on consolidating the revolutionary ideological foundations of our organization and destroying its reactionary foundations.

The conduct of ideological struggle, however, was not confined to the realm of organizational problems and fighting against negative thoughts and habits. This struggle, gradually and in step with its spread, was bringing our fundamental political views and basic philosophical viewpoints under its corrective influence\*. On this basis, we were able to make concrete analyses of the organization's past. We were able to establish a concrete relationship between our political mistakes and educational shortcomings before August, 1971, the

(\*) The process of these transformations will be explained in later sections -- in the chapter about the activities of the organization in 1973-75 period. [not included in this translation -- tr.]

reasons for the August 23, 1971, blow [More than sixty members and sympathizers of the OMPI were arrested on that day. They had been betrayed by a police agent who had come into close contact with the organization -- tr.], and the political-organizational-military weaknesses and shortcomings in the years 1971-73, and to discover their common nature which explained the reasons for them all during eight years of organizational work (1965-73). We were also able to advance our views on the nature of the enemy, on the people's forces, on armed struggle, and to attain new perspectives and wider dimensions of armed struggle.

In mid-autumn, 1974, a year and a half after the start of this struggle, the beginning of a new period of qualitative transformation in ideological struggle was announced by the organization's leadership. This announcement was made official in an article titled *Raise High the Banner of Ideological Struggle* which was published [in the internal bulletin of the OMPI; its full text has not been published outside the OMPI -- tr.] at that time. This article, after summing up the ideological struggle in the past one and a half years, said,

*... a year and a half ago, when we put forth ideological struggle as the main content of our education at this stage, what we had primarily, and in fact solely, on our minds was dealing with those problems and defects that, in our opinion, stemmed directly from our class backgrounds and the organization's intellectual composition, and naturally had evil consequences on our political and organizational work. We intended to start an honest struggle against these defects and their evil consequences.*

*This struggle was started, and it produced considerable positive results. But this struggle, because of its revolutionary character, was not confined to these limits: in its process we succeeded in discovering many of our essential, but superstructural weaknesses -- weaknesses which in fact referred to the nature of our philosophical beliefs. These weaknesses constituted another aspect of our class attachments ... which required much more effort and honesty to understand deeply and radically and to find the correct methods to combat them. These dimensions have now become completely clear for us, so that we can decisively declare the beginning of a new period of qualitative transformation in ideological struggle whose outstanding character is principled struggle against reactionary superstructures and thoughts,*

and against the principles and foundations of non-proletarian ideologies belonging to the decaying classes of society.

*Thus, if until now the organization's advancement and sincerity were predicated on ideological struggle in political-organizational realms, if until now we succeeded in leading the struggle in these dimensions to acceptable victories, today, in such a position of revolutionary consciousness and honesty and organizational solidarity, we will not hesitate for a moment to continue this ideological struggle in all its organizational, political, and now philosophical dimensions ...*

Thus, with the fall of the last bastion of idealism, i.e. its philosophical front, ideological struggle achieved its successful end after two years of patient work in the organization.

## **Oppositions, Problems and Obstacles on our Way**

But we did not travel an easy road to attain these aims and results: in the course of this struggle we were not only under the most severe pressures of the ruling dictatorship, but were also confronted with other pressures from within, from the most reactionary elements, from die-hards who were in no way willing to understand new revolutionary necessities. In fact, we had to struggle in two fronts: one outside the organization against the ruling regime, and the other inside the organization against the political-organizational-philosophical idealism existing in our thought and ideology. We also had to bear counter-revolutionary pressures from two sides.

Although on the first front the revolutionary activities of the organization, in different forms of military action, political work and propaganda against the puppet regime of the traitor Shah, gained new heights and a more correct direction, the struggle on the second front took much more energy, especially because it was a great deal more sensitive and contained many more complex political-organizational elements (relative to the struggle against the regime), and because it was our first experience in this field of struggle. The problem, furthermore, was not just starting the intra-

organizational struggle but, more importantly, assuring its correct and sound guidance and leadership in the direction of the main targets at every stage, so as to avoid left or right deviations.

For these reasons, although the political content, and therefore the method of our intra-organizational struggle was fundamentally and basically different from the content and method of struggle against the regime, the problems and obstacles in its way -- that is, the problems and obstacles we faced in the internal front -- were not simpler, less dangerous and smaller than those of the external front; they were far more complex, dangerous and great. Later experiences also showed that the importance we initially attached to this struggle was in no way out of proportion, since ultimately our survival or destruction depended on the outcome of this internal struggle\*.

Thus it becomes clear that at every stage of the ideological struggle we confronted certain reactionary resistances which, in fact, reflected the antithesis to the aims of that stage of the ideological struggle. The number of individuals in whose views these resistances crystallized was not great -- perhaps not more than five at each stage. Nevertheless, this problem was serious because of, on the one hand, the potential for the spread and development of this opposition and, on the other hand, the obstinate nature of these resistances, which resembled that of a chronic disease.

As we said before, we overcame many of these deviations and reactionary oppositions through a patient, long-term and fundamental policy of *reform and education*, which took its appropriate and necessary form according to the requirements of each case<sup>+</sup>. But a few cases remained, the most dishonest,

(\*) Overall, during the two years of ideological struggle, about 50% of the cadres were expelled and many cadres were stripped of responsible positions until gaining necessary qualifications.

(+) Our methods consisted of: discussion and persuasion in the course of explanation and education, together with the summing up of the person's self-criticisms, or criticisms of the organization's past which were done with the help of the person's organizational superior but mainly by the person himself/herself; discovering their causes and roots and ways of fighting them; criticizing the political-organizational and philosophical idealism of the organization's past and pointing out its negative consequences in particular cases; living and working among the masses and concretely analyzing the people's living conditions, their sufferings and their demands, their economic, political and ideological motives, etc.

incorrigible and careerist elements. They pretended to be ready to criticize themselves, reform and change, but were in secret plotting against the existence of the organization, against all the achievements that our people have gained at the expense of hundreds of genuine and militant fighters. What deluded us for a period from the treacherous positions of these four or five individuals was the confidence we still had in them as comrades who had principal weaknesses but were ready to overcome them.

At the head of these four or five elements was Traitor #1. For a long time he had covered his real, reactionary face on account of certain incorrect criteria in the organization and had thus succeeded in attaining certain responsibilities in the organization. But despite all the years that he had covered up his real self and his unsound motives, and despite all his desperate efforts to escape criticism, he finally felt the sharp edge of ideological struggle against his deep ideological weaknesses and shortcomings. In words, he accepted the criticisms and even wrote analyses of his unsound motives and deep weaknesses; he was thus stripped of all responsibilities and was sent to mass work. But in reality, not only he did not want to struggle against his deep ideological weaknesses and shortcomings and unsound motives -- which had been brought out into the open during months of explanatory work -- but with the worst treacherous methods, he was waiting for the opportune moment to deliver a blow at the organization and to deviate its revolutionary course.

Such a moment finally arrived. In early winter of 1975 the enemy started an extensive campaign of nightly house searches and thus subjected the revolutionary organizations, and even ordinary people, to a new form of its most savage counter-revolutionary attacks. This situation called for greater time to be spent in confronting this form of night raids, which were continued regularly by the police. So for a period the control over some wavering elements, including Traitor #1, slackened. He, who like a snake injured by the sharp sword of ideological struggle had until then hidden his poisonous stings behind dozens of self-criticisms, etc., suddenly began to move. He contacted several wavering members as well as individuals expelled from the organization at the early stages of the ideological struggle and attempted to cajole them into forming a clique. He also contacted many marginal elements, inexperienced and naive individuals only to make them hate the struggle and thus prevent them from cooperating with and supporting our organization. He even dispersed persons who wanted to intensify their revolutionary struggle by pessimistic and negative advice, without suggesting to them an alternative way of struggle!

Finally after four months of treacherous conspiracy against the organization, he succeeded in attracting two

persons, one of whom (Traitor #3) had been expelled from the organization and the other (Traitor #2) was at the stage of criticism, and to partially attract a third person (1). These elements had been criticized for their deep ideological weaknesses, for their egoistic motives and negative petit bourgeois characteristics, and while a great deal of their concrete practice and its negative consequences in the organization were known to us, and they had criticized themselves time and again for them, they now shamelessly pretended to the naive and uninformed individuals on the periphery of the movement that their differences with the organization were philosophical because the organization had Marxist-Leninist positions and they believed in religion. But the existence of many honest religious persons<sup>\*</sup>, who cooperate with us while freely preserving their own principled convictions, exposed their shameless lie. Anyway, they could not stab us in the back for long. They were soon exposed, and their treasons in the previous four months were unveiled. The organization condemned Traitor #1 and Traitor #2 to death. With the execution of Traitor #1 he received what he deserved for his treasons, while Traitor #2 succeeded in escaping execution, but was caught by the police (2). The arrest of another expelled member of the group (renegade traitor Khalil Dezfooli)<sup>+</sup>, who had

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(\*) Generally, a criticism is meaningful only in the framework of the principles of the person, group or organization involved. Therefore, one can never ask a person believing in religion why he/she believes in such a supernatural force or in angels and demons, or why he/she carries out certain directives without any reason or consequence. Because these actions and beliefs are manifestations, necessary and logical consequences of those principles; without negating those principles, one cannot criticize their manifestations and consequences. But one can ask this same person why, in the framework of those same principles, he/she does not carry out his/her other tasks like fighting to destroy oppression, inequality, corruption, and to establish justice, etc. (within the religious interpretation of these phenomena).

(+) Renegade traitor Khalil Dezfooli was one of those elements who pretended to agree with the course of the ideological struggle and even its principled results. But in practice he was not willing to change himself and his deep motivational weaknesses in accordance with the content and ramifications of the ideological struggle. After several stages of criticism, and after his organizational position was changed several times because of dishonesty and personal complexes arising from a corruption-infested life, which he was not able to reform, he was at last sent to work as a worker. Contrary to the lies of the infamous SAVAK of the traitor Shah, he did not surrender. He was arrested on April 23 [1975 -- tr.] in

been sent to work as a worker, gave the enemy a suitable opportunity to arrest some of our comrades with the help of the information they had gained and with the direct cooperation of Khalil, and to intensify the savage political and propaganda attacks against our organization and the armed movement\* and in this way deliver relatively important blows at the movement and our organization†.

front of the Central Store (Sepah avenue) [in Tehran -- tr.]. After enduring a period of torture, he finally gave up and, on account of his internal and chronic weakness and wavering, was turned into a pitiable and weak pawn in the hands of the Shah's mercenary police and committed the most shameful treasons. To inform the revolutionary forces and to heighten their political-organizational experience, we will soon publish the analysis and self-criticism that this renegade traitor wrote recently after the conclusions resulting from his one year of education. He is now extensively cooperating with the police. The enemy drives him around the city in its patrol cars (unmarked cars or those that look like taxis) to identify and arrest those of our comrades whom he knows. Comrade Vahid Afrakhteh and comrade Mohsen Khamooshi were both arrested in this way. Vahid left his safe house at 3:30 and had an appointment with Mohsen Khamooshi at 4 o'clock, and Mohsen had appointments at 2 and 3:30 which were carried out with no incident. Thus it becomes clear that these two comrades were pointed out to the police by Khalil (who knew Vahid) at their appointment, and this led to a confrontation with the police and the arrest or martyrdom of Vahid and the arrest of Mohsen, who was not armed.

(\*) In previous editions of the *Manifesto*, based on initial information and the available indications, we had said that Morteza Samadiyeh Labbaf has actively cooperated with the police. Later news and information that we have obtained show that this assertion has been incorrect, and we have thus corrected it in this edition.

(+) The fact that we were attacked more savagely than before by the enemy, and that it viciously slandered us is not unnatural, and is not a bad thing in itself! It shows that we have aimed our political-military-propaganda blows right at its heart, and that the road which we have chosen is exactly the one at the end of which the enemy sees its own annihilation and defeat. An important point in the infamous propaganda of the enemy against us was that the schemers behind its propaganda policy refrained from mentioning the Marxist-Leninist positions of our organization. The enemy knew about our new ideological positions through the documents and information it had obtained, including our organization's recent leaflets.



These were some of the roadblocks, obstacles, and sharp, poisonous thorns along the road of *liquidation and ideological rectification of the organization*. Travelling this road, there were many fair-weather friends who stopped half-way along the way and gave up the heavy burden of responsibility, and this increased the burden on those who continued, if no task were to be left unattended. Even worse were those who spitefully stabbed us in the back! Thus we travelled no easy road, and to reach such a destination, we paid no small price. Even the blow that the enemy delivered at us at the end of this road was in fact the continuation of those same oppositions, obstacles and dangers. This blow was possible only on account of the weaknesses and selling out of those elements, and their last treacherous and moribund attempts to destroy all the political-ideological achievements of our organization.

But if the road was dangerous and obstacles numerous, the eagerness to reach the new ideological unity made it easy to bear. Now the greater part of these crises are behind us, and our organization, with positions ever more solid and impregnable, positions which are now based on the scientific philosophy and thought of Marxism-Leninism, is resolutely moving forward.

## The People's Revolutionary Movement and its Most Urgent Problems at this Stage

The publication of this *Manifesto of the Ideological Positions of the OMPI* gives us a suitable opportunity to start a dialogue on some of the most urgent strategic problems of Iran's revolutionary movement with the revolutionary and progressive forces of our country and with all those who understand the necessity of struggling against such an aggressive ruling system -- the puppet regime of the traitor Shah. The proper place for this dialogue is definitely not in the preface to the *Manifesto*, but rather at its conclusion, after the brief sum up that we intended to do of the more than four years of armed struggle and the previous activities and future tasks of the vanguard organizations. But since the publication of the upcoming parts of the *Manifesto* will require some time, and bringing up these problems would have been postponed till

Yet for several reasons, including its fear of propagation of this ideology and its possible effects on revolutionary groups and elements, it preferred to attack our previous ideological positions.

then, and because of the urgency of these problems -- especially their immediate practical consequences -- we have decided to discuss them, though very concisely, in this preface.

The question may be raised, "why is it necessary to discuss these problems in an ideological manifesto?" We must respond that conditions necessitate discussing these problems immediately, and in addition we must point out that our organization's joining the Marxist-Leninist forces of society produces changes in the balance of the popular forces of the movement, which definitely provide new political prospects and affect the future formation of the society's revolutionary groups.

This can explain the pertinence of these questions to the main content of this pamphlet. Especially when it is noted that discussing these questions can potentially have concrete, actual consequences in the direction of a deeper unity of the society's revolutionary forces -- if the organizations representing these forces show the necessary readiness -- then there remain no obstacles whatsoever to our discussion of these questions in this *Manifesto*.

## Conditions of the Battle Front

What are the conditions of the forces inside the battle front? What does the balance sheet of the vanguard armed struggle show four years after its inception? Do we see any positive items in it? What are the most fundamental problems currently facing the armed movement? What solutions have been thought of to solve them? How does one see the prospects of the armed movement and the movement's organizations?

These and similar questions are today weighing on the minds of many people who are observing the battleground of the people's vanguard forces and the enemy, or are themselves, in one way or the other, involved in the battle. Of course, there are clear general answers. But we intend to enter the details of the problem.

Today, even the most prejudiced initial opponents of the line of armed struggle cannot deny its achievements: that the armed movement of the recent years has had tremendous effects in releasing the revolutionary forces of society, and bringing to the fore the latent revolutionary capabilities of various classes of people and directing them toward political and even military struggle against the enemy; that despite its very short life, it has had very great effects in heightening

the political consciousness of vast sections of our popular classes -- an effect incomparable with any other period of struggle since the oil nationalization movement of the late 1940's and early 50's -- and that the vanguard armed movement has attracted the support of sections of the popular classes, especially the intelligentsia and different sections of the urban petit bourgeoisie. Many of these opponents who at the beginning criticized the line of vanguard armed struggle as "revolutionary romanticism" and the armed revolutionary organizations as the "harsh rebellion of emotional intellectuals" or the "spontaneous and outraged resistance of the petit bourgeoisie," etc., in the not too distant past, have been forced to think for a moment and see, in reality, who -- we or they -- have been able to honestly act on their convictions, not fear sacrifices, overcome obstacles by resistance and determination, and produce important and even decisive effects on the political-social and even economic aspects of society for the benefit of the people and the growth of revolutionary forces, and still survive and continue.

Looking to the other side of the battle lines, the fact that now the puppet regime of the criminal Shah, by daily intensifying its dictatorship, persecutes even the liberal reformers and harmless national reformists; and that today the Shah's autocratic and fascist system cannot tolerate any opposition, even non-violent and peaceful; and that even the most wavering national elements can have almost no doubt about the necessity of joining the ranks of the armed movement, all these are solid indications of the correctness of our initial strategic orientation and our continuing armed struggle up to the present. What other road could our people take that, since the start of the vanguard armed movement till now, would not have encountered dead ends and crises? Yet the armed movement, despite all the complex problems it is facing, has broad and exciting prospects that herald a very bright future for it.

These are achievements that by themselves can show a positive balance for the armed movement despite all the tormenting blows that our organizations and revolutionaries have received from the enemy.

With this explanation, the problems, obstacles and shortcomings facing us today have not arisen from our revolutionary practice; rather it is precisely our revolutionary practice which has allowed us to understand the problems and difficulties of a more advanced stage of struggle. Had we not travelled this road, we would be facing problems far more elementary and backward, which, considering our lack of experience and primitive knowledge at that stage, would appear as important and complex as our problems today. Thus the problems and obstacles of a more advanced stage of armed struggle by no means negate its previous stages; rather, their appreciation itself affirms the correctness of the road travelled.

We have said that we are here concerned with those other aspects of armed struggle, its present and future problems and obstacles, and at the same time its great prospects. We want to show that the theory of armed struggle and the vanguard armed practice, like any other live and dynamic theory and like any correct revolutionary practice, are not relevant only in a fixed sphere, are not static and separate from all the phenomena and changes in process around them. This theory and practice do not separate themselves from those social phenomena which are not immediately affected by armed struggle; rather, they must, and are able to, establish a creative and dynamic relation with all those phenomena, in all political-social and cultural aspects. This means that current interpretations of armed struggle definitely cannot and must not be the same as the limited interpretations of four or five years ago when the first armed clashes occurred between the people's revolutionary forces and the enemy. These interpretations must now be far more advanced and developed, and must take into account new dimensions. This can very well be seen in our own organization. During this period we understood new dimensions and much broader meanings of armed struggle of which confronting the enemy is only one dimension. The complexities of the relation between various popular classes and the armed movement, their tangible and short term or long term interests and demands and their relation with the short term or long term aims of armed struggle, the complexities of the relations between the revolutionary and progressive forces of the whole revolutionary movement (both armed and non-armed), the effects that different elements of this set take from each other, and the positions that these forces take -- or must take -- towards each other and also against the enemy, etc., are other dimensions of struggle that today no genuine fighter in the battlefield, on any front and with any weapon, can disregard. For these reasons, and because these questions have so far been neglected, we shall briefly take up two questions: the relation between the armed movement and various popular classes, and the relations among the progressive and revolutionary forces of the movement. This can only be a beginning for more all-around discussions that must be continued both by us and by other militant elements and groups.

## **What are the Relations Between the Vanguard Armed Movement and the Different Popular Classes?**

In a preliminary classification we can distinguish these classes: the working class; the urban petit bourgeoisie consisting of two main sections, traditional and non-traditional -- the traditional section composed of urban craftsmen, small

merchants, young students of religion, that part of the clergy which is not dependent on the ruling class, and the remaining isolated elements of the national bourgeoisie who are politically tied to petit bourgeoisie, and the non-traditional section composed of students, university and non-university intellectuals, white-collar workers, lower and middle government employees, technocrats, etc.; and the peasantry composed of petty land-owners, poor peasants and agricultural workers (landless peasants).

Much experience as well as objective indications show that the vanguard armed movement has so far been able to establish solid and mutual relations with two strata of the traditional and non-traditional petit bourgeoisie. These two strata are: 1) the students and the university, and sometimes non-university intellectuals, and 2) the middle and lower elements of the urban petit bourgeoisie and the left wing of the clergy who are economically underprivileged (young students of religion and non-dependent clergy). These strata have so far been among the principal supporters of the vanguard armed movement. A glance at the class origin\* of those who have been martyred in the course of the armed movement in the past few years, or those who are now under torture in the enemy's prisons is enough to prove this claim.

This does not mean that there have not been any worker or peasant elements in the armed movement; rather, it means that the armed movement has so far and in the main been able to come into contact with the spontaneous class movement of the intelligentsia and the lower and middle strata of the traditional urban petit bourgeoisie. At the same time, the number of elements who have joined the armed movement with working class origin or even as workers is not small. However, the difference between these workers and the intellectuals is that the worker who joins the armed movement does so not in the course of the practice of his/her and his/her class's spontaneous movement, nor in the process of growth, development and elevation of this movement to the level of armed struggle; rather, he/she is subjected to political conscious-

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(\* ) As you can see, we are talking about the class origin, not the present class nature of these elements. It is obvious that a revolutionary intellectual, for instance, who is of petit bourgeois origin, will not remain a petit bourgeois for ever; rather, he/she can, through participating in revolutionary practice, change his/her old class position in the interest of the position of the laboring masses. Similarly, it is the class content of the political-social aims of the revolutionary organizations or persons affiliated with them which can determine the class nature of these organizations or persons, and not necessarily the initial class origins of those individuals.

ness and education through ways other than the general movement of his/her class, and he/she joins the armed movement as an intellectual (we will discuss this point further). In contrast, the intellectual is naturally attracted to the revolutionary movement in the course of participating in the practice of his/her own class struggle -- e.g., in the process of limited syndicalist-political university struggles, in the form of student strikes and demonstrations, and putting forth concrete and democratic demands. The natural development and logical direction of the struggle of his/her own stratum and class which, on the one hand, has a highly democratic content and, on the other hand, faces the most severe resistance of the ruling dictatorship, quickly leads to the only possible form of struggle, i.e., underground, and the only appropriate content against such a repressive system, i.e., armed violence. Similarly for the left elements of the traditional petit bourgeoisie the same process, though with other motives, leads to the same result. On the one hand, the traditional petit bourgeoisie feels the most severe and crushing economic-political and cultural pressures of the comprador bourgeoisie, and on the other hand, no other form of struggle -- except an armed, violent resistance -- can express the content of its angry rebellion and resistance against a system which is determined to destroy it (the fact that the petit bourgeoisie sees its destruction and annihilation in the growth of this system has a great influence in the formation of its political ideas and the content and form of its struggle). (Note that Iran's traditional petit bourgeoisie enjoys a continuous history of struggle since the Constitutional Movement [1900's -- tr.] which overall has provided it with strong militant traditions and relative political consciousness. The imprint of these traditions -- i.e., being anti-regime, which of course conforms to the interests of the traditional petit bourgeoisie -- and consciousness are visible in its current struggle too.)

Thus it is seen that the vanguard armed movement immediately, in its first steps approaches the most immediate and palpable tendencies of the intelligentsia (the democratic aims of the vanguard armed struggle) and the interests and political ideas of the traditional petit bourgeoisie (the violent form of struggle against the ruling regime), and reciprocally, these two strata show their active support to and association with the armed movement and are turned into the first reserves of the movement.

But the aims of the vanguard armed movement are certainly not limited to attracting the support and cooperation of these strata which comprise a very small section of the popular forces, especially because the support and cooperation of these forces and their relation with the armed movement are always conditional and vulnerable due to reasons stemming from their wavering class nature and their non-proletarian inter-

pretations of armed struggle\*. In fact, except for those few elements of the intelligentsia (and those much fewer elements of the petit bourgeoisie) who can break class fetters and completely assimilate in the essentially socialist aims of the armed movement, the rest, who comprise a great majority, advance only to the extent of democratic demands and their own limited class interests (and necessarily bear the pressures of revolutionary struggle not to the extent of a proletarian struggle, but only to the extent of their own demands and interests). Thus, gradually and with the increase and intensification of the enemy's counter-revolutionary violence, these forces will either leave the ranks of the movement or force the movement into the dead end of their deviationist tendencies.

Consequently, the vanguard armed organizations must fundamentally base themselves neither on the intelligentsia whose feelings are hurt by the existing dictatorship, nor on the angry rebellion of the left petit bourgeoisie in the face of the ruling class' annihilating offensive, but rather on the shoulders of the oppressed masses and laboring classes whom the regime has no possibility of compromising and separating from the revolutionary movement. Although these classes have a much lower level of consciousness relative to the middle classes, as soon as they are infused with revolutionary theory and as soon as they recognize their fundamental interests in the political aims of the revolutionary movement, they are transformed into great impregnable bastions of revolutionary forces which guarantee the irreversible victory of revolution. In fact it is the ability of the movement to attract the support of these classes and bring out the changing balance of forces in the interest of revolution which can shatter the internal hesitation and wavering of the middle strata and secure their active support and continuous cooperation.

After these preliminaries, it is now necessary to turn to the relations between the vanguard armed movement and these classes (workers and peasants). But before that, we should briefly discuss the social-political and cultural condition of the working class.

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(\*) Refer to introduction to the "Declaration of Unity of Latin American Revolutionary Organizations" and introduction to "Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchov's Revisionism", by the OMPI, appendixes 1 and 2 to this Manifesto. [not included in this translation -- tr.]



## The General Condition of the Working Class

Our experiences and objective observations, which are the result of some of our comrades' several years of work and close contact in factories and some worker circles, clearly show that Iran's working class is still at its beginning stages of class consciousness and trade-unionist/economic struggle. The most advanced workers are involved only in the context of economic demands, and that in a limited way. Aside from two exceptional forms encompassing a very small minority of workers, political consciousness is almost non-existent. The first exceptional form of political consciousness among the working class is that of those older workers who participated in the trade-unionist/political activities in the 1940's. Although this group of workers sometimes talk about communist ideals, they generally do not have a clear or sometimes even elementary concept of communism. Socialist consciousness exists among this group generally not in its revolutionary and principled reality, but in corrupt economist or revisionist forms; as such, this can be viewed as another example of the subversion of the Tudeh Party's leadership in Iran's national movement, and in this case the workers' movement of Iran\*. At any rate, among this group of workers who are now mostly skilled and specialized workers or technicians, many have

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(\*) The fervent and extensive trade-unionist/economic struggles of workers in the 1941-1953 period were led by the Central Council of Workers' and Toilers' Unions. But the members of this council who were loyal to the working class and its aspirations, were under the supervision of the Tudeh Party and its corrupt leadership. The Tudeh Party's leadership was unable to utilize the revolutionary capabilities of that period and the vast potential and actual abilities of the workers for real political organizing in the workers' movement. On the one hand, it deviated the workers' movement through dissemination of deviationist political ideas (such as opposition to Mossadegh's anti-imperialist policies and putting forth the reactionary slogan of 'nationalization of oil in Southern Iran' against the slogan of 'nationalization of oil', which played directly into the hands of the imperialism), and, on the other hand, it opposed in practice the progress of the movement by its own capitulationist actions toward the working class (such as participation in Ghavam's cabinet, and breaking the famous strike of the oil company workers by dispatching several leaders of the Tudeh Party to the site of the strike!).

still preserved their militant spirit despite years of political stagnation. If given political re-education, they can play a leading role in Iran's workers' struggles.

The second exceptional form of political consciousness among workers is petit bourgeois political consciousness. It is generally in the form of semi-religious, semi-political circles and is relatively more widespread than the first form. This form of consciousness enters the working class through two channels. One, through elements of the urban petit bourgeoisie who have been forced by capital into the working class, and two, through religious circles which although composed of workers, are headed by a mullah or other traditional petit bourgeois element. Workers engaged in such religious circles are generally influenced by the political tendencies of the petit bourgeoisie. At the first encounter with such workers, a person unfamiliar with the conditions of Iranian workers may be taken by surprise at their level of consciousness and their anti-regime spirit. And yet such workers sometimes have not had the experience of even one strike or other trade-unionist/economic struggle! In fact, those workers under the cultural-political influence of the petit bourgeoisie do not understand their real contradictions with the ruling class. Thus their sentiments and political ideas do not express their most fundamental class interests; rather, because of their tailing of the petit bourgeoisie, their political consciousness is explainable in the framework of the petit bourgeoisie's contradictions with the regime. For these reasons their motives are mainly their opposition to the decadent manifestations of the ruling class' culture, and their super-structural anti-corruption convictions, etc., and not their own mode of life and the political-economic demands related to their own class interests\*. Thus the influence of this consciousness, which is based not on the main interests of the working class but on the limited interests and ideology of the petit bourgeoisie, neglects the main contradiction of the working class with capitalism and hinders the influence and consolidation of

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(\*) It must be noted that when this petit bourgeois political consciousness enters into other relations of production and into the life of the proletariat, it is immediately influenced by them, and the proletariat tries to transform this consciousness in accordance with its own interests and daily life problems. For instance, in one of those semi-political, semi-religious circles whose members were mainly new and young workers, a worker asked the leader of the meeting -- an old but poor and toiling mullah -- "do we have the right to confiscate the factory-owner's property? And, for example, take some of the factory's products for ourselves?" The old clergyman hesitantly tried to answer when the same person asked again "is it not true that their wealth and capital is the fruit of our labor? Then why shouldn't we do this?" This broke the mullah's doubt and he nodded that it was O.K. to do this.

genuine socialist consciousness among the working class, damaging its real, long term struggle. From this viewpoint, it definitely cannot be considered a positive phenomenon.

But putting aside these two exceptions -- and neither reflects the mainstream of the working class -- Iran's working class is young, new, and in fact evolving. Of course, it is true that it is over 60-70 years since the introduction of industry and the formation of the working class in nucleus and that except for periodic declines, the very fervent trade-unionist/economic/political struggles of this class have consistently continued since then (refer to the history of Iran's workers' movement by groups abroad, and also to reports on Iran's workers' movement by the OMPI [*these documents are not yet available in English -- tr.*]). But this class has increasingly grown and has turned into the *decisive* and *main* force in production, and inevitably in politics, essentially because of the developments of the past few years and the astronomical growth of Iran's dependent bourgeoisie. Iran's working class is no longer just the static and secondary class of the dependent feudalism period; rather, it is a growing class which is rapidly gaining a completely dominant and decisive role in Iran's economic and political life. Thus Iran's working class, with the great army of peasants-turned-workers, small craftsmen, and petit bourgeois and lumpens who have been forced by capital into wage slavery, is a class in the process of formation and evolution. It has just started its quantitative and qualitative development and is a long way from complete homogeneity, suitable organization and gaining trade-unionist/political experience and complexity (3). Of course, these are not eternal conditions for the working class and, as we said before, its forward movement rapidly and increasingly puts it in a more decisive position relative to other productive and political forces in society. Parallel to this development, the spontaneous movement of the working class develops independently of any will, in connection with the inevitable internal contradictions of Iran's ruling capitalism, and as a result of particular infrastructural necessities. Thus the fundamental question is: while the workers' movement exists, and its important historical characteristics and present particularities are clear to us, what are the revolutionary movement's main tasks and those of this stage regarding the workers' movement?

## The Relation Between the Revolutionary Movement of Iran and the Spontaneous Movement of the Working Class

It is obvious that the main task of a revolutionary (especially communist) movement regarding the proletariat's spontaneous movement is, in general terms, *introducing* political (especially socialist) consciousness into the workers' spontaneous movement, elevating and organizing this spontaneous struggle to the level of an all-around political-military struggle against the ruling class, to smash the bourgeoisie's political-military-economic machine, and establishing the rule of the proletariat. But this is a very general task and the particular conditions of our country call for a specific mode of work appropriate for these conditions. So the whole question is how to carry out this process in the particular conditions of Iran. *How* and by *what means* is a weak, heterogeneous and unorganized movement which is still at its most elementary stages -- posing backward trade-unionist/economic demands -- to reach that level of all-around political understanding which is necessary for mobilization around political-military struggle against the ruling regime (or mobilization around armed struggle) and advancement under completely political slogans and goals?

But this fundamental and decisive question will be misleading if all the problems in carrying out this task are blamed on the workers' movement and its being backward, apolitical and limited. And this is an unsound tendency among many intellectuals. But what is the real problem? The fact is that the problem and the roots of the shortcomings should be sought not in the spontaneous movement but rather in the revolutionary movement.

If the spontaneous movement is at a low level, if it is backward and of limited scope, if it is not political, etc., it can only increase the responsibilities of conscious revolutionaries. Thus all the problems hinge on this question: what are the conditions of our revolutionary movement in its totality? What are our revolutionaries in the cities, the countryside, factories, abroad, etc., doing now? We especially mean the Marxist-Leninists, who carry the main responsibilities in this regard. A brief look at the present conditions reveals very bitter realities.

## Internal Conditions of the Movement

Iranian communists are in very bad conditions today not only because they face the worst kind of persecution, torture and execution, but even more because they are inflicted with the worst form of disunity and factionalism. Group worship, group prejudices, anti-unity and departmentalist factionalism severely threaten Iran's communist movement. A consequence of such fatal tendencies is the great dispersion and primitiveness with which the communist groups (and following them, the non-communist revolutionary groups) are inflicted. The two main groups of communists, sometimes known as believers in the line of armed struggle and believers in the line of political work (regardless of other, less important divisions), have no unity with each other or even among themselves. The revolutionary groups and organizations inside Iran (believers in the line of armed struggle and the rest) on the one hand, and the revolutionary groups and elements of society on the other, each go their own way. Under such circumstances Iran's revolutionary movement, headed by Iran's communist movement, is in the worst condition of dispersion and disunity. And the enemy, its forces at the highest form of unity and concentration, utilizes this situation and delivers its most fatal blows at the scattered forces of the movement. Primitiveness is rampant in its various forms: from printing books and publishing newspapers to small study groups and political, even military, circles. And none of them is coordinated in a specific political framework and in a specific organizational relation. So far no unity has been achieved even between the two main urban armed groups, ourselves and the *People's Fedayee comrades [the Organization of the Iranian People's Fedayee Guerrillas -- tr.]*.

Now it should be asked why the activities of all our revolutionaries, or at least a majority of them, should not be organized in a single political-organizational framework? Why has no relation so far been established between the scattered groups of revolutionaries -- revolutionaries whose sincerity and honesty no one can doubt? Between this militant armed group which with greatest conviction is fighting the armed-to-the-teeth enemy to the last drop of its blood in the distant villages, and that militant urban guerilla who under the harshest conditions is honestly engaged in armed propaganda, and this honest group which is doing political work among the toiling classes, and that circle which is persistently publishing and distributing revolutionary literature? Who can be responsible for such dispersion except ourselves? Are the facts not enough to make us think? -- The facts that our revolutionary movement is in the worst state of disunity and dis-

persion, and our revolutionaries -- militant groups and forces -- have not been organized around a general political line in even a broad organizational framework, and that the historical conditions and the growth and development of our revolutionary movement have made clear the necessity of the unity of revolutionary forces more than ever before. Is the present state of our movement not disturbing -- while maximum potential exists in the spontaneous struggle of the masses? Are our communists and other genuine revolutionaries not losing the best revolutionary conditions by their disunity and dispersion? Who, which group or organization, can, or wants to, solve the problems of the revolutionary movement by itself? Which group or organization can, or wants to, deal with all the social questions and all the problems relating to the struggle of the various popular classes by itself? Can the problems which the individual groups are facing -- with regard to such complex problems as how to deal with the struggle of various popular classes, how to contact their spontaneous movements, how to orient the organization towards the masses, how to define its general tasks and the tasks of this stage, etc., especially the problems which the vanguard armed organizations are now facing due to the growth and development of the armed movement which may not yet be concretely tangible for some other groups -- can all these problems be solved by each group independently, divorced from other popular revolutionary forces?

Today many questions are facing us and perhaps the vanguard armed movement as a whole. Questions such as what long term slogans and what immediate slogans to raise for the workers' movement? Or what tactics should the vanguard armed movement adopt at this stage regarding the workers' movement to approach its interests? How to link up with that movement? But would it not be wrong for us, as a part of the armed movement and still a smaller part of the people's revolutionary movement, to think about these problems in abstract from the tasks of the revolutionary movement as a whole and its other forces? And attempt to deal with and solve these problems independently?

Of course we have thought about solutions to these problems; we have ideas and practical measures in mind, and we may not have hesitated in implementing what we think is correct. But these solutions can definitely not be separate from the task of uniting the revolutionary forces, from the struggle to overcome the disunity and dispersion in Iran's communist movement. Is an individualist or sectarian attitude and style of work a communist attitude and style of work? Is an individualist approach to such problems -- especially at such a stage in the development of revolutionary forces and readiness of social conditions -- anything but a new kind of primitiveness which increasingly wastes the movement's forces? Is neglecting other parts of the revolutionary movement, disregard-

ing the great forces that they have and the appropriate place that they can find in a conscious organization of the movement's forces (not the present spontaneous organization) not a sectarian tendency in the revolutionary movement? And finally is it not true that the groups' solution can be effective in solving the movement's general problems, and the problems of each class' spontaneous movement in relation with the revolutionary movement, only when they are implemented around a general political line and in a specific organizational framework and in the course of a deep and principled ideological struggle within that framework? In the next section we will show how this is possible.

Therefore, we must say that the present problems and difficulties of the groups and organizations, *those concerning the relations between the revolutionary movement (both armed struggle and other political-revolutionary activities) and various popular classes, depend on the problems and difficulties concerning the relations amongst the various revolutionary and progressive popular forces.* This is true not only of the relations between the revolutionary groups and organizations and the struggles of the urban masses, but also, and more emphatically, can be generalized completely to the present problems and shortcomings in the relations between the revolutionary movement and the struggle of the toiling masses in the countryside. For more complete conclusions we can look briefly at the present condition of the rural movements.

## **A Brief Look at Iran's Rural Movements\* and Their Relation to the Revolutionary Movement**

More than ever before, the toiling rural masses are showing their readiness for struggle -- and that at its most acute form, armed resistance. A study of this question is outside the scope of the present discussion. In addition, there have been many militant groups and organizations in recent years which have engaged in armed actions in different places in Iran's countryside. With no relation or coordination between these forces and the urban armed organizations or other sections of the revolutionary movement, these forces, unfor-

(\*) Our aim here is neither a detailed study and analysis of the conditions of Iran's countryside, nor a study of the class structure or the political and economic tendencies of the peasantry, nor a study of the contents and aims of the rural movements. Rather, as the above heading shows, we take only a brief look into the general condition of these movements and their relation with the revolutionary movement as a whole.

tunately, either have been destroyed or still do not have any relation with each other or other parts of the movement. The Kurdish people's armed movement, despite the severe defeats and blows it has received, lives on in the form of armed resistance, offensives by groups, and scattered military nuclei in the mountains of Baneh, Sanandaj and elsewhere, and more importantly, it lives in the spirit of Kurdish fighters and toilers. Iran's countryside in general and this area in particular -- because of its long history of struggle, the aggravation of the regime's contradictions, and the presence of the Kurdish Democratic Party -- are still very important centers of revolutionary fire and are powder kegs about to explode. The Baluchi people's movement (in Iran, Pakistan and the Gulf area) has threatened the interests of world imperialism in one of the most sensitive strategic areas (Baluchistan) in the whole region. The puppet regime of the traitor Shah -- hand in hand with other servants of imperialism in Pakistan -- while engaging in savage repressive actions against this movement, is covering it up with a conspiracy of silence.

The Iranian Arab people's movement, which is supported by the tent-dwellers and the oppressed people of the desert tribes and the coasts, has for years been engaged in a bloody struggle against Iran's ruling class colonialists (Although these movements may have deviations in their political aims, the main content of their struggle is revolutionary. It is the duty of conscious revolutionaries to responsibly deal with the deviations in their political aims, which are mainly due to the lack of political education.)

Last year there were new revolutionary moves in the mountains around Boroujerd and the sensitive area of Lorestan. This movement could come into contact with the urban revolutionaries and the urban armed movement on the one hand, and, by crossing the mountains between Lorestan and Kurdistan, with the Kurdish movement on the other. After a series of extensive repressive actions by the regime and after the guerilla nuclei were heavily surrounded, we have not received any news from them (the group is known as *Dr. Azami's Group*).

And this year there are unconfirmed reports from Azarbaijan. In addition, the scattered, limited and sometimes armed spontaneous resistance actions of the villagers continuously goes on (The last such case was the storming of the city of Roodsar by the villagers and rice-growers of some villages around that city. They surrounded Roodsar's county government office and demanded the removal of the county governor and went so far as to attempt to kill him. Their bloody confrontation with the police forces -- in which one villager was killed, the police escaped and the city was completely occupied by the rice-growers for half a day -- had such an impact that the regime was forced to publish its distorted news in *Keyhan* [a semi-official newspaper -- tr.] : "Guilan governor's office

promised Roodsar's rice-growers to help eliminate the problem of water distribution.').

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Now it should be asked: how can Iran's revolutionary movement (its various components) link itself with the spontaneous peasant movements prior to the establishment of any connection, any political and/or organizational contacts whatsoever with the rural revolutionary militant groups and with the regional revolutionary movements (revolutionary movements of the Kurdish people, the Baluchi people the Lor people, the Iranian Arab people, etc.)?

Perhaps a few years ago -- four, three, or even two years ago -- this matter, i.e., dealing with the relations among the various forces of the revolutionary movement, could not be on the agenda. But today, in a situation where many revolutionary groups of the society have regained their class identity in connection with their social practice, where they have gained adequate political-organizational experience for a more fundamental and expansive cooperation, especially considering the prospects for unity and cooperation of the revolutionary forces created by the vanguard armed movement after victoriously passing through its first stage, where the enemy with its unity and centralization has made the matter of unity and centralization of the revolutionary forces an extreme necessity, and finally, in a situation where the Marxist-Leninists constitute an important and decisive force, quantitatively and qualitatively, within the revolutionary movement, how can such a question -- the question of the relations among various revolutionary forces -- not be on the immediate agenda of Iranian revolutionaries?

Summarizing:

1 -- Iran's revolutionary movement, and at its forefront the vanguard armed movement, has achieved great accomplishments with regard to the conscious forces of society -- particularly the intelligentsia and also the lower sections of the petit bourgeoisie. Also the rural and regional armed movements enjoy the support and backing of the rural and native masses in their areas of activities. These accomplishments are the direct result of armed propaganda and armed actions of the revolutionary groups, and reciprocally, they are an indication of the favorable and positive reaction of these forces toward the people's revolutionary vanguards.

2 -- Yet the most fundamental problem for the revolutionary forces of society and also the vanguard armed organizations (we mean the Marxist-Leninists) is not acquiring the support of just these strata. The urgent task is acquiring the active support of the toiling classes of society, and in

its forefront the working class, and mobilizing the struggle of the rural laborers and orienting their struggle to an anti-imperialist and anti-monarchy direction. Our organization, as a small part of Iran's revolutionary movement and as a relatively important part of the vanguard armed movement, believes that questions concerning the relations between a vanguard armed organization and the laboring classes cannot be separate from the more general question of the relations of the entire revolutionary movement with these classes, and naturally the relations among the society's revolutionary forces themselves.

3 -- Also, we believe that under the particular conditions of the revolutionary forces' development, and of the position of the enemy forces, resolving the problem of the revolutionary forces' relations with different popular classes depends on resolving the problem of unity among these same revolutionary forces. This unity is the key to the confusing maze of the existing division and factionalism in the revolutionary movement as well as to the basic problems and difficulties confronting revolutionary groups and organizations. Grasping firmly this key link is the pre-requisite for resolving these problems.

## **MASS UNITED FRONT** **The First Step Towards Unity**

Now this fundamental question can be raised: what should be the relations among different forces of the revolutionary movement? How can the unfavorable, divided and scattered situation of the progressive and revolutionary forces of the movement be ended? How can the question of unity of the fighting forces of Iran be solved? How can forces with different ideologies, with different and sometimes contradictory political beliefs be the elements forging such unity?

But if today the matter of unity of the revolutionary forces is required not by the wishes of this group or the inclinations of that group, but rather by historical necessities -- on one side the blood-sucking and repressive dictatorship of the puppet regime of the traitor Shah, and on the other side the needs of the growth and development of the people's revolutionary movement -- then can it not be considered a necessary, and therefore possible, task? Are the facts that the puppet regime of the traitor Shah no longer tolerates any opposition whatsoever and savagely attacks any move of opposition, and reciprocally, the fact that the people's revolutionary movement is gaining new heights and strength every

day, and that greater forces are joining the ranks of the revolutionaries and genuine popular fighters, not the necessary objective and subjective conditions for this unity? Is this not true especially when our revolutionaries, headed by the armed organizations, have been tempered enough after passing through a successful period of fighting, to carry out this unity?

But what steps are to be taken toward such unity? How should such a vital necessity, which confronts our revolutionaries fully today, be dealt with? At this time, our organization proposes to all revolutionary and progressive forces the formation of a *MASS UNITED FRONT* composed of all the popular forces involved in the battle against the puppet regime of the traitor Shah and its imperialist masters -- headed by the U.S. Imperialism. We believe that this *Mass United Front* can be the first necessary and possible step toward the unity of these forces. Thus all genuine Marxist-Leninists, all militant religious forces, revolutionary democrats and forces and representatives of the rural armed movements can organize joint revolutionary activities against the puppet ruling regime in this *Mass United Front*. The scope of work within this front can begin at the lowest level, publication and distribution of revolutionary literature, political-agitational and propaganda work among the laboring classes (workers, peasants, etc.) and move on to the highest forms of armed actions in the cities or the countryside.

In this way the organizations, while preserving their independence, will carry out the task of unity of the popular forces and consequently, their joint struggle against the enemy through the Mass United Front.

The following considerations provide a clearer picture of this front:

1 -- Within such a front all the Marxist-Leninist forces with the line of armed struggle have the possibility of organizing themselves into a single political-military organization. This matter on the one hand allows them to resolve the problem of their relations with other militant forces in the front with more power and effectiveness, and on the other hand lays before them much broader perspectives of future revolutionary cooperation, especially in regard to a much deeper and all-around mass work.

2 -- In such a front all the non-Marxist revolutionary forces -- religious militants, revolutionary democratic forces, and others -- who believe in the line of armed struggle can organize themselves in their own organizations and thus secure the connection of a large section of the popular middle classes with the united vanguard armed organization and with the main forces of revolution -- workers and peasants.

This allows the main forces of revolution to prevent any progressive and militant force from being wasted -- a possibility which is definitely in the enemy's interest.

3 -- All the Marxist-Leninist individuals and groups who are active in concrete political agitation, propaganda, publication and distribution of socialist thought among the laboring classes\* can, independently or in some form of connection with the united vanguard armed organization composed of Marxist-Leninists who believe in the line of armed struggle, continue their revolutionary work. In our view, the work of these forces is not at odds with the armed struggle of the armed Marxist groups. In fact, part of our forces are presently mobilized for such purposes (mass work, especially among workers) though with the fundamental aims of armed struggle. Of course, the differences such as which line is primary and which one is secondary, or the relation between the strategic content of mass political work and armed propaganda (which essentially has completely political content) will be discussed in the process of work in the Mass United Front.

4 -- While the front prepares the necessary conditions for revolutionary unity in action against the puppet regime of the traitor Shah at a much more extensive level than exists today, it also offers favorable conditions for principled ideological struggle among various revolutionary forces. Thus ideological struggle will break away from its present form in the movement, i.e., vulgar, irresponsible intellectual chattering, and will become a revolutionary driving force for

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(\* When we talk about believers in the line of political work, we mean those militants who are firmly based on the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism and are honestly doing what they believe in. Thus there can be no talk of those opportunists who, under the cloak of such theories as "calm political work," etc., justify their inaction. Nor of the corrupt revisionists of the ex-Tudeh Party's leadership who, under the guise of pompous yet hollow phrase-mongering, still have not given up publicizing their capitulationist, putschist and revisionist line. For these gentlemen calm political work and party building are those 'valuable assets' with which to deviate the people's armed revolution and sell it out for some concessions (!) from the ruling class -- such as obtaining lucrative posts from Iran's liberal bourgeoisie (the same thing they did in Ghavam's cabinet). It is not without reason that their conception of struggle against the Shah's dictatorship cannot surpass the limit of exchanging this dictatorship with that of the liberal bourgeoisie. And again, it is not without reason that to free Iran from dictatorial conditions they propose pseudo-putschist and putschist solutions similar to the Bangladesh affair (whose consequences we have seen), or Afghanistan, etc.

a deeper and more solid unity. This struggle, precisely because it is based on an objective basis of unity (joint revolutionary action), can elevate the revolutionary theory in the movement and produce concrete practical results for the revolutionary forces.

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At this point it is necessary to explain a few remaining points.

First. Our definitions and views of the *Mass United Front* are by no means complete or unchangeable. The essential question is the necessity of the formation of this front, while its precise definitions and criteria can be determined according to the views and multi-lateral discussions of the forces in the battle front.

Second. An important question confronting the new communist movement of Iran at this time is the question of its position toward the militant religious forces. This position is worthy of attention in two respects: in terms of cleansing all the negative and incorrect vestiges left behind from the unprincipled, sectarian and dogmatic attitude of the leadership of the Tudeh Party toward these forces, and in terms of the necessity of uniting all the militant popular forces against the Shah's puppet regime. So far most of the Marxist-Leninist groups and organizations have not taken a clear and explicit stand toward these forces which, naturally, has made any close relation between these forces (the Marxist-Leninists and the religious militants) impossible despite all its necessity\*.

Our organization not only fully confirms the position of *militant religion* -- meaning that religion which justifies the struggle of a relatively large section of the popular middle classes -- but also will not withhold any effort and possibility in helping the struggle of the religious groups against the Shah's puppet regime. In fact we believe that Islam, and particularly *Shiism*, still contain those progressive and fighting elements which can provide the explanation for the struggle of these groups and strata against the dominant imperialist oppression. The historical revolutionary traditions in a religion that since its inception in the 7th

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(\*) We will refrain here from mentioning the secondary reasons for this separation, such as the fanatical tendencies of some militant religious groups and the extreme pressure of the poisonous propaganda of the imperialists, the Shah's regime and also its reactionary puppet clergy.

century A.D. was, in the form of an underground party, a gathering place of fighters and rebels against the oppressive regimes of the time, including the progressive traditions of the thought and practice of the exemplary uprising of Hossein, are the backings which have still maintained their anti-oppression and progressive political-social concepts within this ideology.

With this explanation, it is natural that we warmly welcome the unity of militant religious forces in the framework of a Mass United Front and support their struggle.

Third. It is necessary at this point, and parallel to our proposal of the formation of a Mass United Front of the forces involved in the battle front, to deal with and answer the views of that section of Marxist-Leninists who call for the immediate formation of the communist party in Iran before any other political-organizational measures.

Stalin said "the communist party (party of the working class) is the integration of the workers' movement and socialist theory." A deeper study of this seemingly simple definition shows what wishful thinking is the immediate formation of the communist party in the present situation of Iran. This view, besides being unable to provide a practical path for the advancement of the people's revolutionary movement, is at a minimum (if we want to be very optimistic) an indication of its designers' neglect of Iran's stark social realities and even of their subjectivism in appraising their own present condition. Stalin's definition contains two separate, yet organically related elements. These two elements are the "spontaneous workers' movement" and "socialist theory." Obviously, the workers' movement exists in Iran; not only that, it is advancing. We briefly studied this in the previous section. But as we said before, the whole problem is in the other element, "socialist theory." All the difficulties are in the discovery and formulation of this theory and integrating it with the spontaneous workers' movement. But let us see where that socialist theory which should be linked with Iran's workers' movement comes from? Is this theory created in the mind of a revolutionary genius or another talented Marxist-Leninist? We do not think so. Is this theory the general doctrines of Marxism-Leninism and the theory of scientific socialism? Again, the answer is negative. That socialist theory which must be integrated with Iran's workers' movement can be discovered through the movement of this class, from the historical-social-economic and political conditions of this class, and its relations with Iran's bourgeoisie on the one hand and the other popular forces on the other. Thus it is not just the teaching of scientific socialism and the general doctrines of Marxism-Leninism which will bring about the integration of socialist theory with the working class movement. More important and essential is that particular line

which should be discovered, formulated and taken to the working class. This line should be in accordance with Iran's social conditions, with the conditions of different popular classes and especially with the conditions and the economic-political situation of the working class. We can ask you: how do you define the struggle of the working class and its relation with other classes at this stage? What particular slogans for this stage and what general slogans do you put forward for the working class? How, and with what organizational and political measures have you contacted the working class? What has been the outcome? How, with what organizations, and with what theories do you want to form the party of this class? You, as founders (or one of the founding groups) of this party, tell us how you have so far carried out the tasks of the party regarding the struggles of other popular classes, regarding the peasants, the petit bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, etc.? Through what process have the forces which are to form your party (normally Marxist organizations composed of revolutionary intellectuals and conscious workers) have contacted not only the working class movement, but also the movement of other popular classes (since both are necessary)? Through what process of revolutionary action have they been prepared for carrying out the common party tasks -- tasks which are no longer limited to one area, to one stratum or one class, but rather are related to leading the entire anti-imperialist movement of Iran under proletarian hegemony?

We honestly recommend that if you have such organizations and forces which have even just initiated the formulation and integration of socialist theory with the working class movement, fulfilled the task of uniting the popular forces (even relatively) under the leadership of proletarian thought and organization, etc., and thus have formulated not only the political line of the working class movement, but also the political line of all the popular classes throughout Iran, then do not lose even one moment. We will be among the first to join your communist party.

But, dear comrades, if you have not formulated even the first sentence of this socialist theory, if you do not have any direct or even indirect contact with Iran's workers' movement (contact does not mean printing some reports and news from the workers' movement or repeating general Marxist theories over and over) and if you have not made any effort toward creating the initial grounds for mobilizing and organizing the society's Marxist-Leninist forces and advanced workers, then how can you talk about the immediate formation of the communist party prior to any other political measures? Some of you propose "organizing an apparatus for political exposures, systematic political agitation and consciousness-raising activities among the masses" as the starting point of party formation or maybe the beginning of the party itself. If this apparatus you have in mind is the communist party then

we have no more to say to you. Then it becomes clear what you expect from a communist party, what goals and what content you have set for it. In this case, we will retract all we have said, because it becomes obvious that what you are after as the communist party we basically do not recognize as such. But if by organizing "many apparatuses for political exposures and systematic political agitation among the masses ..." you mean the formation of Marxist organizations which engage in political agitation and propaganda, and in the course of whose development and increasing unity the communist party will be formed, we must tell you again that you lag behind the present conditions of Iran. How can you disregard the important fact that presently the armed movement exists, both in the cities and in the countryside, and has carried out its political and agitational activities in the form of armed propaganda, direct political work among the people, etc., far ahead of your proposed "apparatus for political exposures, etc."? You have overlooked the present activities of our revolutionaries -- who are engaged in armed propaganda or patient underground-political work among the laboring classes under one of the worst and most brutal dictatorships in history -- to a degree that now, after all these activities and when even the blood-sucking regime of the Shah has been forced to admit the extensive range of the revolutionaries' activities "in the schools, the universities, the mosques, the factories, etc." now you come up with your proposal of forming "an apparatus for political exposures and systematic agitation among the masses." And still it is not clear what the subject of these political exposures and systematic political agitation will be, and for what class, and with what goal and content (and these are very important).

In our view, your proposal of building "an apparatus for political exposures, etc." is an indication of your incorrect understanding of the concept of integrating socialist theory and the workers' movement, of the concept of the party and its tasks. Because this "apparatus" at best, at the point of its greatest growth, can only imperfectly carry out a small part of the tasks of a Marxist-Leninist organization, and a much smaller part of the great tasks of the communist party.

Yes, dear comrades, your words sound very nice, but what you say is nothing more than a repetition of commonplace facts, of general principles and a set of concepts that have been known for the past sixty or seventy years, and it has no political guidelines for our people. You put forward a very advanced slogan, one which is the desire of every revolutionary and dedicated Marxist-Leninist. But when you try to formulate the most minor aspect of practical work -- and that still not in practice but in theory (perhaps for this very reason) -- you demonstrate your intellectual backwardness. While you have refused to join even one of the many aspects of revolutionary activity (armed struggle in the cities or in the



countryside, underground-political work among the laboring classes, etc.), while you have not taken any steps towards uniting these forces which, despite all the obstacles and problems caused by the ruling dictatorship, are honestly engaged in practical work, and while you have withheld your smallest assistance and cooperation from the revolutionaries who are active in different fronts, you call out the slogan of the immediate formation of the party. And when asked how, you put forth vague and backward plans such as "an apparatus for exposures..." Then do we not have the right to consider your slogan of "immediate formation of the communist party" as stemming not from a sense of revolutionary responsibility, but from intellectual wish and fantasy, belonging to the category of "picking up a big stone is the sign of not hitting"?

You are like that person who with a lot of fanfare invites everyone to climb mount Damavand [*the highest mountain in Iran -- tr.*] and makes a lot of noise and propaganda around it. But when he is asked to start climbing, he points to the rooftop of his house! Your conception of the building of the communist party is also the rooftop of your house, "building an apparatus for political exposures, etc., among the masses," which probably is something like publishing a propaganda newspaper -- one which is published outside of Iran at that, and must be taken to the masses, explained to them, etc.!

No, dear comrades, the communist party of Iran can be formed neither on pretty sheets of paper, nor through spontaneous generation, nor while hanging from the sky, nor as a result of forming an apparatus for political exposures, but rather in the process of the growth of Iran's revolutionary movement, and foremost in the process of the growth of the people's armed movement, in the course of the mobilization of the Marxist-Leninists around this movement and their relation with the spontaneous movement of the working class. Thus today the formation of the Mass United Front is precisely the necessary condition, the timely and appropriate step to be taken toward the goal of forming Iran's communist party.

Today, all genuine Marxist-Leninists, all the true revolutionaries and all the militant fighters of our people are asking themselves who benefits from the existing division and dispersion in Iran's revolutionary movement but the imperialists and the puppet regime of the traitor Shah? Today all of them are honestly asking themselves what has really caused this division and factionalism? Is it because each one of us is strong enough to confront the enemy? Is it because the enemy is weak and disintegrating and the unity of militant forces is not necessary?! Can sectarian prejudices and individual and group hegemonism prevent such a unity? Is it pos-

sible or correct that narrow group interests overshadow the interests of the entire people's revolutionary movement?

Our people and all our true revolutionaries resolutely answer all these questions. Their answer is best summed up by the slogans: *Forward to the unity of all revolutionary forces! Forward to the Mass United Front!*

TO THE FIRM UNITY OF ALL  
THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY FORCES!

TO THE EVER GROWING ARMED STRUGGLES  
OF THE POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY FORCES!

VICTORY TO MARXISM-LENINISM,  
THE SOLE IDEOLOGY OF THE WORKING CLASS!

Organization of Mojahedeen  
of the People of Iran

October, 1975

## Footnotes

(1) Traitor #1 was Majid Sharif Vaghefi, an electrical engineering graduate of the Industrial University. He was accepted into the organization in summer, 1969. From the start he avoided collective activities through a kind of individualistic isolationism. Thus he did not have much progress in organizational affairs despite his considerable progress in education (which requires personal effort and motivation in Iran's educational system). It was agreed that he be removed from totally professional activities and, after graduating from university and getting a job, be engaged in secondary activities of procuring supplies. So in 1970, after graduating from the university, he was employed at the Regional Power Company; he worked there until November, 1971, when he was identified by the police. Then, during a one year period of military work in the organization, he took a passive attitude and was assigned in effect to a position with no responsibilities. After a period of criticism in winter and spring, 1973, he showed some improvement, and was therefore given some responsibilities. These responsibilities increased after spring, 1973, and he seemingly approved of the ideological struggle. In this period when the sharp edge of criticism was on other individuals, he showed no disagreement. But when his actions were brought under criticism, he rapidly fell into passive and then treacherous positions.

In his period of passivity he admitted his weaknesses and shortcomings in utmost desperation and helplessness. However, he made no effort to change himself and to overcome his weaknesses and shortcomings. Thus he showed that his acceptance of his weaknesses and criticisms should have been taken not as a revolutionary self-criticism and a starting point for change and rectification, but rather as a sinner's confessing a sin to a priest. From this point, i.e., when he compromised with his weaknesses and refrained from a persistent struggle against them, his treason-bound fall and degeneration started.

Later, he no longer accepted his criticisms and weaknesses -- which had been revealed many times and which he had himself acknowledged; rather, he justified them by non-revolutionary excuses and by invoking such and such an external condition. Thus, day by day, he saw a greater distance between himself and revolutionary activity. And at last, while pretending complete loyalty to the organization, he took up a

sectarian, conspiratorial line and treacherously started to subvert and destroy the organization's activities, driving militants away from it and making them pessimistic toward struggle.

Traitor #2 was Morteza Samadiyeh Labbaf who escaped us when we wanted to carry out his execution. He was captured by the police. He will most probably be condemned to death by the enemy too because of his participation in one or two military incidents, including the accidental killing of a gendarme who had attempted to search him in Hashemi mosque looking for drugs (these incidents are known to the police).

(2) Among the last treacherous actions of those two was the evacuation and theft of one of the organization's storages to which they still had access. They gave the contents of the storage to a spineless person named Seifollah Kazemian. After some searching and investigation, a group of our comrades found out that the storage was kept by him, and they attempted to contact him. This person (Seifollah Kazemian) had some record of struggle, but he had been completely drowned in his petit bourgeois life and his business relations for some time. In our view, therefore, he was totally unreliable (the mere fact that he had agreed to cooperate with those traitors, despite his later denial of any knowledge of it, is an indication of his counter-revolutionary nature and of the correctness of our initial views of him). It was agreed that we take delivery of the storage from him immediately, in one or two contacts. But right at this time -- one day before delivering us the storage -- he was betrayed by Morteza Samadiyeh Labbaf. After being arrested he not only gave the police the entire content of the storage (the same things that the traitor Shah's police displayed in the course of its propaganda attack on us. Of course all sorts of usual lies about ten guns, an arms depot, etc., were added for propaganda purposes), but also cooperated with the police in utmost shamelessness and betrayed the appointment next day of the comrade who was to take over the storage from him (arrested comrade Mohammed Taher Rahimi). In the course of the betrayal of that appointment a woman comrade, Manizheh Ashrafzadeh Kermani, who had gone to check the site of the appointment, was also arrested. These two comrades were not cautious, and the location of the safety/danger signal to be left by comrade Manizheh for comrade Mohammed Taher was chosen too close to the appointment site. The area was extensively controlled and surrounded by more than 250 policemen and both comrades were arrested. Comrade Mohammed Taher was to carry out his appointment half an hour after getting the safety signal from comrade Manizheh.

(3) Other reasons for this matter (i.e., the disorganization and backwardness of the spontaneous movement of the working class) can be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Iran's ruling bourgeoisie is essentially a bureaucratic and comprador bourgeoisie. This means that the policies for production and economic growth and development of the country flow not from real and genuine national needs, but precisely from the needs of the dominant economy -- here, U.S. Imperialism. This system, therefore, distorts the natural and genuine growth of the productive forces. For example, at the same time that the ruling bourgeoisie imposes its extremely centralized and pillaging political and economic rule upon the society by developing non-productive forces, by developing the bureaucracy, the army, the police organizations, etc., and at the same time that its various state organs (government, bureaucratic institutions, army, police, etc.) are becoming more intricate and reciprocally provide all the possible means for the dependent bourgeoisie with which to impose its class rule, this bourgeoisie undermines the growth and organization of the proletariat and its trade and political organizations in different ways and with utmost power.

The proletariat necessarily starts not in step with the growth and consolidation of capital -- which in this case has a bureaucratic and "middle man" character -- but initially from several steps behind the bourgeoisie and from a much weaker point relative to the classical forms of capitalism. This phenomenon -- the relative backwardness of the starting point of the proletariat, its class consciousness, its organization and its trade organizations, etc. -- which are due to the process of consolidation and development of capitalism in such dominated societies, has concrete historical explanations. It is enough to note that Iran's transition to capitalism has been principally and more than anything else under the interests of U.S. Imperialism. Iran's capitalism was not created in the course of a democratic struggle against reactionary forces and old relations of production. Furthermore, in an unholy alliance with the flunkeys of old colonialism, this capitalism inherited all their historical, political and cultural instruments of oppression and dictatorship. Thus without any favorable and progressive opportunity for the popular forces in the process of this development, the worst form of exploitation of labor by capital was added to all the traditional (feudal) instruments of force and suppression.

(b) Iran's ruling bourgeoisie has extensive possibilities for various economic-political maneuvers with the help of its savage plunder of billions of dollars of oil revenue. This situation has allowed it to remedy its distressed economic condition by increasing the oil revenue in the past six or seven years, especially at three specific critical points in two year periods (1968-69, 1971, and 1973). Also, the re-

gime was able to confront the actual scarcity of foodstuffs in 1974 solely by relying on the huge increase of oil revenue. Iran's capitalism has had a notable growth in the past ten years due to its intact markets, vast underground resources, cheap labor and human resources, etc. Naturally, in a period of growth (economic boom) the bourgeoisie can, for a while, return a small portion of its great volume of appropriated surplus value to the working class in order to mitigate the extremely harsh colonial conditions and to push back the continuous waves of the workers' movement (through welfare measures, insurance, wage increases, etc. Note that the rate of surplus value in Iranian factories is between 200% and 400% according to the organic composition of capital and the degree of the workers' exploitation). In this manner it can postpone for some time the potentially critical conditions caused by the upsurge of the workers' movement (of course this method cannot be effective over a long period because it will immediately lead to increased prices and inflation, which in turn will have the immediate result of further upsurge in the workers' movements, inflation-caused recession, and the spread of crisis to other classes). This growth has now reached such a point that the bourgeoisie is facing a severe shortage of workers and technicians. In other words, there is full employment (disregarding the inability of Iran's bourgeoisie to mobilize the entire labor force) and demand for commodities in the market is at its highest. (Of course, one must keep in mind that the unevenness of development and the regime's anti-national economic policy have effected even the manner of mobilizing and utilizing the labor force in different regions of Iran; the regime faces serious and important dangers as a result. For instance, precisely at a time when Iran's capitalism is complaining about a shortage of specialized personnel, many such experts remain idle as rusty parts of its bureaucratic machine; or while thousands and thousands of people are still afflicted with hidden unemployment in different forms of non-productive and parasitic activities, it (capitalism) has to hire foreign workers; or while the wages for 14 hours of back-breaking work in a township outside Maragheh [*in the Northwest -- tr.*] are less than \$1.40, in Bandar Abbas [*port city on the Persian Gulf -- tr.*] \$1.40 per hour cannot hire even an unskilled worker. These examples are some of those particularities which will greatly accelerate the decadence and destructive crisis of Iran's capitalism.)

Neither Iran's capitalism nor, naturally, the working class has yet experienced a period of stagnation and recession. Such an experience, which is not far away considering the present situation of severe inflation and the decline of the oil revenue, will teach the working class many lessons. Especially for regimes such as that of Iran which is characterized by great political wavering and very fragile stability, stagnation and recession are nightmares to be avoided even

at the expense of double-digit inflation rates (the newspapers call Hoveyda's [*then prime minister -- tr.*] economic policy the 'gas pedal' policy -- as opposed the 'brake' policy -- and write that Hoveyda is not used to putting his foot on the brake). Reciprocally, some technocrats and economists reason that the problems of Iran's economy are essentially political and can be solved only by political measures!

At any rate, it is obvious that in such conditions of economic growth and boom, considerable economic and political options are available to the bourgeoisie in confronting the spontaneous movements of the workers and other popular classes. The Iranian regime has fully utilized these options in the recent years. Obviously, after a certain period, after those revenues and extra revenues are absorbed by the insatiable greed of Iran's ruling bourgeoisie and its imperialist masters, these options, which were based principally on the increasing oil revenues, start to degenerate and turn into their opposites, i.e., inflationary crisis, greater economic dependence on other countries and on imports, lagging of the main branches of production because of uneven growth, etc., and consequently higher prices, more strikes and the upsurge of the spontaneous movements of the masses and workers, the next round of recession, and on to political-social crisis. For example, if it was not for the extra revenue produced by the oil price hikes (in October and December 1973), the regime would have been rapidly led toward a double crisis of inflation/stagnation even more severe than those in Western countries by the recession-bound movement of the international markets on the one hand and its own movement toward economic crisis on the other. But the oil revenues allowed the regime to control to a degree the progressively soaring prices by relying on huge imports of foodstuffs, and at the same time to agree to a small increase in workers' wages, and to maintain its accelerating economic trend. This policy, which was implemented in the two year period 1973-1975, was successful regarding the growth and boom conditions of the economy -- of course from the ruling clique's viewpoint on growth and boom. In regard to opposing the workers' movement, although this policy did not halt this movement (note the strikes in 1973 and early 1974), but it was able to limit its scope and spread. Presently, (summer, 1975) there are indications of a new upsurge of the workers' movement. In regard to controlling inflation, this policy (the policy of open doors) was more or less successful until late 1974. But then, with the more general circulation of the huge oil money (which had no productive backing), inflation started to rise progressively. Despite the regime's one set of weak deflationary measures in late winter, 1975, inflation had risen to 30% by mid-summer, 1975. It is interesting to note that the regime has again refrained from economic methods of fighting inflation (i.e., strong deflationary measures) in its new anti-inflation program (out of

the fear of possible recession). It has rather taken to its old political methods (arresting and fining profiteers!) which themselves, indirectly, have more important though long term effects on the production process.

(c) The formidable pressure of the dictatorship has prevented any political orientation of the workers' movement, and has created many obstacles in the way of introducing revolutionary and socialist consciousness into this class. It has, moreover, relatively succeeded in keeping the level of the spontaneous movement and even the daily and immediate demands of the workers at a low level. Of course the spontaneous movement of the working class, as indicated by its very name, is formed essentially in relation to economic life and the degree of the ruling class' exploitation and the economic-political pressures of the bourgeoisie on the working class. It is thus an infrastructural necessity which will materialize independent of any personal will or conscious process. But the harsh, repressive police system is significant not as a factor destroying the spontaneous movement, yet as an obstacle that can cause considerable disorder in its spread, continuity or elevation. But if under democratic conditions the workers' spontaneous strikes and protests have the possibility of rapidly spreading and becoming nation-wide, under dictatorial conditions every spontaneous move of the workers -- given a vigilant and conscious leading force -- can take up political and anti-regime aspects very rapidly, much more so than in democratic conditions. From this viewpoint, the qualitative force existing in these movements (Iran's current spontaneous movements) are much stronger than those in their counterparts in capitalist countries with democratic regimes.



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*Iranian Communist Students Group* is a group of Iranian Marxist-Leninist students and intellectuals abroad. *ICSG* believes that the *Organization of Mojahedeen of the People of Iran* represents the correct line in the Iranian communist movement. *Documents from the Iranian Communist Movement*, the publication of the *ICSG*, is mainly dedicated to propagating the positions of the *OMPI*.

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