EDUCATION FOR SOCIALISTS
ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL EDUCATION DEFARTMENT SOQAUST WORKERS RARTY 14CHARLES LANE NEW YORK, NY 10014
Towards a History of the Fourth International, Part 3
Struggle in the Fourth International
INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS
1951-1954
Volume 2 of 4 volumes    $1.00 March 1974

 2.	Letter from Sam Gordon to Friends in the SWP	101
 3.	Letter from Gerry Healy to James P. Cannon	101
 4.	Letter from James P. Cannon to George Novack	102
 5.	Letter from James P. Cannon to George Novack	104
 6.	Letter from James P. Cannon to Gerry Healy	106
 7.	Letter from Gerry Healy to James P. Cannon	108
 8.	Letter from Sam Gordon to Friends in the SWP	109
 9.	Report from  England for the National
Committee Majority (September 1953)	110
 10.	Letter from Gerry Healy to Farrell Dobbs	110
 11.	Statement by Gerry Healy on the Document
"The Rise and Fall of Stalinism"	111
Section VIII: Is World War III Inevitable?
by Joseph Hansen	111
Section IX: Preparing an International Struggle	120
 1.	Letter from James P. Cannon to Farrell Dobbs      120
 2.	Agreements Arrived at at London Meeting,
October 3-4, 1953	121
3.	Letter from George Breitman to James
P. Cannon	121
 4.	Letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry Healy	122
 5.	Letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry Healy	124
 6.	Resolution of the 25th Anniversary Plenum gUhtrSWF-"""*~ "•''-   ~	™.	_._„_	125
 7.	Letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry Healy-	125
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 1951-1954
Contents, Volume II
67
Introductory Note
67
Glossary of Pseudonyms and Pen Names Used by Key Figures
Section IV: Pablo's Role in the Cochran Fight
(Continued)	68
^ 14. Letter from George Novack to Gerry Healy	68
17 15.  Report Given to the Majority Caucus of the New
York Local (August 3,  1953), by George Novack     70 V  16.  Letter from George Novack to the Majority
of the SWP National Committee	72
Section V:  The Deepening Differences on Stalinism	74
i/1.  Some Remarks on "The Rise and Fall of
Stalinism," by Morris Stein	74
tx^. Clarke's Views on Stalinism, by George Novack	79>
V/3. Memorandum on "The Rise and Decline of
Stalinism"	84
Section VI: Four Supporters of Cochran-Clarke-
Bartell "Graduate" from the SWP	96
1/4.  Statement of Daniel Roberts to Seattle Branch,
July 23, 1953	96
^""2\ Report from Seattle to the Majority Caucus,
by George Flint	98
^Section VII: Pablo Attacks the British Section	99
^ \. Letter from Sam Gordon to Friends in the SWP       99
Contents of Other Volumes
Volume I
Section I: Before the Third World Congress
Section II: The Split in the French Section
Section III: The SWP Majority Position on Stalinism
in the Cochran Fight Section IV: Pablo's Role in the Cochran Fight
Volume III
Section X: Declaring an International Public
Faction Section XI: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Plenum
of the SWP, by James P. Cannon Section XII: The Chinese Experience with Pabloite
Revisionism and Bureaucratism (A Letter to
James P. Cannon), by Peng Shu-Tse Section XIII: Pablo Declares a "Split" Section XIV: The Struggle in Canada
Volume IV
Section XV: Correspondence Between Ernest
Germain and George Breitman Section XVI: Correspondence Between James P.
Cannon and Leslie Goonewardene Section XVII: The Struggle Over the "Fourth
World Congress"

Introductory Note
In 1953, sharp differences over Stalinism and organizational matters divided the Fourth International into two public factions, the International Committee of the Fourth International and the International Secretariat of the Fourth International. This division lasted until the Re-unification Congress of the Fourth International held in 1963.
The articles, documents, correspondence, and circulars published in these Education for Socialists bulletins are presented as an aid in tracing the evolution of this dispute. The material is divided into two parts. The first (Part Three of Towards a History of the Fourth International) is composed of four bulletins and contains materials from the International Committee. The second (Part Four of Towards a History of the Fourth International) consists of four bulletins containing material from the International Secretariat faction.
Both sets of bulletins begin with the discussion prior to the Third World Congress of the Fourth International held in 1951. They are divided into sections dealing with key stages in the development of the dispute. Each section opens with a brief introductory note. To the extent that these notes include historical interpretations or conclusions, the views expressed are my own.
The documents, correspondence, articles, and circulars have been subjected to minimal editing. In general the style, grammar, etc., have been retained as in Hie originals. Additions to the text for explanatory purposes appear in brackets.
The term "section" appears frequently in these documents. This word was used in two different senses within the world Trotskyist movement. On the one hand, it refers to those groups which are affiliated to the Fourth International. Secondly, it is used in reference to organizations that are barred from membership in the Fourth International by reactionary legislation, such as the SWP, but are in full political solidarity with the world Trotskyist movement and represent the continuity of Trotskyism in their countries.
The faction struggle in the world Trotskyist movement
Glossary  of Pseudonyms  and Pen  Names  Used by Key Figures
The   individuals'   names   appear   on   the left,  with  the pseudonyms following in italics.
Harry Braverman: Harry Frankel
James P. Cannon: Walter, Martin
George Clarke: Campbell, Livingstone, Livingston
Colvin R. DaSilva: Roy
Farrell Dobbs: Smith, Barr
Ross Dowson: Kane
Leslie Goonewardene: Tilak

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occurred when the McCarthyite witch-hunt was at its height in the United States. Similar manifestations of political repression appeared in other capitalist countries, as the ruling class sought to whip up anticommunist hysteria. In view of these sharp attacks on democratic rights, many radicals found it necessary to use pseudonyms or pen-names in carrying out their political activity. This was true of the Trotskyist movement as well. In line with a policy of printing this material as it originally appeared, these have generally not been changed. Instead, a glossary of these pen-names is included in each volume. Note that some individuals used more than one pen-name on occasion.
The 1953-54 dispute was worldwide in its scope and repercussions. Many parts of the Trotskyist movement that participated in the struggle are not represented in this collection. An instance of this is the lack of documentation from Latin America. Material from the dispute in the Latin American Trotskyist organizations is now being translated and will appear in a future volume.
This selection is based on the documents and correspondence presently available to the National Education Department of the Socialist Workers Party. Because of the speed with which the dispute developed, once the differences had become apparent to both sides, many aspects of the struggle are not fully dealt with in official documents. Therefore, it was necessary to include a considerable amount of correspondence to allow maximum clarity for the reader.
Hopefully, the publication of these bulletins will inspire others who were involved in the dispute to make available the relevant materials in their possession. Special thanks are owed to James P. Cannon, National Chairman Emeritus of the Socialist Workers Party, and Tom Kerry and Karolyn Kerry for making their personal archives available for this project.
Fred   Feldman February 1974
Sam Gordon: Tom, Harry, Burton, Joe Joseph Hansen: Herrick Gerry Healy: Burns, Mason, Jerry John Lawrence: Collins
Ernest Mandel: Ernest Germain, Albert, Jeb
Sherry Mangan: Patrice, Terrence Phelan, Patrick O'Daniel
George Novack: Manuel, William F. Warde
Michel Raptis: Michel Pablo, Gabe
David Weiss: Stevens
Milton Zaslow: Mike Bar tell

SECTION IV: PABLO'S ROLE IN THE COCHRAN FIGHT (CONTINUED)
14.  Letter from George Novack to Gerry Healy

v
V

Dear Jerry:
The enclosed caucus letter by Dobbs will give you the information on the N. Y. convention elections. It was a very hard-fought and embittered struggle that lasted about four weeks, which resulted in effectively blowing up the truce. And, as both sides stated, the truce had to find its decisive test in this key local of the key city.
What is most important from our standpoint is the consolidation of a strong political majority in the local, since all our votes were obtained on the basis of agreement with our plenum resolutions. The 12-8 vote enables us to take firm hold of the local, which has been paralyzed by the internal strife for eight months, and set it moving again. To do this we can count only on our own leadership and forces.
This has been made plain by the convention itself held yesterday.
The day after our victory in the elections, we made the following proposals to the minority, for the purpose of assuring their collaboration and showing there was no intent of reprisals or discrimination. Despite the provocations and heat of the pre-plenum brawling, we wanted to abide by the plenum agreement, and see if it could be sustained. We were not sure whether their pre-conven-tion antics were a filibuster, an effort to pressure us into concessions, and to try and parlay a minority into a majority by devious means —or whether they had actually abandoned the truce and the collaboration connected with it.
Our proposals were: we would choose the organizer; permit them to retain the Asst Organizer; include two majority, two minority and one Marcyite on the Municipal candidate election slate which must be announced in a day or so; eight majority, four minority, one Marcyite on the City Committee; with three majority and two minority alternates; Bartell was offered the Mayoralty candidate with assurance that his financial needs would be taken care of during the campaign. They rejected this and would make no counter proposal. This was an ominous sign.
At the opening of the convention both the reporter for the P. C. and for the City Majority re-iterated the appeal for genuine collaboration, now that the question of the majority had been settled by the membership. If they were not satisfied with our terms, what did they propose, on their part for consideration? In their report, Bartell declared that we switched from war to peace to suit our factional advantage; that they had been tricked before by this, at the plenum; that they are not going to be caught in that trap again; and that they don't trust us; that we insisted upon a political determination in the N. Y. voting because we thought we had them at a disadvantage because of the Seattle breakup of their caucus, and could disintegrate them here in N. Y.; that this maneuver had failed; we had only succeeded in solidifying them,   and   making   them   see  just what we were up to.

In the midst of such remarks, he let loose their big bombshell —or rather stink-bomb. He read excerpts from two documents: 1. Jim's report to the Majority Caucus of May 18 on Internationalism to the SWP; 2. from Jim's letter to Tom of June 4th.
These documents had been sent out to the local leaders of the Majority caucus. One set had been handed over to Bartell by Lou Becker, the Akron organizer, who Bartell announced had broken with the Majority and gone over to the Minority. You have met this comrade, and know him. He had been in N.Y. the week before but, although evading discussions with us, had not expressed any change of mind or discussed his differences with us. Therefore the event was a surprise.
These were the most scandalous and shameful documents ever written in the movement, said Bartell. They demonstrated that Cannon was organizing an international faction against Pablo, just as he had previously set about to organize an unprincipled combination to dump Cochran nationally and Bartell locally. This was an unprincipled combination because he was enlisting the aid of Tom, who was opposed to the Third World Congress against Pablo, with whom he presumably agreed on the Third World Congress line. Or else, Cannon had never really agreed with that line, and was now exposing his hidden opposition to it. This proved what the minority had contended all along, that the majority only formally accepted the line, but did not actually approve of it and apply it. Instead they waged factional war upon its genuine interpreters and defenders here and abroad. Cannon had a social democratic conception of internationalism, as a loose federation, and consisting essentially of consultation and collaboration, since he has said the SWP would take orders from no one. He said that the opposition between Cannon and Pablo was now plainly exposed to view, and they were going to fight on Pablo's side against this conspiracy of Cannon's. In this fight they awarded us the Bleibtreu group in advance. This was nothing less than a fight to save the whole international   movement from being wrecked  and destroyed.
The minority now possesses all the factional material we have sent out to date. This does not bother us too much in view of the developments. We are even not too much concerned to have Pablo and the others read this material. It will drive home the fact of the deadly seriousness of the situation. Fortunately, none of your letters to Jim have been sent out. All that they know, we presume, from these documents, is that Tom was given permission to show material to you, and to solicit your cooperation.
The minority expected that these Revelations would practically blow up the convention, shake a number of our people, and even several of our delegates, and place them on the offensive. But despite the surprise and momentary shock, so far as could be observed, the immediate impact did not have the desired results. In the course

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of this fight our comrades have become fairly well in-nured to this method of substituting sensations for politics, and scandals in place of discussion of opinions. As some of them remarked, "this sort of thing had been pulled twice before," and they were ready to wait for further and full information.
In our reply, we made the following points: 1. We condemned this school for scandal method which introduced matters which were not the business of the local convention. 2. If anything was irregular in this correspondence, Bartell as an N. C. member had the duty to bring it before the P. C. first. 3. Cannon had been corresponding on such matters, for the past 25 years, and a large part of it has been published and provided education for our movement. Just as his previous correspondence in this and other fights had been published, so would this at the proper time. 4. If there are any differences in the world movement, these will be brought out and discussed in connection with the forthcoming pre-congress discussion, as is the tradition in our movement.
It was later explained to our own comrades that the correspondence was designed as a precaution to preserve the peace from any tampering with, by anyone. Jim's earlier speech on internationalism had already alerted the original members of the caucus to the possibility of such a development.
In his summary, Bartell indicated that the minority would not engage in joint collaboration, they would do work, of course, they said, but "in spite of us." He said we should make the proposals, and then they would decide what to do about them. This is really tantamount to a declaration of minimum activity and maximum friction. At first they proposed to have only token representation of one on the city committee, but later changed their mind, and designated their four candidates. But this is no more than a formal compliance.
Here is how, subject to further considerations and developments, we appraise the situation. The plenum truce is smashed. The N. Y. local and party is in a state of de facto civil war. Whatever the time intervals, this is heading for a split on their part. Our problem is to smash the split. What can be their perspective? As the champions of Pablo and the Congress Line, in opposition to Cannon and the Old Trotskyism, they will further consolidate their faction, hop up their people, and try to pick up some more supporters. They will utilize the pre-congress discussion for that purpose, while contributing as little as possible to party building. We shall have the double burden of maintaining the organization and combatting them. After the next congress, we will either have to submit like the French or they will emerge separately as the official representatives of the world movement.
This perspective sheds light on several aspects of the minority's conduct and course which puzzled us up to now. Their confidence and belligerence, which was not justified by the situation here, has its source over there. Second, they did not want any voting on political lines here in N. Y. until the unfolding of the congress discussion and Bartell attributed to us in his speech the motive of wanting to get people committed on the political issues before there had been any real political discussion.
Meanwhile there have been certain significant developments  about political differences with the minority here.

As you know, Clarke's article on Stalinism in the last issue of the magazine was not shown to us before publication and has aroused considerable protest. We called him to account on it, and especially for the next to the last paragraph, in the P. C. in its revision of our traditional position on the political revolution against the bureaucracy.
Now he has submitted two editorials for the next issue; one on the Beria purge and the other on the E. German events, which go much farther. The main conclusion of the E. German article is the restricted repression of the Soviet occupying forces, and the extensive concessions of the regime.
It tends to embellish and whitewash the Stalinist bureaucracy. It does not counterpose any clear program of revolutionary demands and action, along Trotskyist lines. The article on Beria sees the political revolution already under way within the S. U. itself, with the intervention and pressure of the Soviet masses producing differentiations and rifts in the Kremlin command, a conflict between die-hard and liberalizing factions-which will provide rallying points and leadership for the next stages of the struggle. The lines of both articles run counter to the line put forward in the paper and was deliberately designed as their polemic against us.
We propose to print the articles under his signature with a notice that they do not represent the views of the majority of the editorial board, and will be answered in the next issue. In the same issue will be included a letter signed by Morris criticizing Clarke's earlier article and setting forth the party position very briefly. This will serve notice of the opening of the political discussion.
We cannot believe that these are merely Clarke's personal views. For example, some of us, disturbed by certain omissions in the I. S. declaration on the E. German events, have asked the following question: Why no call for the withdrawal of all occupying forces, and no call for German unity under socialist auspices? Why the omission in the latest I. S. draft on Stalinism of the following two sentences from the transitional program: "Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses toward insurrection, the party of the Fourth International"?
This brings us to the new congress documents, which you refer to in your latest letter of July 28. We intend to study them with extreme care; after our discussions on them here we shall pool our ideas and send them on to you for consideration. Or, if you wish, you can send us any suggestions you may have in the meantime. We do not have to decide now in exactly what form our criticism and amendments will take when they are submitted for the discussion. The first reaction of a number of comrades to the document on Stalinism is the feeling that it may well have a dual character. On the surface it presents itself as an extension of orthodox Trotskyism, while its real drift in certain key passages is away from it. In view of the experiences with the previous Congress document, we want no possibility of ambiguity or misunderstandings in any new ones. And that is precisely what we propose to take measures to eliminate. We will either have agreement on a clear and unambiguous line, or forthright disagreement on opposing lines. But we are

determined to end the abominable indeterminateness which has plagued us for so long, and which has obscured the reasons for the unfolding faction fight.
We are thoroughly in favor of a continuation, deepening and strengthening of our joint collaboration. This has now become a life and death question. The former axis between Paris and us has been shattered. Whether or not it is beyond repair remains to be seen, but that is not now the decisive factor. A new axis has come into being —yours and ours. You should know, from all our past relations, as well as the present ones, how highly we value that.
As for P., we are inclined to reserve final judgment until we see his reaction to the latest developments here. We do not propose to take any action first. But, speaking for myself, I have very little optimism about the outcome. I shall not speak of the personal confidence game played on me and others, whatever the motives. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. But the visits of Clarke and John do not leave much margin for doubt, along  with   the   accusations   of   Cannon's   machinations

to destroy Pablo. This game of hide and seek which has been going on for so long is coming to end. Nor do I think you should nurse many illusions that the troubles we have had here will not crop up in your own bailiwick.
We have just received a letter from P. telling us about the two projected junkets. He proposes that Ernest see us instead of himself. From the standpoint of rational and realistic organizational methods these junkets come close to fantasy and recklessness. They are acting like compulsive grasshoppers leaping about without any steadiness of purpose. Even the best political line cannot be implemented in such a fashion.
In the light of our common experiences, I wish we had several days or weeks to talk all these matters over, but these few remarks will have to suffice for the moment. I wanted to bring you up to date on the most recent events. Jim will write separately to you.
M.
August 2, 1953

15. Report  Given   to   the Majority   Caucus of the New York Local (August 3, 1953), by George Novack
The City Convention has registered a victory for the majority here in Local New York. Now we take on the job of using that victory responsibly; not, as Bartell insinuated in his inimitable manner, "to divide the spoils," but to share the work, in implementing the program set forth by the National Plenum for this Local as well as all others.
This marks the opening of the second phase in the re-animation of the New York Local. Now we can proceed to put our house in order, insofar as that can be done under the given conditions. The first household task is to help de-odorize the atmosphere generated by the minority at the Convention. I refer to their efforts to scandalize the proceedings and poison inner party life by reading excerpts from supposedly sinister documents and letters purporting to demonstrate the existence of a Great Conspiracy, a super-sensational international intrigue on our part.
We have already become somewaht familiar with these cloak-and-dagger maneuvers. The minority has pulled them before. Most of you will recall the onion-skin letter from Cannon, which, in the early stage of the struggle last spring, was waved in front of selected comrades with the insinuation that this was part of an intrigue to organize a faction in order to perpetrate the most nefarious deeds. And Bartell, at the close of his presentation in the debate with Cannon, tried to make a similar sensation, quoting reports from various members of the minority on the National Committee about real or alleged conversations with Comrade Dobbs.
Now what were the aims of the minority leaders in springing their latest would-be sensation? First, they thought to belittle the majority victory and derail the Convention proceedings. Second, they were seeking to extricate themselves from the corner into which they felt themselves pushed by the whole development and internal movement

of the factional struggle —the consolidation of an authoritative majority in the national leadership at the Plenum, and subsequently the similar consolidation of a majority here in the New York Local. Third, they are endeavoring to keep their faction whipped up to white heat against the majority. Fourth, they are trying to becloud the opening of the new phase in the discussion of the political differences in the party here, and whatever differences may be put forward in the discussion which will precede the Fourth World Congress. Finally, they are using this "scandal" as a pretext for their refusal of collaboration in party work and the renewal of their split offensive.
I will now read to you the full text of Comrade Cannon's letter. Those of you who heard Comrade Cannon's report on "Internationalism and the SWP" — the other document Bartell quoted from —will, I believe, find in this letter nothing essentially new. The main points in the letter were either stated or alluded to in that report; the letter is a follow-up to the general viewpoint already set forth in that report by Comrade Cannon.
(Here Comrade Novack read the full text of Comrade Cannon's letter of June 4 to Tom, which was forwarded earlier to all caucus leaders and, if it has not already been done, should be made available to all the majority caucus to read.)
(After reading Comrade Cannon's letter, Comrade Novack continued:)
First of all, let me make two brief explanations. (1) On the point of Jerome's "dissimulating answer." When Comrade Stone broke with the minority, he reported to us that the minority claimed they were not only the true interpreters and defenders of the Third World Congress line, but that  Comrade  Clarke was  the closest associate and

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most authoritative spokesman for Pablo in this country. We therefore felt duty-bound to report what may well have been a misuse of the authority of that comrade in the factional situation. We believed that we were entitled to a removal of any ambiguity on that score. However, the answer we received neither affirmed nor denied these rumors which the minority had been spreading. That is why Comrade Cannon characterized the letter as a dissimulating answer.
(2) Bartell tried to make it "unprincipled" that Cannon wanted aji explicit understanding with Tom that there would be the closest collaboration, given their agreement on political fundamentals. Tom, for his part, recognized the principled character of Cannon's approach to the establishment of collaboration and was in full accord with it.
Tom's attitude stands in marked contrast to that of Clarke, who, when he was given the responsibility for making known our views in advance of the Third World Congress, violated that trust and —as he personally boasted at the Plenum — burned the document containing our views.
Now this letter by Comrade Cannon — which as you see is consistent with the international report he previously made to you —is similar to letters he has been writing to leading comrades throughout the movement for the past 25 years, whether or not there was a factional situation to worry about. I have no doubt that in the course of this struggle the minority also has conducted and is conducting a voluminous correspondence with quite a number of people. As a matter of fact, one reason which led us to conclude that the reply by Jerome was "dissimulating" was the fact that we had been reliably informed that he had been corresponding with the minority leadership, and that such correspondence had not been made known to the leaders of the party.
Comrade Cannon pointed out in his international report how completely contrary such procedure is to the relationship we had with comrade Trotsky in his lifetime, and to the procedures which have always been normal and correct in our movement. Comrade Trotsky would often reply to a comrade with differences, but he would always send a copy of his reply to comrade Cannon or to the leadership so that they could rest assured he was not attempting to tamper with the inner life of the party or doing anything behind the back of the responsible leadership. Otherwise, we would never be able to have a responsible elected leadership administering the organization, or have any kind of normal atmosphere in the party. Scrupulous adherence to such procedure is all the more necessary in the case of a faction fight threatening the unity of the party.
Comrade Cannon's apprehension that factionalism could be whipped up after the Plenum only by the introduction of the international factor has certainly been confirmed by the minority's conduct at the Convention. There is no justification whatever for the continuance of any power fight or red-hot factional atmosphere, on any national or local grounds, after the Plenum and this Convention. But as I said, the minority leadership needed a fresh diversion in order to heat up the atmosphere. And Bartell, in his report at the Convention, very clearly made the implicit threat of split if we dared continue the course which he assumed was projected in the letter he waved.

Now this implicit threat of split is in itself a clear violation of the unanimous agreement to which the minority bound themselves in the Plenum truce. Therefore they had to manufacture a new alleged scandal to substitute for all those pre-Plenum and pre-Convention beefs which have now collapsed. But this new "scandal" will be exposed and exploded too. We do not know whether the minority cooked up this would-be scandal on their own initiative, or whether it was undertaken in order to encourage some kind of intervention or action by others. In any event, we intend, as before, to repel any attempt from any quarter to stir up or encourage factional strife. For us, that is the only way to safeguard the peace and the unity of the party.
This letter, and other similar letters and documents, will be published, at the proper time, to insure that the comrades have a rounded picture and can give serious, objective consideration to the matters therein —just as all the material which has had a bearing on the issues in dispute up to this time have been presented either to our caucus or to the membership. You remember the hue and cry they raised about Cannon's onion-skin letter, about the Dobbs-Hansen-Stein memorandum, etc., all of which the minority challenged and dared us to produce — and all of which, in good time, we published. The comrades will understand that neither in the caucus, nor for that matter at all times in the party, is it possible, necessary, or desirable to bring everything at one tirhe to the attention of the membership. But, sooner or later in the course of party life, whatever is essential is conveyed to all the comrades — and so it will be to you.
The minority has a wider aim in trying to raise a cloud of supposed scandal at the present moment, because they are now in the midst of a new smuggling operation. This time it is Comrade Clarke's smuggling operation in connection with the magazine. The method they are using is the same one Cochran used last spring when, while launching a broadside against party election policy in Los Angeles, he raised in the PC the charges of financial irregularity, discrimination against the minority leading comrades on the staff, etc., Now we are confronted with this same method of crying "Scandal!" as a screen for smuggling in revisions of established party policy.
In the current issue of the magazine, Clarke has an article entitled "Stalin's Role—Stalinism's Future." This article was not shown to a single one of the majority leadership before its publication. More serious still, there are in it many misleading statements. Most important is the attempted revision of the established Trotskyist position on the inevitability of a political revolution by the workers to overthrow the Soviet bureaucracy. In the PC we challenged Clarke sharply on this point. Soon after, he presented two further pieces for the next issue of the magazine, one on the events in East Germany, the other on the Beria purge. These present a different line than the one given in the paper, which is the official line of the party. At the same time, they constitute a veiled polemic against this established line.
Now we have never permitted, and cannot permit, two different lines to appear in the organs of the movement But that would be the outcome —whatever Clarke's intent— if these two pieces appeared as editorials in the magazine.

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most authoritative spokesman for Pablo in this country. We therefore felt duty-bound to report what may well have been a misuse of the authority of that comrade in the factional situation. We believed that we were entitled to a removal of any ambiguity on that score. However, the answer we received neither affirmed nor denied these rumors which the minority had been spreading. That is why Comrade Cannon characterized the letter as a dissimulating answer.
(2) Bartell tried to make it "unprincipled" that Cannon wanted aja explicit understanding with Tom that there would be the closest collaboration, given their agreement on political fundamentals. Tom, for his part, recognized the principled character of Cannon's approach to the establishment of collaboration and was in full accord with it.
Tom's attitude stands in marked contrast to that of Clarke, who, when he was given the responsibility for making known our views in advance of the Third World Congress, violated that trust and —as he personally boasted at the Plenum — burned the document containing our views.
Now this letter by Comrade Cannon — which as you see is consistent with the international report he previously made to you —is similar to letters he has been writing to leading comrades throughout the movement for the past 25 years, whether or not there was a factional situation to worry about. I have no doubt that in the course of this struggle the minority also has conducted and is conducting a voluminous correspondence with quite a number of people. As a matter of fact, one reason which led us to conclude that the reply by Jerome was "dissimulating" was the fact that we had been reliably informed that he had been corresponding with the minority leadership, and that such correspondence had not been made known to the leaders of the party.
Comrade Cannon pointed out in his international report how completely contrary such procedure is to the relationship we had with comrade Trotsky in his lifetime, and to the procedures which have always been normal and correct in our movement. Comrade Trotsky would often reply to a comrade with differences, but he would always send a copy of his reply to comrade Cannon or to the leadership so that they could rest assured he was not attempting to tamper with the inner life of the party or doing anything behind the back of the responsible leadership. Otherwise, we would never be able to have a responsible elected leadership administering the organization, or have any kind of normal atmosphere in the party. Scrupulous adherence to such procedure is all the more necessary in the case of a faction fight threatening the unity of the party.
Comrade Cannon's apprehension that factionalism could be whipped up after the Plenum only by the introduction of the international factor has certainly been confirmed by the minority's conduct at the Convention. There is no justification whatever for the continuance of any power fight or red-hot factional atmosphere, on any national or local grounds, after the Plenum and this Convention. But as I said, the minority leadership needed a fresh diversion in order to heat up the atmosphere. And Bartell, in his report at the Convention, very clearly made the implicit threat of split if we dared continue the course which he assumed was projected in the letter he waved.

Now this implicit threat of split is in itself a clear violation of the unanimous agreement to which the minority bound themselves in the Plenum truce. Therefore they had to manufacture a new alleged scandal to substitute for all those pre-Plenum and pre-Convention beefs which have now collapsed. But this new "scandal" will be exposed and exploded too. We do not know whether the minority cooked up this would-be scandal on their own initiative, or whether it was undertaken in order to encourage some kind of intervention or action by others. In any event, we intend, as before, to repel any attempt from any quarter to stir up or encourage factional strife. For us, that is the only way to safeguard the peace and the unity of the party.
This letter, and other similar letters and documents, will be published, at the proper time, to insure that the comrades have a rounded picture and can give serious, objective consideration to the matters therein —just as all the material which has had a bearing on the issues in dispute up to this time have been presented either to our caucus or to the membership. You remember the hue and cry they raised about Cannon's onion-skin letter, about the Dobbs-Hansen-Stein memorandum, etc., all of which the minority challenged and dared us to produce — and all of which, in good time, we published. The comrades will understand that neither in the caucus, nor for that matter at all times in the party, is it possible, necessary, or desirable to bring everything at one time to the attention of the membership. But, sooner or later in the course of party life, whatever is essential is conveyed to all the comrades — and so it will be to you.
The minority has a wider aim in trying to raise a cloud of supposed scandal at the present moment, because they are now in the midst of a new smuggling operation. This time it is Comrade Clarke's smuggling operation in connection with the magazine. The method they are using is the same one Cochran used last spring when, while launching a broadside against party election policy in Los Angeles, he raised in the PC the charges of financial irregularity, discrimination against the minority leading comrades on the staff, etc., Now we are confronted with this same method of crying "Scandal!" as a screen for smuggling in revisions of established party policy.
In the current issue of the magazine, Clarke has an article entitled "Stalin's Role—Stalinism's Future." This article was not shown to a single one of the majority leadership before its publication. More serious still, there are in it many misleading statements. Most important is the attempted revision of the established Trotskyist position on the inevitability of a political revolution by the workers to overthrow the Soviet bureaucracy. In the PC we challenged Clarke sharply on this point. Soon after, he presented two further pieces for the next issue of the magazine, one on the events in East Germany, the other on the Beria purge. These present a different line than the one given in the paper, which is the official line of the party. At the same time, they constitute a veiled polemic against this established line.
Now we have never permitted, and cannot permit, two different lines to appear in the organs of the movement. But that would be the outcome —whatever Clarke's intent— if these two pieces appeared as editorials in the magazine.

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We have initiated two steps in order to bring the issues in dispute out plainly before the working-class public and before the party. We will publish the two pieces as signed articles by Clarke, prefacing them with an editorial note that these are his personal views, and that his editorial associates hold to a different analysis which will be printed in the following issue of the magazine. This will be a rounded piece counterposing the party policy to the line of Clarke's articles. In the same issue with his two articles, we are publishing a letter by Comrade Stein which, from the traditional standpoint of Trotskyism, justifiably takes exception to two main positions in Clarke's article on "Stalin's Role—Stalinism's Future."
The positions to which we take exception are: (1) Clarke's assertion that the Soviet economy is "nationalized in form, socialist in essence" — which Comrade Trotsky polemicized against in his debates against the Stalinist theoreticians. (2) This in turn is connected with Clarke's further proposition that it is now not entirely clear what form the struggle between the Soviet workers and the bureaucracy will take. "Will the process," he wrote, "take the form of a violent upheaval against bureaucratic rule in the USSR? Or will concessions to the masses and sharing of power —as was the long course in the English bourgeois revolution in the political relationship between the rising bourgeoisie and the declining nobility — gradually undermine the base of the bureaucracy? Or will the evolution be a combination of both forms? That we cannot now foresee."
I won't go into this at any length —but how on earth is it possible to combine two diametrically opposite forms: a "violent upheaval" against bureaucratic rule, and a "sharing of power" with it? That is something better brains than mine will have to figure out. But this internal contradiction is only one part of Clarke's throwing overboard, with no motivation or substantiation, our established position on the inevitability of political revolution in the Soviet Union. Our articles in the magazine will open a new phase in the political discussion here of our differences on theory, and they will very likely play a part in the coming pre-Congress discussion.
Neither in the discussion here, nor in the broader discussion, do we propose to allow any ambiguities to be contained  in any new documents.  We want resolutions that

mean what they say and say what they mean — and we intend to get them. This squabble over who is the best interpreter of documents, or who is the best interpreter of what may or may not go on in the mind of Pablo, is something entirely new in the history of our movement, and alien to our movement.
But not entirely new elsewhere. I have here a letter from Comrade Cannon in which he remarks: "We had that sort of business in the Comintern, in the later days of our sojourn in that jungle of machinations, intrigue and double-talk. Resolutions of the Comintern were always so worded that the factional battles would hinge around their interpretation. Many times the resolutions gave 'concessions' to our point of view —at least, that's what we, in our peasant ignorance, took them to be. But the Love-stoneites always claimed that the intention was different and that they had inside information to this effect I must admit that the Lovestoneites always proved to be right in this respect, even if in nothing else.
"Under the regime of Trotsky in our international movement, however, I cannot recall a single time or occasion when there was the slightest doubt or dispute as to what the resolutions, articles and theses drafted by him really meant. They meant exactly what they said, every time. That, in my opinion, is the best system. We cannot feel easy about the state of affairs in our international movement until this tradition of the 'old Trotskyism' is again reinstated as the invariable rule and not the exception."
We intend to participate fully, with our contributions and our point of view, in the forthcoming discussions on Stalinism and on all other questions. But our main job now is the work we have cut out for us here in the United States, on the basis of the line set forth in the Plenum resolutions — not only on American Stalinism, but on our perspectives for building an independent Socialist Workers Party in the United States. We have to offset the partial creeping paralysis that has been felt so strongly here. The positive outcome of the City Convention is that we can now put into practice in our daily work the recommendations for party building in the Plenum resolution.
So, having broken the factional log-jam, let's get moving forward.

16. Letter from   George Novack to  the Majority  of the SWP National Committee

New York, N.Y. Sept   10,   1953
Dear Comrades:
Since Comrade Cannon's report May 18th on "Internationalism and the SWP" we have sought to alert the majority caucus to the possibility that the Cochran faction had inspirers and allies in Paris and, if so, that the fight in the SWP would inevitably spread to a broader arena. It was known that Clarke started his factional operations upon his return from abroad two years ago; that the Cochranites   persistently   claimed   he  was   Pablo's  right-

hand man; and they claimed to be the real representatives of Pablo's interpretation of the Third World Congress documents. They recruited and held together their faction with the aid of this contention.
These circumstances indicated the possibility that the faction fight had been encouraged by some sort of understanding between Clarke and Pablo; that the Cochranites were proceeding with at least tacit support from that quarter; and that this was one of the main reasons for their arrogant and reckless behavior.
Despite growing apprehensions on this score, we were reluctant to come to a definite conclusion that this was

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the case. On one hand, early in the year after the Dobbs-Stein-Hansen memorandum was written, we received assurances that the general line the memorandum defended was acceptable to the IS and provided an adequate basis for continuing collaboration. On the other hand, in the absence of irrefutable evidence, we hesitated to believe that responsible figures would knowingly engage in a double game behind the backs of our party leadership. We had to suspend judgment pending further and conclusive proof of devious organizational methods unprecedented in our movement and at odds with all our traditions.
We did inform the IS that any outside intervention in the unfolding factional situation would be extremely unwise since it would serve only to complicate, prolong and embitter it, although we did not object to expressions of opinion by them on the political issues involved at some point in the literary discussion. The SWP has a leadership and membership mature and experienced enough in faction fights to solve its own internal problems. Moreover, as Comrade Cannon recalled in his report, we did not want any repetition of the moves made without our knowledge or consent in the fusion negotiations with the Shachtmanites during the Morrow-Goldman fight.
We learned later that, at an informal meeting in Paris held shortly before our May Plenum, Pablo and several others indicated sympathy with some of the minority's views and raised the question of taking a stand on the American struggle. This move toward intervention on behalf of the Cochranites was held up at that time by Burns' objections.
A week before the Plenum Comrade Cannon sent Pablo a digest of the information reported to us by Comrade Stone after his break with the Cochran faction regarding their claims to represent Pablo and his views in our party. We did this to give him the opportunity to repudiate these allegations and dissociate himself from the Cochranites and their revisionist positions. His ambiguous reply added to the accumulating evidence that he was dealing with the Cochranites behind our backs. Moreover, as we learned directly from him, he had been in correspondence with Clarke, although we did not know the content of the correspondence.
The agreement made at the Plenum temporarily altered the outlook of the internal situation. Having accepted it in good faith, the majority leadership was concerned with making the truce effective and preventing any further flareup of factional hostilities. As Comrade Cannon wrote in his letter to Tom, the main threat of disruption could come only from "some artificial 'intervention' from Paris, which would feed the flames of factionalism, again call in question the authority of the majority leadership, and plunge us headlong into an embittered factional organization struggle, with the implicit threat of split."
As his letter indicated, we would try to forestall such an unwarranted intervention, but would nevertheless prepare for its possibility. It appeared that the danger had been averted, at least for the time being, when a message came from the IS saluting the outcome of the Plenum.
The situation took a sharp turn when the Cochranites capped their disgraceful conduct in the New York Local by unloosing the "scandal-sensation" of the Cannon documents and trying to make them the pivot of the convention
«

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proceedings. The minority aimed to blow up the truce and renew the split offensive; shove aside the Plenum resolutions as the basis for party activity; switch the discussion from the home grounds where they had fared so poorly onto the field of foreign affairs. They sought to cast off party discipline in the name of allegiance to Pablo, and to justify their withdrawal from collaboration in party work and sabotage of party finances with the pretext that Cannon was organizing a personal international faction against Pablo.
This declaration of war was promptly followed by Clarke's trip abroad which was a defiant demonstration of international factional activity.
Now, as a sequel to these developments, come the IS letter of August 10 addressed to the NC Majority. This hypocritical letter confirms our worst expectations. It is contrived to back up the false allegations of the Cochranites and prepare the ground for extending their unprincipled factionalism throughout the world movement.
It is clear that this threatening letter is only a preliminary to a series of hostile moves against us and other orthodox Trotskyists. This has been made plain by the expansion of the factional warfare into England. There a group around Lawrence, obviously set into motion by Pablo, has opened hostilities against the Burns majority.
The internal struggle in England is unfolding along parallel lines and around the same fundamental issues as in this country —with the Lawrence clique using the same unsavory organizational methods as the Cochranites. For example, they have gone so far as to brand Burns an "American agent," and tried to impose IS discipline as a gag upon him to prevent him from expressing criticisms of the IS documents at the beginning of the discussion in his own party. Such methods, employed by the Comintern, have been unheard-of in our movement.
Simultaneously the IS has called a special meeting which portends new hostile acts of the same type, despite the declaration in their August 10 letter that "we are resolved to undertake nothing in this matter."
Even if there existed no serious political differences, such abominable organizational methods would have to be openly challenged and vigorously combatted. However, the severity of the clash on organizational grounds betokens the presence of political divergences on basic questions which will have to be fully brought out and counterposed to each other.
The nature and trend of these opposing views have already been manifested in the fight the majority has been waging against the Cochranites for the past year and a half. Under the war-cry of "Junk the Old Trotskyism," this revisionist and liquidationist tendency has been throwing overboard more and more of the principles and positions of our party, including our conception of the role of the revolutionary party and the Trotskyist analysis of the character and role of Stalinism.
It is now apparent that the lines developed by the Cochranites is merging with that of an international tendency which not only shares their general outlook but may well have prompted at least part of their ideas. Those who support the course taken by the Cochranites do not represent the views of orthodox Trotskyism — and that is precisely the core of the developing political dispute.

The major task before us is to clarify the growing theoretical and political differences between the orthodox Trot-skyists and those who are moving away from basic Trotskyist concepts, especially on the nature and role of Stalinism and the role and prospects of world Trotskyism. The international discussion preparatory to the Fourth World Congress will be utilized for that purpose, and we shall continue to press for the fullest probing of the political questions at the bottom of this conflict.
As a number of comrades have already observed, the trend of thought in Pablo's article on "The Post-Stalin 'New Course'" in the March-April magazine approaches the appraisal of the Stalinist bureaucracy and Stalinism's future which we have already challenged in Clarke's articles. There Pablo envisages the liquidation of Stalinism, not through the organization and victory of the uprising of the Soviet masses against the Stalinist bureaucracy, but through the progressive reform of the bureaucratic and police regime under mounting pressure from the masses.
He raises the question: what form will the now irresistible liquidation of the Stalinist regime take? "Will it be that   of   an  acute  crisis  and  of violent interbureaucratic

struggles between the elements who will fight for the status quo, if not for turning back, and the more and more numerous elements drawn by the powerful pressure of the masses?"
This is a partial projection of the idea put forward by Clarke that the bureaucracy may reform itself, share power, and a section of it even lead the anti-bureaucratic movement of the masses. In our opinion this is not a realistic view of the way Stalinism will be liquidated; it points toward liquidation of the Trotskyist program of the necessity of the mass uprising to smash the entire bureaucratic caste.
In the forthcoming discussions in our party and in the world movement, we propose to challenge all such false conceptions head-on. Against the revisionist cry of "Junk the Old Trotskyism," we will raise the slogan of "Hold fast to Orthodox Trotskyism against the new revisionists."
Fraternally,
William   F. Warde

SECTION V: THE DEEPENING DIFFERENCES ON STALINISM

[The materials in this section deal with initial efforts of the American Trotskyists to dissect the views of the grouping that had formed around Pablo in the International. The article by Stein was a first response to the resolution "Rise and Decline of Stalinism," drafted by Ernest Germain, in which some of Pablo's ideas received more open expression than heretofore. This resolution had been submitted by the International Secretariat for a vote at the coming world congress. It can be found in SWP International Information Bulletin, September 1953, in an unamended form.
[George Novack's talk, given to a majority caucus meet-

ing in New York City, was aimed at the latest contributions of George Clarke to the party's theoretical magazine, Fourth International. Clarke projected the possibility that the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union would decide to share the power with the working masses. (Clarke's articles appear in Part Four of this collection.) The "Memorandum on 'Rise and Decline of Stalinism'" was written by a subcommittee of the SWP Political Committee in October 1953. Intended as a presentation of the deep differences that had emerged in the Trotskyist movement, it was quickly overtaken by events as Pablo moved rapidly toward a split. The amendments and corrections to this memorandum have been omitted from this volume.]

1.  "Some Remarks   on  'The Rise and Fall of Stalinism, by Morris Stein

In reading "The Rise and Fall of Stalinism" I came upon the following endorsement of the Trotskyist program for the Soviet Union: "The program of action put forward in this "connection by the Transitional Program and which the Second World Congress reaffirmed and concretized, now acquires burning actuality."
This statement of support would seem to apply to the program in its entirety. The document, however, does not leave it at this. It proceeds to cite the Transitional Program in a footnote. But in citing it, it stops short of the two last sentences reading as follows: "Only the   victorious   revolutionary   uprising   of   the  oppressed

masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection — the party of the Fourth International!"
Why are these two sentences omitted? They contain the two central political conclusions of our program, namely: (1) that only a mass uprising of the oppressed masses can guarantee the Soviet Union's further development towards socialism and (2) that only a Trotskyist party can lead such an uprising. Without such a clear-cut statement as to how and by whom the program will be carried out,  it remains  suspended  in mid air.  This omission be-

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comes   all  the more glaring in view of the statement that this program "now acquires burning actuality."
I propose to deal here with the reasons for this omission as I deduce them from the document.
The main conclusions of the document.
The main political conclusions of the document can be summed up in the following passages of the introduction to "The Rise and Fall of Stalinism."
"The fundamental conditions under which the Soviet bureaucracy and its tight hold over the Communist parties developed, namely, the ebb of the revolution, the isolation of the Soviet Union and the backward condition of its economy — these conditions have disappeared" (p. 2).
These qualitative changes in the objective world situation— that is the disappearance of all the conditions which originally gave rise to the Kremlin bureaucracy — have already set into motion the forces for the socialist regeneration of the S.U. and the disintegration of Stalinism the world over.
That is the next proposition. It is stated as follows: "The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death do not constitute only the first stage of a process which must end in the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union. These changes likewise constitute the relaxation of the brake, which has operated in the most conservative and even reactionary way over what today still comprises the most important revolutionary vanguard in the world, even in the many countries where the Communist parties are extremely weak. As a result there has opened up a new stage not only in the Soviet Union but also in the development of the Communist parties and of the non-capitalist countries, accelerating the disintegration of Stalinism in the sense indicated above."
What can be the tasks of the Trotskyist movement in the face of this alleged development? If we are witnessing the beginning of the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Stalinism as a political power on a world scale, then we have made a leap into a new epoch. This would require indeed that "we junk old Trotskyism". In this context the omissions from the Transitional Program assume precisely this meaning.
From this also flow perspectives and role for the Fourth International which is set down in the document as follows:
"The role of the Fourth International, which was created in order to assure the continuity of Marxist revolutionary program and organisation is to intervene in this disintegration in order to rally around its banner the forces influenced to this day by Stalinism." p. 4.
There is no support for this contention in the founding documents of our movement which assigns to the Fourth International the solution of the historical crisis of the leadership of the proletariat. The Transitional Program states categorically that "the crisis of the proletarian leadership, having become the crisis in mankind's culture, can be resolved only by the Fourth International."
Yet it is the propositions set down above that constitute the general framework of "The Rise and Fall of Stalinism." It gives  the impression  of being a traditional Trotskyist

document This historic review of the world situation, following the Russian Revolution is largely based on Trotsky's writings. The analysis of the present situation and the predictions of things to come, seem to flow logically from this historical review.
A Liquidationist Document
But that is only the first impression. A careful study of the resolution reveals it as the most deep going revisionist document seen in our movement to date. Acceptance of the main line of the resolution would result in complete ideological disarming and eventual liquidation of Trotskyism.
If there has been so sweeping a change in the Soviet Union and in world Stalinism as the resolution asserts, then an entirely new system of political ideas and organizational perspectives is in order. For example, what is needed in the Soviet Union is not a Trotskyist party to lead the mass uprising, but a party of reform that would help along in the "socialist regeneration" that is already on the way. Or, no party at all but an alliance with the "reform" forces inside the CP. If Stalinism is disintegrating within the existing communist parties, why wrestle anywhere with the task of building independent parties? We should on the contrary be devoting our thoughts and efforts to the best ways of intervening in the existing Communist Parties to help the disintegration of Stalinism already taking place at an accelerated rate. Small though some of them may be—they would nevertheless offer the best immediate prospects. There may be a chance to enter. Or perhaps fuse with a given CP. or an important seg-nority in small doses without serious motivation. The resolution undertakes to provide such motivation.
Motivation for Political Conclusions
It begins with the following historical review as its point of departure:
"The evolution of the Soviet Union and of the world working class movement since 1917 is fundamentally determined by the dynamic of the relation of class forces on the world scale. This development has passed through three major phases: the rise of the revolution in 1917-23, the ebb of the world revolution in 1923-43, and the new revolutionary rise since 1943."
Take careful note of the alleged three major phases and especially of the contention that the ebb of the revolution lasted from 1923 to 1943 —twenty long years, while, on the contrary, there has been a continuous rise since 1943 —the last ten years. This is the keystone for the contention that we are now living in a fundamentally different epoch. It therefore deserves the closest scrutiny.
To begin with, it introduces an entirely new calendar of revolutionary ebb and rise. From 1923 to 1943 it records nothing but "ebb." The defeats of the workers resulting from the betrayals of the traditional leaderships are used to blanket out the abundance of revolutionary situations. For precisely during these two decades designated as the period of ebb, the capitalist world was convulsed by one revolutionary crisis after another. 1923 itself was the year of the revolutionary situation in Germany created   by   the  French  occupation  of the  Ruhr.   1925-6

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saw the British general strike and profound revolutionary convulsions in Poland. 1925-7 was the period of the Chinese revolution. 1931-37 marked the Spanish revolution. 1934 saw the pre-revolutionary situation in France, which came to a climax in 1936, when the "Peoples Fronts" destroyed it.
In other words, during this so called twenty year ebb, the whole capitalist world, engulfed in economic crisis, was shaken by revolutionary convulsions. Even the United States, the most privileged capitalist country in the world, witnessed a tremendous working class upsurge in this period. The Transitional Program speaks of it as follows: "The unprecedented wave of sit-down strikes and the amazingly rapid growth of industrial unionism in the United States (CIO) is the most indisputable expression of the instinctive striving of the American workers to raise themselves to the level of the tasks imposed on them by history." Why then is this entire period wrongly designated as one of ebb? Because, the resolution tries to explain, "despite-these many opportunities the ebb of the revolution became more and more accentuated, it was not all due to the automatism of the mass movement, but, on the contrary, to the pernicious role played by the workers' leaderships."
Criteria for Revolutionary Ebb and Rise.
This explanation confuses matters instead of clarifying them. It identifies revolutionary situations with revolutionary victories. Defeats are made to cancel out everything, including the appearance and struggle of the revolutionary masses. Trotskyists have never used such a criterion for determining the character of a given period. The distinguishing features of the period 1923-1943 was its profoundly revolutionary character, despite the countless betrayals of the Stalinists, Social Democrats and the Anarcho-Syndicalists (Spain).
This innocent looking reevaluation of an entire historical period serves, as we shall presently show, a far from innocent design. For the moment, however, let us go along with the contention that the "pernicious roler played by the workers' leadership" justifies the designation of revolutionary periods as periods of ebb. This same criterion should then also be applied to the period beginning with 1943 —the ten years of "revolutionary rise."
This period is quite fresh in our memory. Let us recall among other things that the Stalinists played the major roie in betraying the French and Italian revolutions, in the crushing of the Greek revolution and in the general rehabilitation of the bankrupt capitalist system in Western Europe. This is also the period when we saw in Yugoslavia both the conquest of power by the CP as well as the merciless Kremlin campaign which finally drove the regime to seek ^protection" in the imperialist camp. There is obviously something wrong in including all of these under the general heading of revolutionary rise. Partial victories are here used to blanket out the "pernicious role" of the official leadership. The authors of the resolution are not unaware of this, and to mend their fences they introduce the following modifying proposition. "The period from 1943 to 1947 . . . discloses itself as a transitional period between the ebb and the new rise of the world revolution."

It is called "transitional" because "The world revolutionary rise was still not powerful enough to permit the bypassing and engulfing of Stalinism . . ." (with the sole exception of Yugoslavia. It was only after 1947 therefore, when the real rise came. It was then that ". . . the revolutionary wave, above all the victory of the Chinese revolution, overcame this total attempt by the Soviet bureaucracy to maintain a policy of equilibrium."
The factor of "pernicious leadership" which determined the twenty years' period of "revolutionary ebb" up to 1943, is cast off here with the same facility as it was introduced a moment earlier. It now gives way to a new mystical criterion—the power of the revolutionary wave "by-passing and engulfing Stalinism." The epochs of revolutionary ebb and rise are juggled to serve preconceptions. All revolutionary struggles dating back to the October Revolution are thus cast in a new mould. For what purpose?
Is the purpose perhaps to lay claim that the Chinese revolution, unquestionably the biggest victory against capitalism since October 1917, has introduced a qualitative change in the world situation? Let us then discuss on that basis. But why come to this claim by such a devious route and in such a tortured manner? Why force historic events into an artificial construction of revolutionary ebb and rise in order to reach an understanding of the significance of the Chinese revolution? The interests of political clarity would dictate a direct approach. We would then take the Chinese revolution as the point of departure in a precise assessment of the concrete relationship of forces resulting from this revolution and determine whether it has indeed "engulfed" Stalinism, and transformed this entire period dating back to 1943 up to the present and apparently for all time to come into a period of continuous revolutionary rise. A concrete analysis of the Chinese revolution and its consequences would not permit of such loose talk and thinking.
"The Engulfing" Revolutionary Wave.
The Chinese revolution has been thrown in as simply one of the ingredients of a new panacea — the all-engulfing revolutionary wave. The other ingredient consists, as we have seen, of juggling with the rhythm of revolutionary developments. We come next to a third ingredient — distortion of historic facts.
The resolution states that during the so-called transitional period, 1943-47 "the world revolutionary rise was still not powerful enough to permit the by-passing and engulfing of Stalinism. . . . But this wave was sufficiently menacing to bring imperialism to seek a modus vivendi with the Soviet bureaucracy. The latter undertook to halt or try to force back the revolution in return for territorial and economic concessions." But then the resolution goes on to add that the revolutionary rise came into full force and "Engulfed by the revolution, stifling within a vital area far too narrow for its needs and menaced by terrible economic shocks imperialism sought to pass on to the offensive. . . ."
The above is at variance with what we have said on many previous occasions. The facts are "engulfed" here under waves of inflated generalities. The truth is quite different.
Imperialism   passed   to   the offensive not when it was

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"engulfed by the revolution" but when the post-war revolutionary wave seemed to be no longer threatening; when capitalism in Western Europe was rehabilitated not so much thanks to U.S. aid as to the "pernicious role" of the Stalinists. It was precisely when the Stalinists finished their treacherous job that they were booted out of the West European cabinets. The Truman doctrine was proclaimed and the Marshall Plan followed. It was only then that the Kremlin bureaucracy, in self defense began to eliminate the capitalist elements in the buffer zone.
So far as Western Europe is concerned the years immediately following 1947 have been marked, by and large, by a recession and not a rise. It should be obvious then, that we are dealing here not with a global revolutionary rise preceded by a "transition" period, but with an uneven and contradictory development in which the betrayed European revolution (1943-47) has resulted not in a period of revolutionary rise but of the resumption of capitalist offensive. What the imperialists — and the Kremlin — did not figure on is that the Chinese CP, under the impact of the peasants uprising and in the face of Chiang's offensive would dare make a bid for power. The triumph of Mao Tse-tung therefore upset the equilibrium between the Kremlin and the imperialists, as the resolution claims, simply because that equilibrium had been previously upset on the European arena. We have thus witnessed the unfoldment of the Chinese revolution while the Western European workers were on the defensive.
The bankrupt and chronically sick capitalist government of France, for example, has dared to repeatedly provoke the workers by attacks on their living standards. How does this fit into the scheme of an "engulfing" revolutionary rise? They dared do it because they knew that their rule is not threatened either by the Socialists or the Stalinists. It is noteworthy that even at the height of the general strike in France (Aug. 13, 1953) the N. Y. Times does not hesitate to say editorially, "It would be a gross exaggeration today to believe or give the impression that a revolutionary situation is brewing in France. A better way of putting it is to use Paul Reynaud's phrase: 'the sick man of Europe'. French vitality is such that one can feel reasonably sure of recovery." It is not "French vitality" the N. Y. Times is relying on, but the prostration of the official workers' leaderships in France. "The sick man of Europe" can go on being sick so long as there is no one to administer the coup de grace.
This general strike of several weeks' duration underscores the basic Trotskyist conclusion of the iron necessity of the revolutionary party as the only way of resolving the crisis of proletarian leadership. What is decisive is not a wave, "engulfing" or otherwise, but the issue of program and leadership. The General Strike created a revolutionary situation in France, it posed the question of power point blank, but there was no revolutionary party in this situation. This is the principal lesson that must be drawn and hammered in France. It is just as true today in the period of "revolutionary rise" as it was in the alleged twenty-year period of "revolutionary ebb."
Inflated Optimism.
This brings us  to yet another ingredient of the mystic

formula of "engulfing waves"—and that is inflated optimism. Let us take a close look at the following quotation.
"With the victory of the Chinese revolution over the Kuo-mintang regime, the period of the revolutionary upsurge, which began in 1943 with the downfall of fascism in Italy, entered a new stage, basically marked by a relation of international forces favourable to the revolution and evolving on a global scale more and more favourably for the revolution. The revolutionary wave spreads from country to country, from continent to continent. It has recently reached the Soviet Union itself and the buffer   zone."
Such inflated optimism is not even excusable as a peroration in an agitational speech. But here it is presented as an ostensibly sober statement of fact, as the point of departure for the revision of traditional Trotskyism. It would be excusable to speak of "a new stage, basically marked by a relation of international forces favourable to the revolution" if one could point not only to capitalist decay, which is the constant element in our epoch, or the mood of the masses, who have proved their revolutionary zeal and combativity over and over again, but also to parties and leaderships, whose revolutionary capacities arebeyond doubt. This is a lesson we have learned from Trotsky and which has been verified again and again through bitter experience.
But even if we could boast of tested Marxist parties in every country of the globe, it would still be wrong to say in such a Pollyanna manner that "The revolutionary wave spreads from country to country, from continent to continent". It does not help in this painful epoch of transition from one social order to another to underestimate the power and resources of the capitalist adversary and to minimize the crisis of leadership from which the revolutionary forces suffer.
Since October 1917 decaying capitalism has lost much ground. But a sober assessment must also take into account the fact that as a world system it has survived the onslaught of the October revolution, World War II and the Chinese revolution. Capitalism is still the dominant force in world economy. What is worse, there isn't a single capitalist country in which we can truthfully say that the crisis of proletarian leadership has been fully resolved. We have the beginnings. These can grow and develop into mass parties. The prerequisite for it is, that they be not engulfed by illusions but learn how to face reality. It would be a good exercise in sober thinking to start with a listing of all the countries of the world, continent by continent to see where the above-quoted contention of the resolution actually stands the test. It does no good to add up all the plus signs on the side of the workers' revolution as against the minus signs on the side of capitalist counter-revolution. Such a balance sheet would naturally look very imposing. But you could only get into trouble if you try to draw on it
Revolutionary Romanticism.
The concept of uninterrupted revolution was quite widespread, following October 1917. There were many then who saw ahead nothing but the continuous offensive of the revolution. They saw the weakness of world capitalism following the war, the inability of the bourgeoisie to strangle the October revolution and concluded that therefore

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there is nothing ahead but revolutionary offensive which would topple the system. They too overlooked one point: the importance of the party in scoring revolutionary successes. It took the combined authority of Lenin and Trotsky to put an end to this revolutionary romanticism and to direct the young Communist parties to apply themselves to the task  of educating cadres and winning the masses.
A similar mood is apparently rife in our movement following the Chinese revolution. But these are not the early 20's. We have lived through the experiences of the last three decades. We have had the benefit of Trotsky's illuminating analysis. Such romanticism is completely out of place in our ranks. The Chinese revolution is to be sure a great victory, but we can't expect from it more than it can give. Leaving aside the regime in China — Stalinist in origin and ideology — the country as a whole is completely dependent on the Kremlin for economic and technical assistance. This dependence has grown greater as a consequence of the Korean war. Following the Korea truce, the tendency in China must of necessity be similar to the tendency in the Soviet Union following the Civil War. While in Russia the tendency away from Internationalism and toward "socialism in one country" met with the fierce resistance of the Left Opposition, i.e., the conscious wing within the ranks of the leadership, we are not aware of any such comparable revolutionary tendencies and forces in China. It is ominous that a bloody Stalinist-type purge followed the armistice in North Korea. This purge could not have taken place without the consent or connivance of the Chinese leadership who dominate the country militarily. We do not presume to know why the purge, but we can surmise. Under the circumstances of a truce whjph involves important concessions to imperialism those to be purged were most likely those who resisted these concessions.
What the Chinese revolution itself needs more than anything is the extension of the world revolution, so that it can be saved from further degeneration and retreat. This need cannot be resolved by glowing phrases about engulfing revolutionary waves.
The resolution stands on its head the Trotskyist concept that the key to the extension of the world revolution is in the hands of the subjective factor, i.e., the revolutionary party. Instead of the subjective factor being the necessary element in the revolution, the "engulfing" revolution by its own inherent power resolves the subjective factor. This formula transforms the traditional workers' parties, the agencies of defeat in the past period into agencies of revolution in this so-called new epoch.
This revision of the Leninist-Trotskyist concept is impelled by an impatience with historical processes—a desire to hurry things up. To find a streamlined solution applying equally well to all continents and which would settle all the contradictions once and for all.
The formula of "engulfing revolution" does wonders — on paper. It resolves the problem of revolutionary leadership not only for the capitalist countries, but also for those dominated by the Kremlin bureaucracy. The same alchemy which transforms the traditional parties of betrayal into parties of revolution operates equally well in both cases. This is why the resolution discards the key propositions of the founding program of the Fourth International.

A Syllogism for Conservatism.
In the section on the buffer countries the resolution states: "It is still too early to predict the precise organizational form which the revolutionary rise will assume in the buffer zone countries."
Why should it be too early "to predict the precise organizational form which the revolutionary rise will assume in the buffer zone countries"? The transitional program predicted it in precise terms for the Soviet Union in 1938. Furthermore, the "Rise and Fall of Stalinism" states that the tasks in the buffer zone countries are"in general similar to those we have in the Soviet Union."Why then this sudden "caution"? The truth is —let's face it —the "too early to predict" formulation is a hypocritical cover for discarding the Trotskyist program. The "caution" in making predictions is discarded in the very next sentence. It reads: "Two variants are possible." The resolution then proceeds to make "precise" predictions. They are precise chiefly in one sense: they leave no room for a Trotskyist party, as outlined in the following variants:
"The development of independent mass movements finding their coordination outside the legally existing organizations through the appearance of new political currents or the revival of Social-Democratic organizations. ..."
"The development of autonomous mass actions transmitting themselves to the native communist parties and giving rise to leftist currents capable of giving leadership to the upsurge. ..."
There is yet another variant.
"A combination of these two organizational forms can by no means be excluded." This third variant is not explained. However, none of the three variants speak specifically of the emergence of a Trotskyist party. As we read on, furthermore, all the three variants become united into one.
Here is what the resolution says later on on this point: "On the other hand, the more the outbreak of the revolutionary rise is retarded, the more will the young generation awaken to political life. This generation will have known no form of political organization other than the CP, and the latter will tend to become the natural arena in which the leadership of the new revolutionary rise will develop. That is why our forces must seek to realize their tasks, which are in general similar to those we have in the Soviet Union, through an entrist tactic toward the CP, while remaining prepared to join quickly any other mass organization which may appear at the beginning of the upsurge."
The simple syllogism that since the young generation will nave known no form of political organization other than the CP, therefore the CP will become the natural arena in which the leadership of the new revolutionary rise will develop, can be used with equal logic to predict indefinite political stagnation in every country of the world. Fortunately, life does not follow such a pattern. The political awakening of the youth, contrary to this conservative concept will take place in struggle and revolt against the existing political forms which are tantamount to their political disenfranchisement.
A Trotskyist worker in the Soviet Union or in the buffer zone would no doubt say to the above: "Thank you for your learned advice and expert generalship with which you marshall your forces.   But you  see,  the workers in

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my factory, young as well as old, have some prejudices against the CP. They see in it the party of bureaucrats who abuse them and mistreat them, of the secret police who always snoop on them, and the army officer caste who kick them around when they are soldiers. They are suspicious of everyone with a party card —for fear he may be spying on them. They never confide in a party member because those who did had the misfortune of disappearing without a trace. There is a gulf between the workers and the CP. Wouldn't it be better to organize my own group even on a modest beginning? Such a group would be bound together by the common ties of hatred for the oppressive, treacherous bureaucracy. Opposition views among workers find an echo and protection. But to enter the party of the bureaucracy with opposition views and with illusions concerning the nature of this party would be tantamount to political and physical suicide."
The confident statement in the founding program that "There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection" is not an abstract political slogan but a guide to action based on the Soviet reality.
It was painful to see that in its statement on the recent uprising of the East German workers, the IS raised the slogan "democratize the CP." The workers who rose up in a life and death struggle against the CP puppets of the Kremlin demanding their overthrow, are not told to build their own party as the only guarantee of victory. They are given the address of the party against which they revolted.
The inflated optimism about the revolutionary wave which is spreading from country to country and continent to continent, is this a cover for deep pessimism about the capabilities of the working class and the revolutionary vanguard. The sum total of this line can only be liquida-

tionism. Why bother building a party when everything is becoming resolved — or will be resolved eventually — by a mounting revolutionary wave. Why be interested in Trade Union activity or have patience with backward workers when everything is ablaze with revolution. Why study Marxist classics when they do not apply to the new epoch?
The claim may be made that in exposing the liquida-tionist political line of the resolution, we are opposing the entrist tactic. Far from it. We believe firmly in utilizing the entrist tactic as an aid in the construction of the revolutionary party. But this is not what is involved in the document under discussion. Entrism here is merely incidental to a political line of liquidationism.
The foregoing remarks on the resolution have dealt only with two aspects: the objective situation and the role of the party. Just as wrong are other contentions in the resolution to the effect that there has been a fundamental change in the Soviet economy, removing the conditions which gave rise to the bureaucracy. Wrong are the interpretations placed on the developments in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death. All of this, plus a more precise evaluation of the Chinese revolution, will no doubt be brought out in the discussion period. Here I attempt to call to the attention of the majority comrades the deep-going revisionism in the resolution which flies directly counter to reality and counter to the traditional political conclusions of our movement, with which the authors of the resolution say they are in agreement.
My remarks are intended to start the discussion going among the leading members of the majority. Once we have reached agreement among ourselves, we must carry the discussion into the ranks. We must once again Trot-skyize the Trotskyist movement.
August 23, 1953

2. "Clarke's Views on Stalinism." by George Novack
(Talk  Given  To  the New York Majority Caucus, August 17, 1953)

Revisionism comes from a masked change in the fundamental theory, methods and perspectives of the revolutionary workers' movement. It is a departure from scientific socialism in theory and in practice which derails the class struggle from a correct and consistent course. It is undertaken under pressure from alien social ideas, interests and forces. In its first stages, revisionism does not come forward in an open and forthright challenge to the Marxist position, but proceeds by stealth. It tries to insinuate its new ideas into the structure of the established ones, inserting them as levers in order to undermine and eventually overthrow the established positions. It doles out its modifications bit by bit, until it becomes bold enough to counterpose its revisions squarely to the old line.
This procedure often may appear like deliberate deceit; it is imposed upon the revisionists, however, by circumstances beyond their control. On the one hand, this procedure reflects the objective trend of revisionist thinking, which deviates from Marxism a step or so at a time — often  without   admitting that fact to itself, not to speak

of others. On the other hand, the revisionists have to reckon at every stage with the solidly-rooted traditions of the revolutionary movement, which stand like a giant barrier athwart its path; and they must therefore resort to protective coloration. The favorite pretext is to claim that they are doing nothing but bringing Marxism up to date, modernizing it, bringing it abreast of new events unforeseen by anyone, especially the founders and great leaders of the movement. For example, in 1939-40, Shacht-man counterposed to Trotsky's vigorous defense of Marxism, what he called the "concreteness of living events." And that is precisely how the Cochranites have been proceeding.
I propose to demonstrate this by analyzing George Clarke's article in the January-February magazine entitled, "Stalin's Death—Stalinism's Future." In this article we see evidence of a growing disposition to embellish Stalinism, and to eliminate the distinctive counter-positions of Trotsky. Clarke alters the history of the Soviet Union since 1923; he alters our scientific definition of Soviet society and the Stalinist bureaucracy; he paints up

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the role of Stalin — all of this in order to pave the way for a change in certain planks of the Trotskyist program, especially our position on the inevitability of a political revolution through the mass uprising of the Soviet workers against the Kremlin caste. Clarke does not do this directly but in a concealed fashion, by confusions, omissions, as well as outright falsifications.
It is quite possible, of course, for a comrade now and then to strike a false note. When it is called to the comrade's attention, he will correct his error. Even though he may persist, one needn't place too much weight upon it if it is an incidental, episodic falsity. But when a leading comrade, who presumably speaks in the name of the party as executive editor of its theoretical organ," writes an article on such an occasion on such a subject, and strikes a whole series of false notes — then one detects a methodical line, and one says: This is not simply a false note, but a new tune.
This was a smuggling operation on two counts. First, Clarke didn't show the article to any of the majority comrades who had co-responsibility for the contents of the magazine. Second, we can assume that his reason for not showing the article was that, under the guise of presenting an orthodox Trotskyist analysis, he wanted to slip in views which have a different trademark and another content. That is why it is necessary to subject his article to careful scrutiny and critical dismemberment.
Let us first contrast the two versions of the history of the Soviet Union since 1923 — the Trotskyist version and the version Clarke sketches. For us, the development of the Soviet Union in the last 30 years has been an extremely contradictory one. Politically, these 30 years have been essentially a period of counter-revolution. After the giant revolutionary leap forward, the working class was totally deprived of its power and rights. A bureaucratic caste numbering millions concentrated all power in its hands and set up a totalitarian apparatus to oppress the people and to guard its power, privileges and income. Stalin became the agent, the head, the supreme arbiter of this completely counter-revolutionary social stratum upon which his regime directly rested. This domination of the usurping bureaucracy in the Soviet Union led to the transformation of the Communist International and the Stalinist parties into mere instruments of the bureaucracy. It led to one defeat after another of the world working class, and to the degeneration of the Stalinized international movement into a reactionary, and finally, a counter-revolutionary political force in the world labor movement, as was witnessed in Spain and during the Second World War.
However, while betraying the revolution at home and abroad and destroying the gains in the Soviet superstructure, the Stalinist bureaucracy did not do away with the fundamental economic conquests of the revolution — the nationalized property, planned economy and monopoly of foreign trade. These were maintained, developed and after the Second World War, even extended. The socialized property and productive relations were factors and forces primarily responsible for the amazing achievements registered by the Soviet Union in war and peace. These achievements were possible because of the surviving institutions of the 1917 revolution — and despite the crimes and mismanagement of the bureaucracy at home and abroad. The credit for them belongs, we have always con-

tended, not to Stalinism, but to the revolution which the bureaucracy opposed and exploited for its selfish aims. That has always been the Trotskyist viewpoint.
No one would have expected a Trotskyist spokesman to have presented that viewpoint as the line of an article summing up Stalin's lifetime from 1923 on. But what is the history of these years according to Clarke? For him, the Stalinist epoch was a period, not of political counterrevolution, but of "reaction." He does not once use the designation "political counter-revolution" in his article summarizing the past 30 years. One would gather from his treatment that what actually took place was not a collision between the forces of the revolution and of the counter-revolution within the Soviet Union, but rather a revolution which went forward in a zig-zag way. During this period, despite twists and turns and setbacks, the revolution, according to Clarke, continued.
For example, he writes that, after a right turn from 1923 to 1929, "The revolution turned to the left again. . . . The proletariat imposed its historic interests on this bureaucracy. . . . The Stalinist bureaucracy were compelled in the interests of self-preservation to again arouse the plebeians of the 20th century." And how was this done? They summoned the working class "to carry the major brunt of toil and sacrifice in the execution of the Five-Year Plans" and sent out the "most hardy and courageous elements of this class" to collectivize the peasants. This aroused colossal enthusiasm among the workers during this period and the revolution spurted forward.
Now it is true that the course of leaning upon the kulaks in the struggle against the revolutionary elements of the working class was abruptly halted and turned about after 1928-1929. But, as Trotsky explained, the resultant left turn of the Stalinist bureaucracy, taken in panic, did not represent a renewal of the revolution but rather an attempt by the bureaucracy to save itself from further aggressions on the part of the openly restorationist elements. In the course of this struggle, the working class in the Soviet Union was prostrate, bound and gagged, and a new aristocracy crystallized.
The workers naturally gave support to the bureaucracy insofar as the latter proceeded against the kulaks —though giving no sanction to the methods of the bureaucracy. They were naturally drawn in, and with great enthusiasm, to the first achievements of the Five-Year Plan, since this too was an objective in their own interests. But at the same time they were completely excluded from democratic participation in the Plan, and mercilessly deprived of the necessary means to give their best to it. According to Clarke, however, this period was essentially an upsurge of the revolution.
Clarke's picture of the historical process is not one of the revolution reversed and betrayed, but the revolution impeded yet carried forward, though in a harsh, expensive and bureaucratic manner. What, according to Clarke, was the role of the bureaucracy in this process? Was it counter-revolutionary? No. According to Clarke, it was "anti-revolutionary." Clarke introduces here a change in the vocabulary traditional to our movement; and this change in vocabulary is part and parcel of his change in appraisal. All this is so consistent that one can only deduce that it springs from a different set of estimates of the events themselves. The bureaucracy is not the promoter of the counter-revolution,  but in certain of its as-

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pects and activities becomes the involuntary promoter of the revolution. This is reflected in Stalin's role, since obviously no one better represented the bureaucracy than Stalin himself.
I will quote what Clarke says on this: "The revolution not only survived" — that is, survived the throttling of the revolutionary wing of the Russian working class, the smashing of the left opposition and the removal of the proletariat "as the conscious guiding force of the revolution and from all direct participation in the state and the economy" — "it not only survived but it even succeeded in making its agent in a distorted and unexpected way the very engineer of the triumphant reaction, Stalin himself." Note here the avoidance of that terrible word "counterrevolution." Stalin is no more than the engineer of the •"triumphant reaction." Further on, Clarke states this view even more precisely: "Stalin's role was fundamentally a barrier to the progress of the Russian Revolution."
Now this puts everything upside down. It was not Stalin who was a "barrier to the revolution," but the revolution which was the greatest of barriers to Stalin. It was not the revolution which "impressed Stalin unwillingly into its service," but the counter-revolution which willingly impressed him into its service. At least this is the way Trotsky explained it to us. It was precisely the living forces of the revolution, its conquests as embodied in the structure of the Soviet Union itself and the consciousness of the people which stood as the barrier to the political counterrevolution embodied in the bureaucracy and directed by Stalin as its spearhead.
Let us listen further to Clarke. The achievements of the Russian Revolution in the post-Lenin era "were consequently a victory over Stalin's opportunism." Over Stalin's "opportunism"!! — not over his counter-revolution. "It was not he who led the revolution (there is a real discovery!) but the revolution which impressed him unwillingly into its service, at tremendous cost to itself." Such a description could by and large be applied to a Tito who did, in an opportunistic and empirical fashion, so lead the Yugoslav revolution. We say: "the revolution caught up Tito and his party and his movement and projected them forward." But that was not true of Stalin. He led the counter-revolution, not only in relation to the Soviet Union, but later in relation to Yugoslavia itself.
For Clarke, Stalin appears to have played a political role similar to his military role in the Second World War. He wasn't a volunteer of the revolution but its conscripted Marshal drawn into it willy-nilly. Just as he led the Soviet Union to victory in the war* though in a bureaucratic and reactionary way, so, despite zig-zags and in a bureaucratic and reactionary way, he was pulled along with the revolution which crawled forward during his period of rule.
Confusion is an indispensable weapon of revisionism. As a matter of fact, we can say that with the revisionists confusion is almost an art. In Clarke's article you find this art displayed. Take the term "regime," for example. Clarke uses the word in two different and opposing ways. At one point, he uses it to mean the political regime, that is, the political superstructure; at another point, the term refers to the social regime. He says, for instance, that it is a "totally false conception that Stalin like other dictators in the past was the keystone of the Soviet regime." Now in one sense that is true; but in another sense, it is not true.   Stalin was certainly not the keystone of the

economic regime in the USSR, that is, the social foundation. But on the other hand, he was the center of the bonapartist dictatorship which is the governing system in the Soviet Union. But this dictatorship rests upon foundations of a completely contradictory character; a social regime, on the one hand, which issued from the October Revolution, and a political regime, on the other hand, which issued from a counter-revolution against the achievements of the revolution. Yet at one point Clarke compares the Stalin regime with Lenin's regime and with the post-Stalin regime, and one would therefore naturally assume that by "regime" he means simply political regime. At another time he uses the term in comparing Stalin's regime with Cromwell's regime, as though he were talking about the social foundations of the regime.
Now this again is not accidental. By using the word in two different senses and not making it clear that he is doing so, he blurs over and in fact erases the fundamental and growing conflict between the social foundations of the regime and the totalitarian rulership which is essentially opposed to it. As you examine these examples of Clarke's method, it becomes increasingly clear that confusion is the objective result if not its conscious aim. The result of Clarke's blurring of the characterization of the political regime, is that it becomes not counter-revolutionary but "reactionary" and "anti-revolutionary"; it is no longer a more or less conscious agent of counter-revolution, but its leaders become converted into objective agents of the revolution.
This leads Clarke to revise our traditional concepts of the social regime itself. He characterizes the Soviet economy as "nationalized in form, socialist in essence." In addition, he states that the methods of planning now in force are "socialist methods." Comrades who have studied The Revolution Betrayed know that Trotsky polemicized against the Stalinists on this very point. Trotsky explained that Soviet society was a transitional system halfway between capitalism and socialism, and marked by all kinds of contradictions. In its foundations there were the elements necessary for a socialist society: on the other hand, in the superstructure and in Soviet society itself there were forces and tendencies which were directly anti-socialist. He explained that it was necessary to take all of these into account in estimating the real character and direction of development of the Soviet Union. He said that the methods of planning of the bureaucracy were not at all those which would be proper to a democratic workers' government or to a socialist society; that these methods of planning were carried on for the benefit of the bureaucracy in the first place, even though in the last analysis the forces of production in the Soviet Union experienced a great development thanks to their nationalized character. The Soviet economy, he explained, represents a higher system of property and production relations; but in order for the methods of planning to be genuinely socialist in tendency, they would have to be under democratic control and with the direct participation of the producing and consuming masses themselves.
One would have expected that, in a review of 30 years of Stalinist rule, Clarke would give a proper characterization of Stalinism. But in his article he characterizes Stalinism solely as "a philosophy of conservatism and defeatism," "the rationalization of a temporary phenomenon," and  so forth.   That is,  he gives us an ideological defini-

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tion. He includes a political characterization, up to a certain point, when he indicates some of the historical circumstances which formed the Stalinist bureaucracy. But what he leaves out are the material interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, the power and income of a social stratum which numbered, according to Trotsky's figures when he wrote The Revolution Betrayed, about 25 million people who benefited from the privileges of the labor aristocrats and bureaucrats. The material interests of this enormous bureaucracy find their political and ideological expression through Stalinism, and are projected internationally through all its agencies. But it is precisely this material content of Stalinism that fades away in Clarke's definition.
I could go into several other deficiencies in the article, but I want now to point out the function which these revisions perform. They are all links in a chain. The revision of Soviet history, of the nature of Soviet economy, of the Stalinist methods of planning, of the nature of the Stalinist bureaucracy and Stalin's role — all these are necessary steps leading up to Clarke's specific political conclusions. According to Clarke, the revolution is once more moving to the left within the Soviet Union. This process has been gathering momentum since 1943. It was already visible at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party. It has been accelerated considerably since Stalin's death. (In Clarke's discussion article, "Shake-up in the Kremlin," in the latest magazine, he says: "Writing about events since Stalin's death a scant four months ago is almost like describing a scene from a fast-moving train." One comrade remarked that this is an optical illusion—Clarke is moving away so fast from Trotskyist positions that he confuses his own motion with movement to the left on the part of the Stalinist bureaucracy.)
But to return to Clarke's description of the movement of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Today, he says, as has happened on several occasions in the past, the momentum of the revolutionary upsurge is dragging the bureaucracy along with it, though the bureaucracy resists the pressure, either in whole or in part. The film of history, he says, has reversed its direction and "is now unwinding toward socialist democracy in the USSR." Now we do not deny, thanks to all the revolutionary developments which issued out of the Second World War and its aftermath, that this is the underlying and fundamental direction of development and that it has been gaining momentum; that is to say, that the fundamental positions of Stalinism and the Stalinist bureaucracy are being undermined on a world scale and, in part, within the Soviet Union itself.
But the question to be asked and answered is: How is the destruction of the bureaucracy going to come about? What is our fundamental line on that? We say that the overthrow of Stalinism and of its bearers, the Soviet bureaucracy, can and will occur only through an uprising of the Soviet workers aganst the totalitarian regime, the smashing and overthrow of this regime by the workers, and by a renovated workers democracy.
Clarke offers a different set of ideas and perspectives. In his article, "Stalin's Role—Stalinism's Future," he projected them openly for the first time. He raised there the possibility of three variants for the process of the downfall of Stalinism. I would like to read the salient paragraph. "Will the process take the form of a violent upheaval against the bureaucratic rule in the USSR? Or will concessions   to   the masses and  sharing of power — as was

the long course in the English bourgeois revolution in the political relationship between the rising bourgeoisie and the declining nobility— gradually undermine the base of the bureaucracy? Or will the evolution be a combination of both forms? That we cannot now foresee. But that this process means not the end of socialism, but its great renaissance—that is certain."
Here you have three possibilities: (1) a violent upheaval against bureaucratic rule in the USSR; (2) the reform of the bureaucracy, its "sharing of power" with the Soviet people; and (3) a combination of both forms. I am at a loss, as I said before to deal with the third variant —except to point out the intrinsic absurdity of combining the mutually exclusive perspectives and programs of the reform of the bureaucracy with its revolutionary overthrow. We understand that in the first stages of the gathering of forces of the new revolution there can be concessions and modifications in the Soviet setup produced by shifts in the relations between the masses and the bureaucracy, prior to the decisive overthrow of the bureaucracy. But how you can take two completely opposed forms of development and put them together into a single reality — that I will leave to Clarke to explain.
But I want to concentrate here on the two counter-positions, namely, the perspective of political revolution and the perspective of reform. In this article Clarke doesn't give anything to substantiate the possibility of a reform except a historical parallel in the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688-89 in England. This was a political revolution, to be sure, but of a special bourgeois type. The government of James II was overthrown and replaced by the government of William III by means of an armed struggle. William landed on England with a certain number of forces and there were a few battles, but not a long civil war or convulsive social upheaval like the "Great Rebellion." But the social essence of the revolution was revealed in its outcome: an agreement between the ruling bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisified nobility, in which the latter were exclusively subordinated to the former and thereupon became the direct agency of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie governed through Parliament, which was thereby elevated to the political supremacy it has held ever since. This was a compact between two propertied classes, directed against the masses—similar to the compact, for example, between the Southern planters and the Northern bourgeoisie in establishing the U.S. constitution of 1788-89 against the masses of the people. It was precisely because there were common material bonds of property and privilege, that these two classes could share the power, with the dominant class, the bourgeoisie, giving a few concessions to the other in order to arrive at a constitutional compromise.
We must now ask: How does this resemble the relations between the Soviet ruling caste and the workers? Here there is a privileged commanding stratum, in full possession of all the institutions and instruments of power, confronting a vast, potentially all-powerful but unarmed working class, politically atomized, without any property of its own, without any organizations at its disposal. This working class has no control over the Communist Party, over the government, over the unions. It cannot hold meetings of its own. It has no newspapers. It is even afraid to talk openly because of fear of the secret police.
How  is this working class going to gain some rights?

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Even more, how are these mighty millions of Soviet workers going to get rid of the omnipotent bureaucracy? They can certainly do this only by the most ruthless mass struggle against that power. The struggle will no doubt have to pass through quite a few stages, and we cannot know now what the precise processes will be before the bureaucracy is overthrown. But the essence of our position lies in the inevitability of the revolutionary struggle of the workers against the bureaucracy.
Clarke's perspective is quite different. It is one of the bureaucracy, under increasing pressure from below, doling out reform bit by bit, dispersing the power little by little from itself to the masses — a new deal, one card at a time, until the proletariat feels it has such a strong hand it can play the trump card. Then the bureaucracy will either have to come to terms or be destroyed. But there is one little omission here, namely the decisive moment —that is, the revolutionary upheaval itself, the general uprising of the workers, the qualitative change in the situation. That is precisely what Trotsky stressed time and again after 1933 when the Trotskyists, from their analysis of the historical development of the Stalinist bureaucracy and its grip upon Soviet society, came to the position that it would require a revolutionary offensive of tremendous power to get rid of this entrenched caste.
In his article in the January-February magazine Clarke only brought forward these variants as hypotheses. But in his two articles in the latest issue, one on the Beria purge and the other on the events in East Germany, he makes more explicit what we had already deduced from his generalized revisions. In the article, "Shake-up in the Kremlin," he specifically brings forward the possibility and even probability that a section of the bureaucracy, the reformist, liberalized section, will pit itself against the die-hards who want to continue the old policy of repression; and this "liberal" section may summon the masses into action and even lead them in struggle in the first phases of the revolution.
I will read you what he said on this in the original version of his article (the passage as published was modified a bit after we challenged it). "One section of the bureaucracy, because of its training, its attachments, because it is therefore more susceptible to pressure from below and to the needs of Soviet society —and, in the interest of sheer self-preservation —may attempt in the ensuing struggles to mobilize and organize the masses in independent action. In that struggle the masses will eventually devise their own program which will signify the end of all bureaucratic rule. More likely is the possibility" — Clarke is a great one for variants —"that goaded by their discontents, encouraged by the more apparent weaknesses of the regime, the masses will utilize the divisions on the top and the consequent greater freedom of action to launch their own independent struggles; they will find spokesmen more generally reflecting their needs and aspirations and draw a section of the bureaucracy behind them in their struggle to re-establish workers' democracy."
Now here you have the cart, and here you have the horse, in either order. In the first case, the bureaucracy is going to lead the masses. In the second case, the masses are going to lead the bureaucracy, more precisely a sec-

tion of it. Take your choice between these two variants. In any event, there is going to be team work between a section of the bureaucracy and the masses — whether a part of the bureaucracy takes the initiative and leads the masses in independent action, or the masses take independent action and lead a part of the bureaucracy. This is the probable outcome, as Clarke projects it, of the "new course" pursued by the post-Stalin regime in the Soviet Union.
In his article on Germany, this perspective also finds its reflection in Clarke's remarks on the conduct of the Soviet army. One of his main points in this article is to show how moderately the occupying forces behaved toward the workers' uprising. He muffles his point, of course, by saying that the workers hesitated to take on both the East German regime and the Soviet troops and tanks at the same time —which is true. But what he left out was the objectively counter-revolutionary role of the occupying forces, no matter how moderately they behaved.
Let me explain precisely what this role was, and what it was incumbent upon a Trotskyist to set forth. The East German working class almost in its entirety — certainly all the energetic elements in it —set out to get rid of the hated Stalinist regime. The regime had no strength within itself at all. It was merely a group of frightened bureaucrats, as shown by its panicky reactions. It couldn't even rely upon its own police forces. What saved the regime? Was it American imperialism? No. Was it the lack of strength within the East German workers? No. They had the forces to get rid of the regime. The sole objective factor which prevented the political revolution of the East German workers from being victorious was the presence of the occupying forces of the Kremlin.
It is precisely that fact which constituted the counterrevolutionary role and effect of Stalinism in East Germany. Again a Trotskyist had to ask himself: Even if the aim of the working class was limited to democratizing East Germany, how could that have been done without getting rid of all the agencies of the Kremlin bureaucracy? Not only the Grotewohl regime; not only its bureaucratically dominated Communist Party; but above all, its main instrument of force, the Soviet troops and tanks in that territory. Clarke, however, sets out to give quite the opposite impression.
Finally, in neither of these two latest articles —and this is the other side of his position —does he bring forward the inescapable necessity of the mass uprising to get rid of the Kremlin bureaucracy. It is for that reason that we decided to open a public discussion with Clarke and the Cochranites in the March-April issue of the magazine. We are publishing a letter by Comrade Stein challenging two of the main errors in the January-February article; a long editorial note by the editors — that is, the majority editors —in which we solidarize ourselves with Comrade Stein's criticisms; and a statement disassociating ourselves from Clarke's analysis, and announcing for the next issue an arf'cle which will present our estimate of recent events in the Soviet Union and East Germany. From there we propose to take the discussion throughout the party and the world movement.

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3. "Memorandum on 'The Rise and Decline of Stalinism"

The resolution on "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism" sets out to bring up-to-date the Trotskyist appraisal of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin bureaucracy and the Stalinist world movement especially in the light of the events following Stalin's death. However, its method of analysis misrepresents the real state of affairs and leads to political conclusions diverging from our traditional views.
/. Three Periods of the World Revolution
This can be seen, first of all, in its arbitrary manner of breaking up world historical developments since 1917 into three main periods: the period of revolutionary rise from 1917 to 1923; the period of revolutionary ebb from 1923-43; and the period of revolutionary resurgence on a higher level since 1943. This division provides the fundamental framework for the resolution and serves as the starting point for a revision of our conceptions on the nature and role of the Stalinist bureaucracy.
According to the resolution, the third period has created a relationship of class forces on a world scale and in the Soviet Union which requires a new appraisal and approach to Stalinism. This period has already had two phases. The years from 1943 to 1947 represent a transition from the second to the third period, partaking of the features of both.
This was the time when the Soviet bureaucracy appeared to reach the peak of its power. The world revolutionary rise was still not powerful enough to permit the bypassing and engulfing of Stalinism. The Kremlin and its agencies were able to restrict and control the revolution, except for- Yugoslavia. The deals with imperialism, the right turns, the betrayals of the revolution continued the former era; the Yugoslav revolution prefigured the new.
But since 1947 the old equilibria have been definitively broken and cannot be regained. The new international revolutionary rise disrupted the equilibrium between the world working class and imperialism. The aggravation of the crisis of the capitalist system and the crushing supremacy of American imperialism has upset the equilibrium between the different imperialist powers. These international changes combined with the domestic changes have broken the equilibrium of social forces in the Soviet Union and undermined the objective foundations of the ruling caste.
The victory of the Chinese revolution marked the turning point in this world transformation and ushered in a new and higher stage, "basically marked by a relation of international forces favorable to the revolution and evolving on a global scale more and more favorably for the revolution. The revolutionary wave spreads from country to country, from continent to continent. It has recently reached the Soviet Union itself and the buffer zone."
This revolutionary wave of global dimensions and unlimited duration, will continue to mount higher, despite minor refluxes, up to the war. The war itself "will coincide not with an ebb but with a new leap forward of the world revolution." (p. 19) This will continue until the end of the Third World War. Nothing can long withstand this all-engulfing revolutionary torrent. It will sweep all established forces into its vortex; both imperialism and Stalinism will crack up and perish in the process. The victory   of  the   world   revolution   is   henceforth  assured.

Such is the line of development projected in the resolution.
If it is really so, it will have to be recognized that we have entered upon a qualitatively different epoch in which all previous political values would have to be reevaluated. The political ideas, revolutionary strategy and organizational perspectives of the vanguard would have to be revised to bring them into line with the qualitatively transformed world reality and its main trends of development.
The resolution undertakes to do this in connection with Stalinism and draws some extremely far-reaching conclusions in respect to it. Let us summarize them.
//. Changes in Stalinism
The fundamental historical, world and national conditions for Stalinism have disappeared. It has irretrievably entered upon its period of decline.
 1.	The dynamic of the world relationship of forces evolving favorably to the revolution has now struck the Soviet Union, undermined the positions of the bureaucracy, upset its stability and already promoted the disintegration of Stalinism in a number of unforeseen ways.
 2.	"The objective foundations of the dictatorship are in the process of rapidly disappearing." The relationship of forces between the Bonapartist bureaucracy and the masses is shifting in favor of the latter. The pressures exerted by these changing conditions and by the demands of the masses is more and more determining the Kremlin's course and policies.
 3.	The post-Stalin regime is no longer able to rule as before; it is instead obliged to liberalize itself and make more and more concessions to save its rule. This tends toward the liquidation of the heritage of Stalinism.
 4.	These developments release centrifugal forces which differentiate and split up the ruling caste.
 5.	The changes in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death constitute the relaxation of the Kremlin's brake upon the Communist parties. Its tight hold over the buffer countries and upon the Communist parties in capitalist countries is being loosened. These are developing new relations with the Kremlin in the direction of greater independence from it while oppositional ideas and anti-Stalinist tendencies more and more manifest themselves.
 6.	"Caught between the imperialist threat and the colonial revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy found itself obliged to ally itself with the second against the first." This enforced alliance with the colonial revolution is mediated through Mao's regime with whom it must share direction of Asian Communism.
7.	The Kremlin is less and less able to conclude deals
with imperialism at the expense of the revolution. Its room
for maneuvers with imperialism and against the revolu
tion is diminishing all the time. "This new situation re
stricts more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary
maneuvers by the bureaucracy." Not only are its capacities
for sell-outs decreasing, despite its intentions, but the prac
tical effects of its diplomatic maneuvers and Popular-Front
experiments with certain sections of the colonial bour
geoisie are more and more restricted and ephemeral. More
over, "the revolutionary tide which the Soviet bureaucracy
is no longer capable of smashing and arresting is even
being nourished by the methods of self-defense applied by
the bureaucracy. ..."

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 8.	The Kremlin's capacity for repressive measures likewise grows more restricted. It is less able to proceed to repressions and purges at home, or to stamp out opposition in the buffer countries, because of the drastic shift in the relation of forces.
 9.	Just as the bureaucracy must liberalize its dictatorship, so the Communist parties, despite right oscillations here and there and now and then, tend to radicalize their policies. This is the dominant tendency. In countries where the CP's are a majority in the working class, they can under pressure of the masses be led to project a revolutionary orientation counter to the Kremlin's directives.
///. To What Degree Have the Fundamental Conditions for Stalinism Disappeared?
To arrive at these far-reaching conclusions on Stalinism the resolution has to present a picture of the world situation which is not in accord with reality and to take partial and limited changes for decisive and fundamental ones. Thus, the resolution states on page 3: "The fundamental conditions under which the Soviet bureaucracy and its tight hold over the Communist Parties developed, namely, the ebb of the revolution, the isolation of the Soviet Union, and the backward conditions of its economy — these conditions have disappeared."
Let us examine the post-war world and see to what degree these sweeping assertions conform to the real state of affairs. We are here dealing with matters of fact. Let us analyze each one of these three fundamental conditions to see to what extent they have vanished.
1. The Development of the World Revolution
The international revolution has undoubtedly experienced a considerable resurgence since 1943. The Second World War generated a revolutionary wave of greater scope, intensity and persistence than the First World War. The Soviet victory over Nazism, the revolutionary victories in Yugoslavia and China, the extension of nationalized property into the buffer states by bureaucratic-military means, the spread of the colonial revolution have all dealt hard blows to world capitalism and enormously strengthened the anti-capitalist camp.
However, this trend in the world situation has been combined and criss-crossed with another. The immense revolutionary movement which has produced such transformations in Eastern and Central Europe and in Asia, came to grief in Western Europe during this very same period. Through its alliance with the Allied imperialists, the Soviet bureaucracy was chiefly responsible for this reversal and betrayal of the European revolution.
This has generated a series of opposite effects in the unfoldment of the world revolution. The proletarian offensive was curbed, the working class became weaker, Western European capitalism was rescued, and became relatively stabilized for a period of years. This has enabled the imperialist counter-revolution directed by the U.S. to take hold of these countries and use them as drill grounds and springboards for its war preparations and prospective attacks upon the anti-capitalist countries and revolutionary forces.
Thus the revolutionary process since World War II has experienced an uneven and contradictory development. While the revolution moved forward in a number of back-

ward countries, triumphed in Yugoslavia and China, it has undergone set-backs in a number of the more advanced countries. The victories for the revolution represent gains for the working class and oppressed peoples. But they must be considered in connection with the recession of the revolution in Western Europe and its effects in order to arrive at a more balanced and accurate reckoning of the progress of the revolution.
Had the revolution succeeded in one or more of the highly developed industrial countries, from Germany to Italy, along with these victories in certain backward countries, that would have sealed the fate of capitalism in Europe andAsia and pressed the Soviet bureaucracy to the wall.
The Kremlin is well aware of the threat to its dominance implicit in the European revolution. That motivated its efforts to block and crush that development which continues up to this very day (French General Strike).
The prevention of an independent socialist workers power arising in Western Europe is an indispensable condition for preserving the rule of the Soviet bureaucracy. The Kremlin can, up to a certain point, tolerate and maneuver with revolutions in the colonies and the backward countries. But it dreads the extension of the proletarian revolution into Western Europe because that means the sentence of death for it.
A rounded review and realistic resume of the net result of the march of the international revolution from 1943 to 1953 leads to this conclusion. With all its great achievements and greater potentialities the failure of the revolution to conquer in one of the major industrialized countries has thus far prevented the revolutionary forces of the working class from growing strong enough to overwhelm the Kremlin oligarchy and give irresistible impetus to the disintegration of Stalinism. There has not yet been such a qualitative alteration in the world relationship of class forces.
Up to date the counter-revolutionary intervention of the bureaucracy itself in world politics has forestalled the objective conditions for such a consummation. It caused the revolution to recede in Western Europe, weakened the working class in relation to its class enemy, and facilitated the mobilization of the world counter-revolution. The struggle between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution is still inconclusive, and far from being settled. This very inconclusiveness, which it strives to maintain, at the present time works to the advantage of the Kremlin.
2.  The Isolation of the Soviet Union
This first factor is directly connected with the second: the encirclement of the Soviet Union by world imperialism. The post-war developments certainly succeeded in loosening and unsettling the imperialist encirclement to a certain extent and breaking through the previous tight isolation of the Soviet Union. The linking together of the countries from the Elbe to the Pacific, however much they may be bureaucratically governed and oppressed, is a strong bulwark to the USSR. But here, too, it is necessary to preserve essential proportions.
The failure of the revolution to break through to victory in Western Europe, which would have radically altered the balance of class forces throughout Europe and Asia, has permitted imperialism to reassert its encirclement and intensify its pressures against the Soviet Union on all planes.

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This isolation is felt in the economic, political, diplomatic and military fields in varying degrees.
Despite all their achievements, the industrial capacities of the states in the Soviet bloc is far below that of the capitalist states. This unfavorable balance could be rectified only with the inclusion of the industrial complex of Western Europe. But this is now cut off in large part by the economic blockade which is an element in the isolation of the. S.U.
The moves being made by the Kremlin to curry favor with the bourgeois governments of France and Italy, and its maneuvers around the German question, testify to its attempts to overcome its isolation.
Instead of attracting workers in the advanced countries, the Kremlin's policy helps to repel them and thus aggravates the social isolation of the S.U. from the class forces which alone can guarantee its defense.
Finally, the U.S. is engaged in forging a military ring around the periphery of the Kremlin-dominated territories, and exerts unremitting pressures from all directions upon it
The Soviet bureaucracy must reckon with this at all times both in its domestic and foreign policies. The looming menace of A-bomb attack determines its plan of production. This takes first place in the strategical plans of the Soviet General Staff. The menace of imperialist encirclement and aggression determines the policies of those Communist parties under the Kremlin's control.
How, then, can it be so unqualifiedly asserted in the resolution that the isolation of the S.U. has disappeared? The isolation has been modified and mitigated, but not at all removed. The pressures of the imperialist environment weigh upon the entire life of the Soviet peoples. The Soviet workers, with memories still fresh of the last war, fear the outbreak of a new one. This is still a potent factor in restraining them from open conflict with the bureaucracy for fear of aiding imperialism. Thus, the very encirclement of the S.U. which the policies of the Kremlin serve to sustain, and even augment, remains one of the factors in maintaining its grip upon power.
There is still another factor to be considered. Before World War II the Soviet bureaucracy could and did maneuver between two opposing blocs of capitalist powers. Now it confronts a combine of imperialist powers being openly mobilized against the Soviet Union. While the Soviet people feel the greater power of numbers in the anti-capitalist states, this is partially offset by their fear of the centralization of forces in the opposing class camp.
3.   The Development of Soviet Economy
Marked advances have been made in Soviet economy, especially since 1947. However these have been extremely uneven. Agriculture, as Khrushchev has just admitted, lags far behind industry, far behind the needs of the mass of the Soviet people.
Soviet advances have led to an improvement in the living conditions of its citizens, especially in urban centers. They have still greater hopes and expectations of betterment in their material conditions, which the post-Stalin regime has had to take into account The new rulers have made certain concessions in the sphere of consumption and promised still more.
But the question at issue is this: has there been so dras-

tic a change in the Soviet economy as to eliminate the objective material basis for the bureaucracy? That would entail the production of consumers' goods and food in sufficient abundance to guarantee necessities to everyone, satisfy the demands of the working people, and thus eliminate any need for bureaucratic arbiters to decide the distribution of the available products.
Has Soviet economy, with all its indubitable successes, reached that point, or even approached it? The citing of general production figures and their global comparison with those of other countries will not help here. The decisive point is not how much more is being produced than before, but is enough being produced now to take care of the basic demands of the people?
The facts are that the rise in the economy has sufficed to provide a minimum for most workers, to eliminate famine conditions, and ease some economic tensions in the sphere of consumption. But side by side with the general improvement, there have been considerable increases in consumption for the more favored layers. From the aristocrats of labor, up to the tops of the bureaucracy there is an inclination to grasp for more. Malenkov is compelled to give a bit more bread and other articles to the masses. But at the same time the Kremlin makes sure to provide more new cars, refrigerators, television sets, etc. which are exclusively within the reach of the upper layers of Soviet society.
All this accentuates the contradiction between the rulers and the ruled, heightens social inequalities, and makes the situation more intolerable to the workers. There is a sharpening conflict between the working class growing in numbers and skills and the bureaucratic guardians of privilege.
The economic and cultural backwardness is in the process of being overcome. But to assert that this has already taken place is to falsify the real state of Soviet economy today.
This does not at all mean that the bureaucracy can or will perpetuate itself in power indefinitely. That depends upon further developments of the world revolution which can definitively remove the hostile pressures of world imperialism, and not simply temporarily ease them, and overcome the scarcity of consumers goods by placing the industrial resources of more advanced countries at the disposal of Soviet economy. It depends even more upon the development of the deepening conflict between the bureaucracy and the masses. The Soviet people need not wait for the elimination of the economic roots of the totalitarian bureaucracy in order to embark upon a mortal struggle against it. As Trotsky pointed out, the social conflict can explode into political revolution as a result of the intensification of antagonisms to the boiling point "Economic contradictions produce social antagonisms, which in turn develop their own logic, not awaiting the further growth of the productive forces." (Revolution Betrayed, p. 48).
Thus a sober analysis of the world situation and its development during the past decade discloses that the three major objective factors responsible for the rise of the Soviet bureaucracy have not been changed in a fundamental sense but only to a certain extent. The Kremlin bureaucracy has to operate today under new but not decisively different circumstances. Its further life-span will depend upon the struggle of the living forces in the world

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arena and in the Soviet Union over the next period in which the ideas and forces of Trotskyism will play their part.
IV. The New Relations and Role of the Soviet Bureaucracy
Proceeding from its wrong and one-sided estimation of the fundamental conditions in which the bureaucracy finds itself, the resolution says that the bureaucracy has acquired such new relations with imperialism, the world working class, the colonial revolution, the buffer countries and its own people that these substantially change its policies and activities and their results. The Soviet bureaucracy is objectively playing a different role than in its past.
a.   The   Kremlin,   Imperialism  and  the   World Revolution
This is purportedly to be seen in respect to imperialism. The resolution correctly affirms that "the global balance of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy is a reformist one, because the bureaucracy aims not to overthrow world capitalism, but simply to maintain the framework of the status quo." It has played this role of an agency of imperialism not only from 1923 to 1943 but from 1943 to the present. "It is more correct than ever to say today that the domination of imperialism subsists over half of the globe only thanks to the role played by the bureaucracy and its agencies."
However, the resolution contends, the victory of the Chinese revolution "marked the opening of a new phase in the world situation in which the Soviet bureaucracy finds itself." (p. 10) This new situation has the following features. It "restricts more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary maneuvers by the bureaucracy." And "the practical effects of these attempts (to utilize the inter-imperialist contradictions, to gain the support of certain bourgeoisies in colonial and semi-colonial countries, to arrive at a temporary and partial agreement with imperialism) become more and more limited and ephemeral . . ."
The actual relations between the bureaucracy and imperialism are highly contradictory. On one hand, the Kremlin has to take the necessary measures to safeguard its own positions and domain from imperialist penetration, aggressions and attack.
But the policies and methods it employs to achieve this end serve to aid imperialism and weaken and discourage the working masses, thereby undermining the defense of the anti-capitalist countries and the Soviet Union.
Neither the counter-revolutionary imperialists nor the revolutionary forces fundamentally aim to preserve the existing state of affairs. Both of these irreconcilable antagonists, for opposing reasons, are driving toward a showdown which brings them into ever-sharper collision.
Moscow comes forward in this contest of class forces as the foremost defender of the international status quo, and therewith a key conservatizing factor in the world situation. It does not aim to aid the revolution or to overthrow imperialist rule. It is anxious to maintain the present division of the world between its own power and that of imperialism and to arrive at a new deal on that basis.

This is consciously formulated in the conception of "peaceful co-existence between socialism and capitalism" repeated by the new Kremlin leaders and echoed by the Stalinist parties. This is more than a theory; it provides the main guiding line of an active policy which predominates the diplomacy of the Kremlin and the conduct of its agencies.
The Kremlin exerts its utmost influence to preserve even the prevailing cold war status quo as a lesser evil. It aims to uphold this by acting simultaneously on two fronts: against further aggressions by imperialists on the one side and against any disruption of the present equilibrium by eruptions and expansion of the revolutionary movement. For fear of provoking retaliation from imperialism and becoming involved directly in war, the bureaucracy will hamstring revolutions and permit them to bleed to death. The cases of North Korea, Iran, and Malaya are instructive in this respect.
Moscow gave the North Koreans supplies enough to drag out the war but not enough to win, even when its armies were sweeping the invaders toward the sea. Whereas Washington did not hesitate to intervene with full force and openly in Korea, Moscow stayed discreetly within its own preserve. Then when MacArthur approached the Yalu, the Chinese were forced to enter the war even though they had just come out of a prolonged civil war. The narrow caste interests and protective fears of the Soviet rulers obliged the Asian revolutionists to bear the brunt of the anti-imperialist fight.
As the pressures from imperialism mount, the Kremlin's disposition is to gain time for itself at the expense of the world working class and the struggles of the colonial peoples. This explains the conduct of the Tudeh Party in Iran which refrained from launching a fight for power at the peak of its mass support and thereby permitted the military coup d'etat which overthrew Mossadegh and restored the Shah. The Kremlin's anxiety to prevent the upsetting of the equilibrium in this sensitive spot and avert the risk of precipitating war accounted for this triumph of the counter-revolution in Iran.
The supposition that the cold war between Western imperialism and the Soviet Union plus the mounting pressures of the mass movement restrains or prevents the bureaucracy from committing deadly treachery is not confirmed by recent events. Quite the contrary. The French CP's behavior in the August 1953 General Strike shows how the Kremlin's agents will let a revolutionary opportunity pass by and ruin it. The Kremlin can stab the workers in the back, not only when it is in open alliance with the imperialists, but also when it is seeking an alliance with them. The treachery may be more devious but its effects are as real and disastrous.
The inevitable outcome of all this maneuvering with imperialism and against the revolution will be the same as before the Second World War. The maneuvers will not avert the war. But the imperialists will be helped to strengthen their positions and make advances while the revolution is crippled and the workers are thrust back and disoriented. Unless the workers in the advanced capitalist countries undertake a revolutionary offensive of powerful proportions, the imperialists will be enabled to unleash the war at a time and under conditions most advantageous for them.
The bureaucracy hates  and fears the world revolution

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and strives to head it off, restrict, control, subvert and strangle it. But it is not omnipotent. It cannot do what it wants, in the way it wants, when it wants.
But this does not mean that the Kremlin has abated its hostility toward the world revolution or altered its treacherous attitude toward it. This can be seen even in the victories of the revolution in Yugoslavia and China. These occurred against the Kremlin's advice and in defiance of it. The Kremlin was obliged to accommodate itself to the accomplished fact.
The limits to this accommodation depend upon how closely the development of the revolutions touches its most vital interests. The Kremlin went along with the Yugoslav revolution up to the point where Yugoslav influence over the Balkan countries threatened to create an alternative pole of attraction. Then the Kremlin turned mercilessly upon it.
To what degree can it be maintained, as the resolution does, that the Kremlin is now obliged to ally itself with the colonial revolution against imperialism? It has had to back up China and North Korea up to a point. The victories for the revolution in Asia have so far been no direct threat to the Kremlin's domination, even though it has had to acquiesce in the co-direction of the Asian Communist movement with Mao. On the whole they have worked to the immediate advantage of the Kremlin. China has broken the imperialist encirclement in the Far East and kept the U.S. forces tangled in the Korean war. This drained China and tied up the United States at minimum cost to Moscow.
So long as the Kremlin can use this or that sector of the colonial movement for its own ends, it will do so. But it remains a very perfidious ally in the best circumstances. It has already been pointed out that it deliberately withheld military deliveries that could enable the North Koreans to win. The current seven-year civil war in Indo-China stems back to the Stalinist coalition politics in 1945^16 which handed French imperialism the positions for fighting the national independence movement. Most recently, the Kremlin sabotaged the revolution in Iran.
It is true that world conditions militate against the Kremlin's consummation of any lasting deals with imperialism or its bargains with the national bourgeoisie. But the objective consequences of its attempts to arrive at such agreements have much more than "limited and ephemeral" practical effects. Although the maneuvers have not brought a deal, they help block the advance of the revolutionary movement and adversely affect the world relationship of forces.
The bureaucracy together with its agencies is not simply a passive reflector and acted-upon object of the world relationship of forces; the bureaucracy acts and reacts on the international arena as a potent factor in shaping the latter. For example, the Kremlin's whole post-war policy toward Germany, the key country in Europe (its participation in the division, its regime over East Germany, its diplomatic maneuvers regarding West Germany), aid capitalist reaction and facilitate the imperialist objectives. Can the effects of its attitude toward this one country be classified as "limited" and "ephemeral" whether these are assessed from the angle of the European revolution, the German workers, the march toward war or the defence of the anti-capitalist states?

In any event, to minimize the results of the Kremlin's counter-revolutionary actions in this manner is no way to educate the vanguard and alert them to the perfidies of the Stalinists. It runs counter to our task of inducing the workers to break politically with Stalinism and discard their illusions about it.
The resolution says on page 20: "the revolutionary tide which the Soviet bureaucracy is no longer capable of smashing and arresting is even being nourished by the methods of self-defense applied by the bureaucracy. . . ." Both parts of this statement are one-sided and misleading. The fact that the Soviet bureaucracy couldn't "smash and arrest" the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions where the revolutionary tide broke through its dikes, doesn't wipe out the fact that elsewhere, by and large, the bureaucracy has succeeded in turning the revolutionary tide in the opposite direction. This has influenced the relationship of forces for an entire period.
Nor do its "methods of self-defense" necessarily "nourish" "the revolutionary tide," even where the revolution has come to power. The Kremlin's "method of self-defense" drove Yugoslavia into the embrace of imperialism and has made China more and more dependent economically upon it It is not clear just what is specifically meant by "methods of self-defense" which can nourish the revolutionary tide. Does that refer to supplying arms to China and North Korea? Or to its action in defense of the Soviet Union in case of attack? But even in these instances "its methods of self-defense" do not in all respects coincide with the self-defense of the workers' movement and can even go counter to it.
We have always recognized that when the bureaucracy defends the Soviet Union against imperialist attack, it can under certain conditions give an impulse to revolutionary struggles in capitalist countries. It will be obliged to do this still more in the event of the Third World War. But now when it is seeking a modus vivendi with imperialism or trying to create rifts amongst the capitalist nations its "methods of self-defense" do far more to drain than to swell the revolutionary wave.
In several places there is the implication that the bureaucracy, faced with the war danger, will have to be more tolerant of independent revolutionary developments and refrain from proceeding against them. For example, the resolution says that the Kremlin's preparations for World War II "was accompanied by a halt of mass purges." Actually the purges were part of Stalin's preparations for war. He aimed to eliminate all potential centers of opposition to the regime The beheading of the Soviet General Staff, which led to the military fiasco in Finland, showed to what lengths the bureaucracy can go in preventive measures against even potentially independent forces precisely when war loomed.
Later, the resolution attempts to explain the campaign against Yugoslavia on the ground that "it was above all able to indulge in such a counter-revolutionary attitude because the preparations for the capitalist war were only in their preliminary stages . . .," etc. This will not hold water. The break took place at a time of high tension between the USSR and the capitalist world. But the overriding caste interests of the Kremlin took precedence over the practical needs of defending the USSR although that meant alienating the one country with morale and armed   forces   reliable   and   powerful   enough  to furnish

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genuine aid for that purpose.
V.   The   Significance  of the Events Since Stalin's Death
The Kremlin regime has been characterized by our movement as a regime of crisis. The parasitism of the bureaucratic caste continuously conflicts withtheproductive relations established by the October Revolution. As the product of a political counter-revolution arising from the delay of the world revolution and the backwardness of Russian economy and culture, the totalitarian bureaucracy could maintain its power only by repressive measures directed against the Soviet masses. The extension of the Kremlin's rule over the buffer zone countries, the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions, and the growth of Soviet economy and culture have confronted the bureaucracy with many new acute problems. As a result the objective factors for a mass uprising against the bureaucratic power are ripening in the Soviet Union. The working class especially, which has grown considerably in numbers, culture, skill, and social power, is becoming impatient with insistent demands for continual exertions and sacrifices, enforced by the bureaucratic apparatus and its agencies. The privileges of the bureaucracy appear ever more monstrous, unjustified and intolerable in their eyes.
The bureaucracy is extremely sensitive to this developing danger. The new rulers face on a higher level, and under different and more difficult circumstances, the resistance and resentment of the masses against the relentless pressures exerted upon them which Stalin periodically encountered. Stalin coped with these situations not by purges alone. He resorted also to temporary relaxations and propaganda campaigns centered around promises of concessions, improved living conditions, and a happier life. As Trotsky pointed out, "Stalin is compelled from time to time to take the side of 'the people' against the bureaucracy — of course, with its tacit consent." (Revolution Betrayed, p. 271)
Stalin's death unquestionably released a flood of hope among the people that with the death of the dictator they would get a new deal. The bureaucracy had the twofold problem of reestablishing the hierarchy of the top command, while preventing the masses from intervening in the situation with their own demands and independent actions. The inheritors of power hastened to create the impression that the masses would get a genuine new deal as a gift from the top. They promised a series of political and economic concessions: a broad amnesty, the revision of the criminal code in 30 days, no more purges, more consumers' goods, etc.
It would seem that the political concessions would be easiest to make since, unlike improved living conditions, they do not require large-scale economic reorganizations. However, these have yet to materialize. There has been another large reduction in prices, the fifth since the war. But a genuine improvement in living standards first necessitates a drastic readjustment of the economy, and above all, a tremendous increase in agricultural production, which has remained stagnant for many years.
The bureaucracy is aiming to do this by raising the incentives of the individual peasant and the well-to-do members of the collectives.
At the same time the bureaucracy had to decide quickly who   would   assume   the   role   of  principal   arbiter   and

purger-in-chief to remove all ambiguity on that score and forestall any moves by the masses to take advantage of fissures in the bureaucratic apparatus. This was the meaning of Beria's downfall which has been followed by a purge of his associates in the various Republics.
These developments proved that the bureaucracy cannot devise new methods of rule. It may make concessions but must maintain intact at all times the mechanism of repression which guarantees its regime. Between the totalitarian methods of the bureaucracy and the democratic methods of working-class power there will be no intermediate methods of rule. A new power and new methods of rule can come into being only through forces outside the bureaucracy and in opposition to it, through the overthrow of Bonapartist rule by the masses.
The Trotskyists base their revolutionary perspectives upon the maturing contradictions betwen the bureaucratic set-up and the working masses which will lead the latter toward a forthright challenge to the totalitarian dictatorship. The East German events prefigure the developments within the Soviet Union in this respect. We must analyze the concessions in the light of the nature and position of the Stalinist bureaucracy and the developing contradictions within Soviet society.
The resolution, however, exaggerates the changes in the objective situation, endowing them with an automatic propulsion which obliges the bureaucracy to liberalize itself, introduce new methods of rule, liquidate the heritage of Stalinism, suppress its most hideous and characteristic features, and deliver more and more concessions.
The resolution states: "That regime (Malenkov's) can now maintain itself only by suppressing —temporarily or definitively — the most hideous aspects, that is to say, the most characteristic ones of the regime." It does not specify which one of these "hideous aspects" has been eliminated or is about to be. The privileges? The police regime? The relentless squeeze on the workers in production? The national oppression? Concentration camps? Purges? The implication is that "the terror of Stalin's epoch" is on its way out. But there were fluctuations in the application of this terror during Stalin's day too. The difference now seems to be that the diminution of terror under the Malenkov era is a growing trend, the most distinctive feature of "the decline of the Bonapartist dictatorship."
The essential liberality of the new regime is only underscored by the next prognosis that "It is not excluded that before falling, the Bonapartist dictatorship will suddenly once again have recourse to the bloodiest terror." This signifies that terror has become not an essential but an exceptional episodic and incidental expression of the bureaucratic state.
To reinforce its contention that the post-Stalin regime is compelled not only to do away with the most terrible traits of Stalinism, but to placate the masses to an ever-increasing degree, the resolution exaggerates the scope of the concessions. It refers to a broad amnesty which seems to have died a-borning since it was not mentioned at the last session of the Supreme Soviet in the decrees submitted for approval. It speaks of the revision of the penal code which was promised within 30 days and still remains to be promulgated seven months after.
The liberation of the doctors was originally interpreted as  an irreparable blow  to  the system  of frameup trials

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and purges. But since then Beria's purge and trial has been announced. It takes the condemnations of police arbitrariness for good coin, setting aside the fact that verbal criticism of police excesses were not unknown under Stalin. Indeed, the GPU was purged several times during Stalin's regime.
It regards the stress upon collective decision as a definitive dismissal of the cult of the chief. But this is only a transitional stage between the demise of the former chief and the elevation of a prospective replacement. During his rise to power, Stalin likewise counterposed the collectivity of the Central Committee against the "aristocrats," that is, the Bolshevik leaders most popular amongst the masses.
As we have pointed out, this does not mean that no concessions have been made or that they amount to nothing. They are largely economic in character. What Malen-kov has done is to dramatize the gradual improvement in living standards since 1947 and even expedite them. But even in the sphere of consumption the Kremlin will be unable to satisfy the demands of the masses. It will give to one section of the population at the expense of another. While offering new incentives to the peasants, it does not increase the general level of workers' wages, and it takes care to increase the privileges of the bureaucracy itself.
How should the concessions be judged? Concessions are of genuine value if they open opportunities to the masses for self-action which can then be used to further their own aims. The new regime has not yet offered the slightest opening of that kind and it is not difficult to understand why. The totalitarian government cannot tolerate the least freedom of action for the workers which would weaken its stranglehold upon them.
The resolution occupies itself with dubious speculations about the centrifugal forces which are cracking the mono-lithism of the ruling group and generating differentiations within the party and its leading circles. It says that the monolithism of the Bonapartist type is being ruptured beyond repair under pressure from other segments of the bureaucracy and the masses. The Beria purge is adduced as evidence of this growing disunity.
There is no doubt that the death of Stalin upset the regime's stability, set a swarm of centrifugal forces into motion, and provoked a crisis which has still to be overcome. The transfer of power in a tyranny is always a delicate operation containing dangers. Having lost its old personal center, the bureaucracy as a whole is impelled to seek, create, and rally around a new one as the principal point of support to safeguard its privileges and regulate its internal conflicts. That is the principal reason for the elevation of Malenkov and the speedy removal of Beria.
The resolution makes much of the heterogeneity of interests amongst the various layers of the bureaucracy as the material groundwork for its growing differentiation and conflicts. It refers in addition to the aging top layer of the bureaucracy as presumably not so much concerned with increasing privileges as conserving them. This overlooks the fact that even at the top the bureaucracy steadily renews its personnel and at all levels its appetite for privileges grows with eating, especially in a country which has far from reached the living standards of the Western world.

The bureaucracy as a social layer is stratified according to its conditions of life, its positions of power, scope of privileges, etc. which give rise to jealousies, rivalries and clique contests of many kinds. But as the sole commanding and favored stratum, it is united against the bulk of the population by common bonds of material interest. It is the sole force in the Soviet Union and buffer countries which is armed and organized.
The bureaucratic caste cannot tolerate any deep divisions of policy within its ruling circles for any length of time or permit any crack in its repressive apparatus which the masses may utilize for their own purposes. It hides them and hastens to cement them as promptly as possible. Since it has no constitutional or democratic ways of resolving internal conflicts, it resorts to the method of purges. The purge is a weapon directed against the bureaucracy itself from on high as well as against the people. It is an indispensable mechanism of Bona-partist rule.
Will the purge method be more and more shelved as the liquidation of Stalinism proceeds, as the resolution implies? Apart from a vague reference to the changing relationship of forces, the resolution brings forward no evidence for this. In fact, the opposite would be indicated. If antagonisms within the bureaucracy deepen, it would seem that purges to resolve them would be in order. If opposition is growing among the people, it would seem that the commanding caste would be obliged to resort to its time-honored methods of repression. Trotsky observed that "the more the course of development goes against it, the more ruthless it becomes toward the advanced elements of the population." {Revolution Betrayed, p. 277)
Now it appears, according to the resolution, that the more the course of development goes against it, the more lenient and conciliatory the regime must become.
The proposition that no significant segment of the bureaucracy will align itself with the masses against its own material interests does not mean that the bureaucracy would not manifest deep cleavages under the impact of an uprising. Such disorganization, disintegration and demoralization was observable in East Germany. But the function of a revolutionary policy is to organize, mobilize and help lead the masses in their struggles, not to look for and even less to bank upon any breaks in the bureaucracy.
In its whole treatment of the events since Stalin's death and the new course of the Malenkov regime, the resolution lays down the political premises for a reappraisal of the nature of the Stalinist bureaucracy and the kind of action the workers must take to overthrow it. While it does not spell out these revisions, it opens the door for others to do so, as we shall see later.
b.   The Kremlin and the Communist Parties
The resolution states that the Kremlin's rigid grip on the mass Communist parties is weakening. It gives three reasons for this deduction: the growing power of the mass movement exerted on these parties, the loosening of their relations with Moscow, and uncertainty about the Kremlin's  authority  and policy  in recent months. No specific

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evidence is cited to substantiate this speculation, although the development cannot be ruled out in advance in specific cases. Such has certainly been the case with the Yugoslav and Chinese CP's. But there are no overt signs of a similar occurrence elsewhere yet.
To buttress this point the resolution cites the Kremlin's inability to reestablish any International since 1943. Actually Moscow finds any International more of a liability than an asset. It wishes to keep the CP's separated and to control them by other means.
This alleged relaxation of Kremlin control is associated with "the penetration of ideas opposed to the interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy within these organizations; and a process of modification in the hierarchical, bureaucratic relations previously established." That is how the disintegration of Stalinism is beginning. Vague as these observations of tendencies are, they seem to point to the growth of new ideological currents and organizational relations within the shell of the CP's which will apparently continue inside them until the reformed and rebellious parties become strong and independent enough to throw off the Kremlin's stranglehold. Does this not project the perspective of such reformed Stalinist parties escaping the Kremlin's clutches and proceeding on the road to revolution?
This conclusion receives reinforcement from the assertion that the mass Communist parties are forced to radicalize their policies more and more. This is the fundamental and inescapable course of their policies.
The resolution grudgingly admits "the possibility of the mass Communist parties to carry through temporary turns to the right within given conditions, so long as the mass pressure has not reached its culminating point." (p. 35) The direction of Stalinist policy in such parties is thus made to depend in the last analysis on the degree of mass pressure exerted upon them.
Up to now there has been no such direct correlation. The history of the French CP is instructive. From 1929-1933 when the workers were not yet energetic it pursued an ultra-left line. In 1936 when the mass movement reached its height the CP took a People's Front line. In 1944-47 at the crest of the revolutionary wave generated by the war the Stalinist leaders disarmed the workers and helped de Gaulle restore the capitalist regime. In 1952, when the workers had relapsed into passivity thanks in large measure to the previous gyrations of Stalinist policy, it summoned the Paris workers into the adventure of the anti-Ridgway demonstrations. Finally, in August 1953 during the General Strike the CP remained passive and maintained its "National Front" mixture of opportunism and sectarianism without radicalizing its policy an iota.
This record shows that, far from coordinating their line with the rise in mass pressure, this mass CP ran counter to it. The diplomatic needs of the Kremlin got the upper hand over the demands of the masses. This does not mean that the CP can get away with anything at any time. It too must adjust itself, like other mass parties, to the radicalization of the masses, more in words than in deeds. But in and of itself the pressure of the masses does not suffice to push the CP closer to the revolutionary road.
The conception that a mass  CP will take the road to

power if only sufficient mass pressure is brought to bear is false. It shifts the responsibility for revolutionary setbacks from the leadership to the mass, according to the following reasoning: if only there had been more pressure, the CP could have been forced to drive for power. The interaction between the insurgent masses and the leadership is thus reduced to the simple equation: maximum mass pressure equals revolutionary performance, however inadequate, from the CP leadership.
Actually, the pressure of the workers in the 1953 French General Strike was formidable enough to start the offensive for power. But it was precisely the momentum of this mass power and its implications that caused the CP leadership to leap away in fright from it and prevent its organization. In this not unimportant case, instead of radicalizing Stalinist policy, the heightened mass pressure had a different effect. Obviously, there is not a direct but a dialectical relationship between the two factors.
Yugoslavia and China show that under certain exceptional conditions the leadership of a Stalinist party, caught between extermination by the counter-revolution and an extremely powerful revolutionary offensive of the masses, can push forward to power. This can be repeated elsewhere under comparable conditions, especially in the event of a new world war.
But it would be unwarranted to generalize too broadly and hastily on this point. It should be remembered that while the Yugoslavs marched to power, the CP's in other countries remained subordinate to the Kremlin and facilitated the work of the counter-revolution. Two Communist parties, the Yugoslav and Chinese, met the test in  one way;  the others in a directly opposite manner.
The specific conditions which forced the Yugoslav and Chinese CP's onto the revolutionary road must be analyzed and understood. Both parties had been in conflict with the existing regimes and operated illegally for long years. Both fought prolonged civil wars during which the leadership and cadres were selected, tested and hardened and their forces organized. The Chinese CP had armed forces of its own for years before launching the struggle for power. The domestic capitalist regimes were exceptionally weak and imperialism was unable to intervene with any effectiveness.
In any case, as the Manifesto issued by the Third World Congress declared: "The transformations which the Stalinist parties might undergo in the course of the most acute revolutionary crises may oblige the Leninist vanguard to readjust its tactics toward these parties. But this in no way relieves the proletariat from the task of building a new revolutionary leadership. What is on the agenda today, is not so much the question of a projection of a struggle for power under exceptional conditions in this or that isolated country, but the overthrow of imperialism in all countries as rapidly as possible. Stalinism remains obstacle number one, within the international labor movement, to the successful conclusion of that task."
c.  The Kremlin and the Buffer Zone
The exposition of the contradictions inherent in the postwar expansion of Stalinist domination over the buffer zone countries: the resistance of the native CP's which have acquired their own state interests and material base

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against the dictates of the Kremlin; the clash between the regime and the peasants; the conflict between the regime and the workers is in general correctly delineated.
There are, however, three main points of difference to be noted.
1.	The National Question
First is the neglect of any treatment of the national question in the resolution, although this is one of the most explosive issues in the Kremlin-subjugated domains. There has long been bitter resistance to the autocratic Russification of the Ukranians and other minorities. The extension of Moscow's rule, its plundering, overlordship and Russification has provoked no less intense national feelings in the buffer zone.
The political revolution against the Moscow despotism can not be visualized without the rekindling of the national independence movement in these areas. This demand will be one of the keenest weapons against the Kremlin overlords. Yugoslavia has already shown how powerful a factor of rebellion this national pride can be.
The program for the political revolution must therefore include slogans for a free and independent Socialist Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., just as we continue to call for an independent Socialist Ukraine. In East Germany, split by joint agreement of the Big Three, this demand takes the form of the reunification of the German nation on a Socialist basis. The unity of the German people, and above all its working class, is indispensable for the promotion of the European revolution. Even though this demand was raised by the demonstrators themselves and was called for by the entire situation, it was missing from the IS declaration on the East German events.
The omission of such a slogan in both the resolution and the IS statement requires explanation. Is the present bloc of anti-capitalist states under Kremlin dictatorship to be regarded as a solid and untouchable entity which the demand for independence disintegrates? Actually the struggle for socialist independence undermines the grip of the Kremlin, helps unify the revolutionary forces, increasing their striking power against imperialism.
This omission is all the more glaring in the light of its inclusion in the Third World Congress Manifesto. "Long live the independent Socialist Republics of Poland, of Czechoslovakia, of Hungary, of Rumania, of Bulgaria and of the Ukraine! Down with the Stalinist dictatorship."
2.	The East German Events
Second, in place of the dubious hypotheses advanced in the resolution on possible variants of development, the revolutionary perspectives for the buffer zone countries should be based upon concrete events from which lessons can be drawn and applied. This means that the treatment of the overthrow of the Kremlin autocracy and the disintegration of Stalinism must take the East German uprising as its point of departure.
This uprising demonstrated in life how the political revolution against Stalinism originates and unfolds. A correct appraisal of the East German events has the utmost importance for our movement because it provides the opportunity to check our program with the actual events and see whether and in what respects it was verified and wherein it requires correction and amplification.

Important divergences in appraisal are equally significant. Briefly,   what   did   the   East   German   uprising reveal?
 1.	It showed that the working" class was the initiating and decisive force in leading the people to revolt.
 2.	It disclosed the colossal power and potentialities of the workers' movement which united all currents of labor opinion in massive protest. Virtually the entire working class opposed itself to the regime and all its agencies-, beginning with the SED.
 3.	The unpopular government was sprung into midair without any support amongst the people. Its main props, the party, the police and the top bureaucracy, crumbled and collapsed under the impact of the uprising.
 4.	The advanced workers broke in action with the government party, the SED.
 5.	They evinced determination to overthrow the regime, not to reform it. This repudiation and rejection was implicit in the demand for "a metal-workers government." The sum total of the other demands were incompatible with the continuance of the dictatorship.
 6.	The general mass political strike, sparked by immediate economic demands and directed against the government, became the means for mobilizing the masses and pitting them against the regime.
 7.	The Trotskyist program of the necessity of political revolution against Stalinism by a mass uprising was vindicated and adopted in action by the insurgent workers.
 8.	The unarmed and unsupported masses had to fall back. They felt the need for the formation of a revolutionary leadership and a party to organize the next stages and link it up with the struggles in the West and the buffer zone countries.
 9.	The events exposed and underscored the utterly counterrevolutionary nature of Stalinism.
a.	It required a series of repressive measures, mixed
with minor concessions, to save and prop up the bat
tered regime. Armed force and police actions against the
most militant and conscious elements had to be used
to subdue the insurgents.
b.	The occupying Soviet troops rescued the regime and
pushed back the revolution.
c.	The Stalinists launched a despicable slander cam
paign against the workers as "fascists."
d.	The SED undertook a purge of its personnel who
proved weak and conciliatory.
Contrast the above appraisal with the aspects stressed in the IS resolution written after the East German uprising. The resolution singles out three points.
a.	Special economic conditions caused the resistance of
the masses to culminate in open revolt. (Actually, they
touched off the rebellion which  had profounder causes.)
b.	This revolt accentuated "the new course" which in
cludes an improvement in economic conditions for all
layers of the people and a softening of the atmosphere
of extreme tension in the mass organizations.
c.	This new course is designed to strengthen the grip
of the Stalinist parties by making it more flexible, less
rigid.
These are the sum total of the principal lessons drawn by the resolution from the East German uprising!
3. Entrism into the CP in the Buffer Zone Countries
Third, the resolution recommends an application of the   entrist   tactic   toward   the   Communist Parties  in the

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buffer zone cquntries. In these countries, "our forces must seek to realize their tasks, which are in general similar to those we have in the Soviet Union, through an entrist tactic toward the CP, while remaining prepared to join quickly any other mass organization which may appear at the beginning of the upsurge."
The question naturally arises why the resolution does not make a specific entrist proposal for the CP of the Soviet Union, if the tasks are "in general similar." This becomes still more puzzling when we are given as one of the motivations for entrism in the buffer zone countries, that "the more the outbreak the revolutionary rise is retarded, the more will the young generation awaken to political life. This generation will have known no form of political organization other than the CP and the latter will tend to become the national arena in which the leadership of the new revolutionary rise will develop."
Several young generations have already awakened to political life in the S. U. knowing no other party than the CP. If this becomes a decisive criterion, the entrist tactic should be applied there above all places. Why doesn't the resolution call for it? Why is such a glaring contradiction permitted?
Can it be because the Transitional Program opens no door for an entrist tactic toward the CP USSR? It insists on the contrary that the Soviet masses will rise up against the bureaucracy under the leadership of the Soviet section of the Fourth International.
But the way is being paved to get around this in stages. In quoting the Transitional Program the resolution drops out the above clearly-stated programmatic conclusions. It substitutes the vaguer proposition that "the conditions are being created for the reconstitution and the upsurge of the Bolshevik-Leninist Party." There is no explicit reference to entry but it is not excluded.
In addition, the resolution prescribes an entrist tactic for the buffer zone countries which is so motivated as to apply with greater force to the USSR. Such an entrist proposal is fundamentally different from any other adopted by our movement in the past.
Up to now the Trotskyist movement has practiced three types of entry. The first involved reformist or centrist parties which, under the impact of events, gave rise to a significant leftward-moving tendency. A Trotskyist grouping or party may temporally give up its organizational independence to enter such a movement to promote the crystallization of a principled revolutionary tendency and augment its own forces in the process. The size of the party is not of decisive consideration in an entry of this kind, which is a temporary detour on the road to the construction of the revolutionary party. It serves the two-fold purpose of gathering forces and if possible, disposing of a centrist rival on the arena of the class struggle. This was the sort of entry the Trot-skyists carried through in the Socialist Party in the United States in 1936.
The second type of entrism involves parties enjoying the allegiance of the working class in its entirety, like the British Labor Party. Unless they have a viable party of their own, Trotskyists will enter such a movement because within it is concentrated the political life and development of the decisive elements of the class.Basing themselves in their activity on the contradiction between the   socialist   aspirations   of  the  working   class  and  the

capitalist-minded party bureaucracy, the Trotskyists articulate the fundamental interests of theranks, givethem leadership and programmatic expression and collect the forces for the revolutionary party in subsequent stages of struggle for socialism.
The third type of entrism has been developed since the Third World Congress. It essentially represents an extension of the second type to the Stalinist parties enjoying a considerable mass base in the capitalist countries, such as France or Italy, or fighting a civil war for power as in Indo-China.
Here the Trotskyists base themselves upon the contradiction between the urge of the masses for the conquest of power and a fundamental social change and the policies of the CP bureaucracies subservient to the Kremlin, with the aim of directing the movement into revolutionary channels. Because of the monolithic character and bureaucratic regime of these parties which does not permit opposition tendencies to operate, this entrism encounters great difficulties and complications and must be of a special kind. This tactic remains in the experimental stage and must be carefully checked at every point to assess the results.
The entrist proposal so lightly introduced to the resolution for the buffer zone countries is of an altogether different type. It involves entering a party that holds state power and is the direct and principal oppressor of the working masses. The fundamental antagonism within these countries, as in the Soviet Union, is between the organized and armed bureaucracy, ruling through the CP, and the unorganized and disarmed working class. To go into the CP is not to acquire closer contact with the best elements of the working class but to become identified with the bureaucracy in the eyes of the most militant workers. A party member is forced to become an instrument of oppression in the day-to-day friction between the bureaucratic regime and the working class.
A revolutionary worker would seek to make contact with the discontented workers repelled by and from the CP in as prudent a manner as possible.
The resolution does not proceed from the existing antagonisms between the workers and the Stalinist regime and the revolutionary impact the development of these antagonisms is bound to have, proposing organizational forms in preparation for that day. Instead it bases itself on the static concept that Stalinist workers will continue to remain in the CP while the Social Democrats will remain in the Social Democracy. Or on the conservative concept that the youth will flock into the sole party they see at hand. The revolutionary wave which, according to the resolution, is spreading from country to country and continent to continent will evidently engulf everything except the traditional parties. It will engulf Stalinism, but leave the CP's intact. There is something wrong here. One effect of powerful revolutionary uprisings is to- break the ties of the workers to their traditional organizations, disrupt the old parties, and lift up from obscurity the most revolutionary elements.
The East German uprising did not reinforce the SED or bring workers closer to it. It dug an unbridgeable gulf between the rebellious advanced workers and the SED. It prepared the conditions for creating a new leadership and bringing forth a new party which alone could guarantee the victory in the succeeding stages.

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The question of entrism forms part and parcel of the revolutionary perspectives envisaged and is designed to serve them. If the leadership of the workers' uprising can be expected to come out of a split in the CP apparatus then it is understandable, even if not justifiable, to prescribe entrism in the buffer zone CP's. But if the revolutionary movement and its leadership is expected to arise in a struggle against the CP then a different tactic is in order.
It should be noted that the Third Congress Manifesto explicitly calls for the formation of new parties in the USSR and the "Peoples' Democracies." "At the same time the Fourth International resolutely supports all proletarian movements of opposition to the police dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy and fights for the constitution of new Bolshevik-Leninist parties in these countries, parties which will take the leadership of the necessary political revolution for freeing socialist development from its bureaucratic shell." There is no such call in the present resolution. A shift in position has been introduced without explanation.
An entrist tactic may be dictated in regard to the Yugoslav and Chinese CP's, which led revolutions. To this day the leaderships have to lean to some extent upon the masses and appeal to their self-action, to undertake some of the uncompleted tasks of the revolution. The bureaucratic stratum is not yet petrified and is not regarded by the workers as an instrument of foreign domination. They still believe the CP's can be the vehicle for their revolutionary aspirations.
VI. How the Line Is Being Applied
How the line of the resolution is being applied, how it distorts the real situation, disarms the FI and would disorient its ranks can be seen in the recent writings by Pablo and Clarke on the East German uprising and the events in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death.
a. Pablo and Clarke on the East German Uprising
As the first proletarian revolt directed at the overthrow of the Stalinist bureaucracy and its agents, the East German uprising possesses immense significance for the entire world working class, and especially for its Trotsky-ist vanguard which alone heralded and worked for this line of action. What does the declaration issued by the IS during this gigantic mass movement do and propose?
 1.	Instead of exposing and denouncing the Kremlin and East German Stalinist leaders as mortal foes of the workers and heads of the counter-revolution, the IS statement plays up their concessions and assures that these will continue. "They have been obliged to continue along the road of still more ample and genuine concessions to avoid risking alienating themselves forever from support by the masses and from provoking still stronger explosions. From now on they will not be able to stop halfway . . . They will be obliged to dole out more concessions . . ." This is tantamount to telling the workers that they can expect ever-greater concessions from their oppressors, not that these will be limited to the minimum and withdrawn unless the workers exert their full powers of resistance and follow through to the end.
 2.	Instead  of warning that the Stalinist apparatus will

inflict repressions and stop at nothing to defend their dictatorship, the IS statement promises a general and growing attitude of appeasement of the masses by the Stalinists.
 3.	There is no clear call for the overthrow of the Stalinist bureaucracy through the organization, strengthening and consummation of the uprising.
 4.	Instead of a program specifically adapted to the conditions and needs of the East German workers, a general program for the political revolution in the Soviet Union and all the "Peoples' Democracies" is put forward.
 5.	This program raises the slogan for "real democratization of the Communist Parties" as though these organs of the police regime could and should be transformed into vehicles for the revolutionary actions and aspirations of the masses. At the very time they are breaking in action with this party, the Stalinist workers are directed to seek its reform.
 6.	By implication, since this program is presented as applying to the Soviet Union as well, the slogan to democratize the Communist party would be on the order of the day for the CP USSR too. This is a direct break with the established position calling for the formation of a Trotskyist Party in the Soviet Union.
 7.	On the other hand, while there is a demand for the legalization of other working class parties, there is none for the formation of a new revolutionary party around the Trotskyist program.
 8.	There is no call for the withdrawal of the Soviet occupying troops which shot down workers and served as the ultimate prop of the shattered regime.
 9.	Although demonstrators themselves put forward the demand, there is no slogan for the reunification of Germany on a Socialist basis. The need for unity is concentrated instead upon the solidarity of the Soviet Union and the "Peoples' Democracies" as a bloc. The resolution concludes with acclamation for "the socialist rebirth of the Soviet Union, the 'Peoples' Democracies' and the international working class movement." Wouldn't the German workers also care to hear acclamation for the socialist reunification of their own divided country?
10.	While the Stalinists slander the workers as "fascist
hirelings," the statement cavalierly observes: "The Soviet
leaders and those of the various 'Peoples' Democracies'
and the CP could no longer falsify or ignore the pro
found meaning of these events."
Where is the revolutionary spirit of irreconcilable combat to topple a powerful and perfidious enemy in such a line? It is not designed to focus the attention of the masses upon the need for a new revolutionary leadership. At the very time when the workers are in revolt, it is permeated with a conciliatory attitude toward the bureaucracy.
Clarke's article on the East German events in the March-April FI displays equally conciliatory features. He plays down the counter-revolutionary intervention of the Kremlin as well as of its puppet regime. He takes careful note of the moderate conduct of the occupying forces but fails to point out their counter-revolutionary function in rescuing the regime and blocking the workers' bid for power. He does not bring forward the inescapable necessity for  the mass uprising to get rid of the Stalinist bureau-

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cracy. Nor does he assert the need of a revolutionary party in order  to lead such a mass uprising to victory.
Much is made of the split in the bureaucracy, although no definite conclusions are drawn from this development It is clear that the SED bureaucracy became panic stricken and differences set in on how best to handle the situation and that the movement found sympathy and support among certain elements in its lower ranks. This happens in every revolutionary uprising and it would be wrong to deny or ignore such developments.
But the question is: what place and significance do they have in the process of the revolution? They are not and cannot be the decisive factor or the central line of the struggle. The IS preoccupation with these subordinate aspects of the struggle tends to shift the axis of revolutionary strategy from the mobilization of the workers as an independent class force relying on their own strength and organs toward reliance for leadership from elements within the bureaucracy. The excessive attention given to the differentiations and splits within the bureaucracy, the embellishment of their concessions, the failure to stress their repressive and counter-revolutionary role, can be explained only by illusions that, under pressure from below, a section of the Stalinist leadership will head the movement for the liquidation of Stalinism, at least in its earlier stages.
There is a sharp break with the traditional Trotskyist concept of the decisive role of the independent mass movement under its own revolutionary leadership.
b. Pablo   and   Clarke   on  the Post-Stalin Developments
Pablo's article on "The Post-Stalin's New Course" in the March-April FI proceeds along similar lines. He grossly exaggerates the scope and significance of the Malenkov concessions. He says that in addition to measures effecting an improvement of working conditions there has likewise been an extension of "the democratic rights of the masses," with less labor discipline and speed-up for the workers under the dictatorship.
He does not prescribe any limits to the concessions. On the contrary, the bureaucracy will have to quicken and extend them. "In reality events will oblige them, as is being demonstrated in Eastern Germany, and partly in Czechoslovakia, to quicken and extend the concessions to keep the impatient masses in the other buffer zone countries and in the USSR itself, from taking the road of action."
This is leading to the liquidation of the entire Stalinist heritage. "The dynamic of their concessions is in reality liquidatory of the entire Stalinist heritage in the USSR itself, as well as in its relations with the satellite countries, with China and the Communist Parties. It will no longer be easy to turn back . . . once the concessions are broadened, the march toward a real liquidation of the Stalinist regime threatens to become irresistible."
He thereupon raises the question: "what form will it (the march toward a real liquidation of the Stalinist regime) then take?" "Will it be that of an acute crisis and of violent inter-bureaucratic struggles between the elements who will fight for the status quo, if not for turning back, and the more and more numerous elements drawn by the powerful pressure of the masses?"

He does not answer the question but the very posing of the question in this tendentious manner implies the answer.
In his article in the January-February FI, Clarke introduces other variants. Among them he projects the possibility of the bureaucracy's sharing power with the masses.
Pablo and Clarke see in both the German uprising and the post-Stalinist developments the emergence of a deepening conflict between the stand-patters and a leftward-moving wing within the bureaucracy which tends to tear it apart into contending factions. In the showdown the reformists appeal to and lean upon the masses; the masses in turn, it is implied, should back them up and look to them for leadership. This is presumably the beginning of the path to socialist regeneration which is already discernible in "the New Course."
This shifts the axis of the development of the political revolution away from the self-action of the masses and focuses it upon the rifts inside the bureaucracy. Thereby the Trotskyist concept that the extension of the world revolution will inspire the Russian workers to rise up on their own account and overthrow the Stalinist bureaucracy gives way to a different concept. The changed international and internal situation, coupled with mounting pressure from the masses, unlooses forces within the bureaucracy itself which work toward the liquidation of Stalinism. The transformations emanate from on top as an outcome of the mass pressures from below.
The working class is transformed into a pressure group, and the Trotskyists into a pressure grouping along with it which pushes a section of the bureaucracy leftward toward the revolution. In this way, the bureaucracy is transformed from a bloc and a betrayer of the revolution into an auxiliary motor force of it.
c.  What Must Such Conclusions Point To?
Such sweeping conclusions on the changing characteristics of the Kremlin dictatorship and the dissolution of world Stalinism have a logic which is bound to assert itself. If the objective processes are marching along so fast and so far, then an equivalent reorientation must be effected by the revolutionary vanguard if it is to be on top of the unfolding events. A general turn would have to be made toward the Communist parties and into the Communist parties to help along the disintegration already proceeding at an accelerated rate and take full advantage of the transformation and impending breakup of Stalinism.
The conclusion of Pablo's article on "The Post-Stalin New Course" envisages such a perspective for the immediate future. Pablo writes: "What is now clear is that the decline of Stalinism in the form of the iron grip of the Soviet bureaucracy over the Soviet masses, the buffer zone countries, the Communist parties, is henceforth speeded up, and that the renovation of socialist democracy in all these countries, as in China, as well as the renaissance of the international workers' movement is now on the order of the day." How is this to be accomplished? "In the years visible ahead, the junction of the ideas and forces of the Fourth International with the revolutionary  elements until now organized or influenced

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by Stalinism will realize in part this first stage of this renovation."
Isn't this a signpost toward a general entry into the Stalinist movement?
The recent writings of Comrades Pablo and Clarke go beyond the stated positions of the resolution on "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism." But the point to be emphasized is that the resolution -contains, or at least indicates, the political premises for their more extreme conclusions. These premises are not clearly and fully expressed in all respects. But they are there.
Recently tendencies conciliatory toward Stalinism have begun to emerge in several Trotskyist organizations. A resolution on Stalinism must take cognizance of this dangerous development and guard against any ambiguities from which it can draw sustenance. For example, the question of the political revolution against the Kremlin bureaucracy, is now in dispute. How does the resolution treat this problem?
In citing the Transitional Program for the political revolution in the Soviet Union, the resolution stops short of the following: "Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward social-

ism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection—the party of the Fourth International!"
These categorical statements leave no room whatsoever for different interpretations of what is meant However, they are replaced in the text of the resolution by two vaguer propositions that: "The conditions are being created for the reconstitution and the upsurge of the Bolshevik-Leninist party in the Soviet Union" and later on: "The task of smashing the dictatorship and the privileges of the bureaucracy, the task of a new political revolution in   the Soviet  Union remains more burning than ever."
This may well have gone unnoticed and uncriticized if an attempt had not already been made, by Clarke for one, to substitute new concepts of the political revolution for the established positions. The ambiguities in the resolution lend themselves to such revisions whereas the clear and unmistakable terms of the Transitional Program preclude them.
Complete clarity and precision on all these questions are indispensable to arm the movement for effective revolutionary intervention in the mounting crisis of world Stalinism.
October 5, 1953

SECTION VI: FOUR SUPPORTERS OF COCHRAN-CLARKE-BARTELL FROM THE SWP

'GRADUATE"

[The conviction that the line of Pablo and his supporters was undermining the Trotskyist movement's opposition to Stalinism was strengthened by the appearance of outright pro-Stalinist currents in various sections of the Fourth International and in the SWP. In Ceylon, a sizable Stalinist faction appeared. In this case, the International Secretariat sent Ernest Germain to Ceylon to oppose this grouping which  eventually joined  the Communist Party.

[In Seattle, a group of four Cochran-Clarke-Bartell supporters appeared as full-fledged Stalinists late in the discussion. Echoing the minority's charge that the majority was "Shachtmanite," they concluded that Trotskyism was counterrevolutionary and joined the Communist Party. They were not the last of such tendencies to emerge as Pablo's concepts were adopted by groupings within the International. ]

1. Statement of Daniel Roberts to Seattle Branch, July 23, 1953

All political discussions such as we are engaged in at the present time have their critical moments.
In my opinion—judging from all that I have heard and seen —we have come to the cross roads with two comrades in the party —namely, Sylvia and Roger. That is a critical point and should be taken notice of in the party. The comrades are disagreeing with us on the most fundamental question of all: namely, which party do we build.
These comrades have indicated in branch discussions, minority caucus discussions and in private conversations that they believe that the party to build is the Communist Party; that it is the revolutionary party. They say: Aban-

don the building of the Socialist Workers Party and build the Communist Party instead. In a discussion in the branch executive committee Sylvia stated that she believed that the two positions that are going to crystallize out of the national discussion are Stalinophobia on the one hand and conciliationism to Stalinism on the other.
I take that to mean that Sylvia believes that only a Stalinophobic program can now sustain the independent existence of the Socialist Workers Party.
Is Sylvia's and Roger's viewpoint compatible with membership in the Socialist Workers Party? We of the majority say "No!" How can it be? The key question of revolutionary   politics   turns  around the question of the

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party. All principles, all theories, all slogans become realised through the party. When Sylvia and Roger assert: Build the CP and not the SWP—they are disagreeing with us on the most fundamental question of revolutionary politics today.
Let us make no mistake. Sylvia is not proposing an entry into the CP, which would be another way of building the Socialist Workers Party, assuming that such a tactic were indicated by the relationship of forces between the SWP and the CP, which it definitely is not. What Sylvia proposes is the outright liquidation of the SWP in favor of the Communist Party.
But we say that a river of blood separates us from Stalinism. There is the murder of Trotsky and innumerable other murders. That is not a small matter. What is more, in all of its politics Stalinism has demonstrated itself to be a completely counter-revolutionary tendency in the labor movement just as much as the Social Democracy. That is why it shed our blood. Our movement drew the conclusion in 1933 that it was necessary to build the Fourth International and to build the independent parties .of Trotskyism in every country. Where we have entered a Communist Party — as in France today — the purpose of that entry is to destroy Stalinism and to build a mass party for Trotskyism, for the Fourth International.
In the U.S.A. we say: Build the Socialist Workers Party as an independent party. War to the death against Stalinism, against the American Communist Party — as well as against the Shachtmanites and other Social Democratic formations. Thus the proposal: Build the Communist Party, which is the essence of the point of view put forward by Sylvia and Roger, is not compatible with the program of building the Socialist Workers Party, and we must face the fact squarely that these two comrades will soon act on their conclusions to the benefit of the CP, unless we can prevail upon them in time to stop and turn around.
Furthermore, the experience of the discussion nationally demonstrates to us that theirs may not remain isolated cases. There may be other comrades who will be moving towards the same conclusions. And any such trend — even if it involves only a handful of individuals — must be combatted and defeated. We have to put this problem on the top of the agenda of the national discussion. Our party can't survive with an indifferent attitude toward a fundamental question of this nature.
How about it, then, comrades of the Cochranite and Marcyite tendencies? Will you make common cause with the majority and can we maintain our discussion within the framework of a common line of building the Socialist Workers Party? Will you join with us in a fight against a pro-Stalinist position? Or are you afraid, perhaps, that by making common cause with the majority you will be aiding the Shachtmanites, who are also our enemies? If so I wish to say a few words of reassurance to you on that score.
The Socialist Workers Party has, as you know, a consistent record of intransigent battle against the Shachtmanites. We have never permitted any haziness to develop in the party in the outlook of its members or its leaders towards the Shachtmanites, just as we have never permitted   haziness   in   the   party's   outlook towards the

Stalinists. Nor do we propose any changes in this respect now.
I look back a few years ago to the debate I conducted against Albert Gates of the Shachtmanites. Everything that I said then in opposition to Gates has been confirmed by the events. I told Gates that he and his cohorts had lost confidence in the revolutionary potential of the working class, and that that was why the Shachtmanites magnified the power of Stalinism to the nth degree and choose American Imperialism as a lesser evil. I told him that the SWP believed that the working class would destroy Stalinism and American Imperialism and that we based our program squarely upon that perspective. I said we want no truck with the Shachtmanite program of reconciliation with American Imperialism.
The events have confirmed us. Aren't the masses moving to destroy American Imperialism throughout the world, and aren't they breaking from and rising against Stalinism at the same time? Is not the very anti-imperialist action of the colonial masses, which we support wholeheartedly, irrespective of who is the leadership of the moment, beginning to put the squeeze of death upon Stalinism? Will not this death squeeze culminate in the revolutionary overthrow of Stalinism? The prospects for the building of the authentic revolutionary party —the Trot-skyist parties — look very bright indeed. We have no cause to move toward reconciliation with the Shachtmanites when the events have proved us right and them wrong. We are maintaining our course of building the Trotskyist party, and it is on that ground that we wish to come to an agreement with the Cochranites and the Marcyites against a pro-Stalinist position.
What does the majority propose to do concretely about comrades Sylvia and Roger? We want to discuss with them. Our aim is to win them back to the party if that is possible. We want to win them back to the idea that they held before the faction fight began —namely, that it is correct to build the Socialist Workers Party and to wage irreconcilable war against the CP. Sylvia and Roger have developed their partial positions of a few months ago to logical conclusions. Thus all the subordinate issues which divided us heretofore can be removed from the discussion and we can proceed to fundamentals: SWP or CP. Of course, should these comrades commit an openly disloyal act then our attitude of "let's discuss" will automatically cease.
We call on Sylvia and Roger to submit their ideas in writing, and I am glad to hear that they plan to do so. We propose that they submit them for the entire party, so that the party nationally, the national leaders of the party and the national leaders of the faction, can reply if they so wish.
If someone with Sylvia's and Roger's ideas were to apply for membership in the SWP, we of the majority would oppose admission. But that is not the issue with them. These comrades joined us in good faith on the basis of agreement with our program and have participated in the building of the SWP. Furthermore, their present ideas flow out of the national discussion and are an integral part of it. We can't brush them aside — either to cast them out summarily or to ignore them on the plea that there are only two of them, that their ideas are "extreme" and that hence they don't count. On the contrary,  we think that discussion with them  should be

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given a high place on the agenda.
In discussing the problem posed by Sylvia and Roger's evolution, a few of the comrades in the majority caucus asked: "Why don't we propose to them that, if these are their ideas, they simply leave us and join the Communist Party." We all concluded, however, that before we advise anybody to join the Communist Party we would first advise him to drop dead. That is how strongly we feel about the matter.
As far as we are concerned, anybody who leaves for the Communist Party from our party does not leave in friendship   or   in   peace,   but   departs  with the brand of

renegade upon him. That is why we propose to exhaust
the possibility by means of discussion to win Roger and
Sylvia back to the movement.	/
To sum up: We propose to the Marcyites and the (Cochranites that we engage in a discussion with Sylvja and Roger and that we close ranks on the question $iat the party to build as the revolutionary party in the U. S. is the SWP. We call upon Sylvia and Roger to enter into a discussion with us on that fundamental question. How about it, comrades of the Cochranites and the Marcyites? How about it, comrades Sylvia and Roger?

2. Report from Seattle to the Majority Caucus, by George Flint

(The following report from Seattle relates the concluding chapter in the pro-Stalinist degeneration of four comrades who started out as Cochranites in the internal party struggle. The circumstances of their departure from the party, with the crassest declarations of support to Stalinism and the most despicable attacks on the SWP, are without precedent in our movement. As the report indicates, a review of the history of their degeneration and a political evaluation of this development will be prepared soon.)
Sept 7, 1953
Dear Farrell:
Sylvia, Bud, Roger and Jim O. finished neck and neck at our Thursday night's branch meeting, in their race to leave the party of revolutionary socialism and enter the party or the milieu of counter-revolutionary Stalinism.
Sylvia in her statement said that she repudiated all concepts of Trotskyism and considered the CP a historically revolutionary party.
Roger said that he was never fully integrated in the Trotskyist movement because he never considered the CP to be a counter-revolutionary tendency.
Bud said that after 6 years in the SWP he decided he must take himself out of the movement that is unreal with wishful thinking about the world today. Our party, he said, feeds on anti-communist sentiments of the masses.
They announced that they were also speaking for Jim O. He came in later after they had left and confirmed this.
In answer to a question at the meeting Sylvia said she considered the murder of the Left Oppositionists in the Soviet Union progressive and necessary because it served the needs of defense of the Soviet Union.
At the conclusion of each statement they announced their resignation from the party. Dan spoke, pointing to the miserable role they played. He made a motion that they be dropped from membership and be considered as enemies of the party. This motion passed.
I reported at the branch meeting the gist of their opinions as I got them from a discussion I had with them the Monday (Aug. 3) before the meeting. They first tried to deny strikebreaking by the Stalinists during the war, but when confronted with the facts they justified it Support of the Second World War they justified. Working of Stalinists together with the F. B. L they tried to deny, but when confronted with the facts they tried to squirm

out of it Finally Roger said we do more harm with our criticism of Stalinism than they do by working with the F. B. L
Murder of Trotskyists in the Soviet Union they considered progressive.
I pointed out the difference between these people and Stalinist rank and file workers. The Stalinist misguided workers are worth while talking to. They blame the openly counter-revolutionary politics of Stalinism during the war on Browderism. In the case of some individuals if we could show that these counter-revolutionary acts were inherent in Stalinism we have a chance to win them over. However, these people know better.
To all this Bud mumbled something about us calling him counter-revolutionary but they, in going to Stalinism, were probably going to end up in a concentration camp.
In my opinion the underlying cause for the complete change of opinions on the part of Bud and Sylvia lies in their spinelessness in whatever milieu they happened to be. Sylvia on Monday night told me that she first realized how ridiculous Trotskyism was when we urged her, when she was on the grievance committee in her shop, to talk to workers in the shop about socialism and the party. We didn't urge her to this everywhere and indiscriminately, but to single out those who would be more receptive and break down their prejudices against socialism and against the party. This she never did. She enthusiastically supported the Cochranite line of directing our propaganda to the politicals (that is, the Stalinists) and within that milieu didn't want to be "ridiculous" either.
Incidentally, when I came back from New York in July Sylvia and Roger were no longer in the Cochranite faction. Bud, however, was; he still called himself a Cochranite. To his knowledge, as of Monday night he still hadn't been dropped.
Comradely, George Flint
P. S. Dan left the day after the meeting for L. A. Frank, Clara and Betty are already there. When they come back, I believe Clara is planning an article which will describe in more detail the development of the four from an allegiance to Trotskyism, then to Cochranism, now to Stalinism.

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SECTION VII: PABLO ATTACKS THE BRITISH SECTION

[As Gerry Healy moved toward criticizing Pablo's political and organizational innovations, a pro-Pablo faction headed by John Lawrence suddenly made its appearance in the British section. They sought, under the banner of democratic centralism, to place Healy under "discipline" to support the line of the International Secretariat in the internal   discussion   in   the  British section.  According to

Healy, offers were made by top international leaders to call off the factional fight against him in Britain if he would agree to support Pablo against Cannon. Organizational threats aimed at cutting off the discussion before it began contributed to sharply increasing the tension in the world Trotskyist movement. ]

1. Letter from Sam Gordon to Friends in the SWP
23rd August 1953
Dear Friends:
I have received copy of Aug. 5 letter on discussion with Marcy as well as mimeoed LA-NY correspondence up to the end of July, but no acknowledgement as yet of my own first August letter.
Glad to note progress of thinking on the problems posed by the new documents. Also, appreciated very much the lead editorial and the article by Murry in the last issue of the paper which, I presume, was a warm-up for the Trotsky memorial issue. "We can do no greater honor to his memory, thirteen years after his assassination, than to continue his work 'In Defense of Marxism,' and to complete it under the heading 'In Defense of Trotskyism' against the new revisionists who are attempting to defile it and —by the same token —to blur the guilt and the reactionary role in history of his assassins."
Enclosed are a few suggested amendments I have drawn up and discussed with Burns. I take it that you have been working on some of your own, including one restoring the deleted conclusions in the quotation from the transitional programme, since this point has been mentioned by you.
Has everyone read Deutscher's new book? It should be made required reading for the present struggle. This man, as is well known, has passed through our international movement on his way to the fleshpots of Fleet Street. He is not someone moving towards us but someone who has moved away from us. And direction, as Trotsky taught us, is a very important element in judging the specific position taken by the political animal at any given time. He is acclaimed not only by Clarke and his friends, but by the British bourgeois press as well (which for reasons of its own, as I believe Jim once said of Churchill, engages in quite a bit of wishful thinking these days of insoluble predicaments).
Pablo, Burns tells me, remarked to him recently that Deutscher has done more than anyone to popularize "our" ideas before a broad public. D. is certainly no mean popularizer, but not of our ideas, that is the Trotskyists — although most everything of substance and truth in his presentation is borrowed from this source. His new book, which purports to analyze Stalinism and to present forecasts from a vaguely "Marxist" point of view, has a few flaws in it in this respect: It leaves out of account entirely a sociological, historical evaluation of the

Soviet bureaucracy; it describes Stalinism as a continuation of Leninism (it is its fusion with the barbaric Russian heritage, according to his description; it passes off the physical destruction of Lenin's party as something of moral rather than political significance; it justifies Stalinism as historically necessary and in its end result progressive. And —on that basis —projects the theory of the Malenkov "self-reform" movement. That is, on the basis of a distortion of the Trotskyist analysis, it presents a complete negation of the Trotskyist line of struggle against Stalinism.
Our new revisionists have so far only half-borrowed from his conclusions and tried to smuggle them in piecemeal as our line. It should not be forgotten, however, that Pablo's views on the reality of the transition epochal which of necessity deformed revolutions and workers states become the norm deviating from the ideal of the Marxist classics — touches some points in the Deutscher analysis as well. Nothing has been heard of these views lately, and for good reason: they need some adjustment to the newer reality so to speak. But has the concept, the trend of thought, behind them been dropped? All evidence is to the contrary.
I have been thinking that perhaps an amendment specifically condemning all these views (that is, rejecting them and explaining why) as well as Deutscherism by name might be a good idea. Perhaps, a separate document in this respect might be more advisable. I cling to the thought of amendments because, for whatever reasons, the general conception of the document-draft on Stalinism and most of the historical presentation has been so put forward by the authors as appears to me quite acceptable. Clarifying amendments, if this is the case, can better bring out the real differences than a separate draft.
The political dispute was brought out into the open here last night at a more or less informal editorial meeting on the review. Before that there had been, it is now clear to me, merely shadow boxing motivated, insofar as Burns was concerned, by his preoccupation with the complex problem of the future of the hitherto very fruitful practical work. That is understandable, but it has only resulted in creating embarrassment for him, and political problems. I think he realizes this now.
Here   is   how   matters   stood.   Burns had requested  B.

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[Burton—Sam Gordon] for an article on Stalin for the review. This was written and Burns presented it to a board meeting, after indicating agreement with its general line. J. L. [John Lawrence] counter-posed the Clarke article, but later retreated to counter-posing the draft on post-Stalin developments which has since been incorporated in the larger document. Apparently Burns agreed, but proposed another meeting with B. present. At this second meeting, J. L. renewed his second proposition. This.was attacked as an impossible proposition since what was involved was a draft up for discussion which avowedly makes a break with important traditional concepts and cannot be regarded as official position. Under pressure of argument which seemed to get general concurrence, J. L. withdrew, but not before he had reminded Burns that he had voted for the general line of the draft and had recorded no reservations. (This was a surprise to me, because I had assumed things to be otherwise, and embarrassing to Burns, who was now pushing the B. article with some modifications.) In the shuffle a proposition was made to write instead a review of Deutscher's book. J. L. quickly took advantage of this to nominate someone else, who has only been evolving to our common position lately, to do the review. Under the circumstances this had to be accepted.
There was the beginning of a political discussion, but only a beginning, and J. L. made very clear that he was on the Pablo line and working for him. With unusual determination and vigor he pushed for his proposition. My impression was that he was pressing for haste in making the Pablo position our public position — which seems to coincide with Clarke's actions. This is something which must now be taken into account as possibly part of a strategy and a plan. It must be probed for significance and there must be preparations for necessary counter-actions.
In view of the possibility that the B. article, of which a number of copies were made and distributed, may now become an element in the struggle, a copy will be forwarded to you. It should be remembered that this article was a draft written, although with political bias, not with the idea that it would be contentious, at least locally. And, that the author made it clear that he does not stand on every formulation but is prepared to re-formulate on the basis of common agreement on general line.
What I wrote regarding Burns sizing up a situation and taking a stand was not meant at all in a derogatory sense, I hope you will understand. I know the man, his capacities, and appreciate him and am aware that he has great responsibilities and problems. But we must understand what we are up against as a result, although we proceed with great patience. From this letter you may get an inkling of what I have meant.
Best regards, Harry

uprisings in many of these countries in the wake of the Red Army advances, and after an attempt by the Kremlin to share the rulership with the native bourgeoisies."
Under c, add:
"despite every effort of Moscow to thwart this development in favor of a coalition controlled by Chiang Kai-shek and, in a measure despite at least formal agreement with this line by the Mao Tse-tung leadership."
Under c. after "Resistance Movements" add: "In France and in Italy genuine possibilities of successful proletarian revolutions,.for the establishment of workers' states existed, which were consciously dissipated under Kremlin direction by the nefarious coalition policy. In Greece a mass uprising heading for workers' power was knifed in the back directly by the Stalinist bureaucracy."
P. 3, after the fourth paragraph ending with "expression" add:
"While in general a transformation of those mass CPs in this sense seems indicated, splits cannot be excluded — particularly with a sharpening of the crisis in the CPUSSR."
In section X, at the end of 5 b. add:
"In the last analysis, the social, historical role of this caste is reactionary and its entire existence thus depends upon a compromise with imperialism. Consciously this is expressed by the bureaucracy in its 'co-existence' theory."
Under 15, p. 13, after the sentence "The entire domestic evolution of the S. U. also speaks in the same sense" strike the rest of the paragraph and add:
"While the victory of the Soviet proletariat over the bureaucracy is historically assured by the continuing world upsurge as well as by the growth of its own internal power, this is not an automatic process. The prospect of losing power must induce in the Soviet bureaucracy, as in every obsolescent social force before it departs from the historic scene, a ferocious struggle for self-preservation. Within the context of the international class struggle, this can mean only alliance in one form or another with the imperialist forces as the showdown approaches, up to and including reflexes of capitulation and passage into the bourgeois camp.
"The rising tide of proletarian struggle will undoubtedly break off a section of the bureaucracy, a 'Reiss tendency,' which will rally to the working class for the defense of the social bases of the USSR and the reestablish-ment of Soviet democracy. But this will only be a byproduct of the whole development and not a dominant characteristic.
"It follows that the unfolding of the political revolution against the bureaucracy in the USSR will thus be linked internationally with the social revolution to overthrow capitalism and imperialism. That is, the class character of the struggle against the Soviet bureaucracy will clearly come to light."

Amendments to "Rise and Fall of Stalinism"
In introduction, p. 2, under b. add:
"after the counter-suppression of all tendencies to mass

On par. 17 and 18, section I, reservations on assumption of conflict between "economic" bureaucracy and Bona-partist summits — insufficiently grounded and unclear as to political import

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Par. 20 obviously has to be rewritten in view of Beria purge; the concluding reference to the 12th Plenum report will similarly have to be revised in view of the Korean truce and the development of the "peace" maneuvers. With crisis sharpening within both camps, tendency to seek a compromise is reinforced.
In par. 21, p. 17, at bottom of page, rewrite sentence to read:
"The socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union can give an impulse toward the decisive world victory of socialism almost to the same extent as the socialist revolution in the USA itself."
In   par.   23,   drop  the last sentence,  gives rise to mis-

conceptions of automatic advance.
In par. 33, reservations on question of new parties. WHY no new parties there? (China, Yugoslavia)
Par. 37 obviously needs reformulation in light of East German events. CP appears finished as an instrument of upsurge.
Par. 44, p. 34, point (c) in second paragraph has to be expanded in light of E. German events. In this connection a paragraph dealing with the current pacifist moods among the masses in connection with possibilities of Stalinist betrayal is required.

2. Letter from Sam Gordon to Friends in the SWP
August 30, 1953
Dear friends:
Following the editorial board meeting last week, Burns has told me, there was a blow-up at the executive meeting on Wednesday. J. L. appeared there with an organized faction and wanted to put him "under IS discipline." He proposed an NC meeting at which he would report on the draft documents, Burns would keep quiet and go along, and a favorable vote would be taken. Just like that. Furthermore they wanted no "American agents" there, and there was to be no discussion of Clarke's views or anything "American." There were protests from the others and nothing conclusive was agreed on except to hold a meeting late in September. But there were threats about what the IS would do.
After this meeting Burns was approached by several others who indicated they now understood what was going on quite thoroughly, were prepared to discuss a common political line and a grouping. Burns expects a slim majority in the present small committee (E. C.) but a very comfortable one in the broader NC, which will then reorganize the E. C. accordingly.
J. L.'s attempt to "discipline" Burns indicates a line of action no doubt inspired in Paris. The premise for it is that Burns voted for the drafts under discussion. There was an understanding on my part that Burns was to record reservations on these ever since May. Apparently, for reasons I tried to explain previously, he did not do so formally,   although he raised the issues; and in each

case voted for with the vague understanding that there would be editorial revisions. Now they think they have him over a barrel. But of course they have another think coming.
I don't know of any precedent for attempted gag-laws of this type, and I don't think anybody serious here will go for that.
Since then there has arrived a copy of the August 10 letter to you signed by MP, EG and PF. Following this there was an August 21 letter by the latter summoning Burns for September 2 to discuss "a very serious situation" for which it is desired to adopt a "common line." Burns believes the matter of the letter to Tom is involved. He is probably right. After talking it over in a group, it was decided that the best thing to do is to ask for two weeks' postponement and to request particulars (agenda, drafts, proposals, etc.) before going. A letter to this effect has gone out.
We are waiting to hear what action you took on the August 10 letter. And, of course, we want to know what suggestions you have on procedure, which may quickly be forced to a head.
Politically, opinion here is developing along the lines of the suggested amendments sent to you in the caucus of the majority which is taking shape.
You will probably hear soon from Burns at greater length on some of these matters.
All the best, Harry

3. Letter from Gerry Healy to James P. Cannon
31st August 1953
Dear Jim,
Last night the struggle broke out here in earnest. Our E.   C.  was confronted with an organized faction of four.

Lawrence, Lane, Brown and Emmett. The combination represents more the character of a clique than anything else especially to those who know the people concerned and their past record. Emmett is the most uncertain, and may yet be detached. The others work for Pablo.

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The fight broke out over the report to the N. C. about the I.S. document "The Rise and Fall of Stalinism." Lawrence stated that since he agreed with it wholeheartedly, he should move it. I didn't object, but said that I wished to comment on certain aspects of the document and make propositions to strengthen it. This brought forth a howl — I was described as "the American agent" working against the International. In reply I said that as a member of the I.S. I would of course lay any suggestions I had before this body, but this did not satisfy the faction. They said that the I.S. may instruct me not to raise points in my own section until they got around to answering them before the international. Meanwhile I would have to remain quiet while Lawrence gave his report. The whole plan was along the lines of gagging me whilst an effort was made to stampede our people. There is little doubt but it comes from Paris. Well, I said that this would be an international scandal and that I would proceed to make my case before my own party.
On Friday 28th I received an urgent instruction from Pablo to attend an international meeting on Sept. 2nd. He also sends me a copy of a letter to the N. C. majority. (Copies of his letter and my reply are enclosed.) I don't see why we must be pushed around like little boys into meetings where no one knows what is coming up. I  had  some  experience   of  this once in the R.C.P. and

W. I. L. — I will not have it again.
Despite all the blurb in the "good relations" letter to the S.W.P. majority, the fact is that the fight has broken out with renewed ferocity here. We now have to contend with a Pablo manipulated faction, and there is no doubt but they will give us trouble until we get them under control. Of course we work under disadvantages inside the L.P., but it cannot be helped. They are running wild already and we will first have to stop them. Thanks to your advice we have already been anticipating this, and some long term arrangements were in hand to curb them.
I would like a reply either from you or Morris on the following:
 a)	What lines if any do your ideas for amendments to the "Rise and Fall of Stalinism" take?
 b)	How am I to handle your letter to Tom? It seems that they are preparing to rush us into something in order to get away on a scandal.
An immediate reply (if you can) would be of great assistance.
Under separate cover an article by Tom is being sent. What are the opinions on his amendments?
Warmest  regards, J.

4. Letter from James P. Cannon to George Novack

Los Angeles, Calif. September 2, 1953
New York
Dear Warde:
I received yours of Aug. 31 with enclosure of the Paris letter of August 10. This letter is in essence a threat designed to intimidate the leadership of the SWP with the hope of splitting it up. It is obviously designed, at the same time, to prepare the "record" for an open attack later on. The form of the letter, a compound of misrepresentation, duplicity and doubletalk, is apparently an expression of the political method of the author.
1. "We have just received documents coming from leaders of your tendency, indicating, among other things, that you believe that the IS or members of the IS have fomented or encouraged the struggle of tendencies in your party, and that they are capable of making it start up again.
"We have been extremely surprised and shocked by such an accusation which has no basis whatsoever."
This is sent to the wrong address. It was not we, but the Cochranites, who originated the "accusation" by claiming to speak for and represent the author of this letter. They were informed of this in my letter of May 22, 1953, and answered with dissimulation which only tended to confirm the claim of the Cochranites. The accusation will be withdrawn and the surprise and shock can be alleviated if and when this claim is clearly and openly repudiated. If there  is  a "misunderstanding"  on our part, that is the

way — and the only way—to clear it up. The author of the Paris letter knows this very well. But this clear, open repudiation is precisely what is lacking. That is what makes all the protestations worthless as far as we are concerned.
There is no possible ground for misunderstanding our position, for we are in the habit of saying exactly what we mean, in private letters as well as in public statements. The "documents" referred to in the Paris letter of Aug. 10, in which the position of the SWP leadership is stated, show clearly that we were not seeking a conflict with the Paris leaders, and did not intend to take the initiative in such a conflict. But it shows no less clearly that we are "ready to react to the first openly hostile move against us." That's the way it stands also today. We will not take the initiative to publish these documents, but if they are published by others, we are fully prepared to defend them.
2. "You appear to have wanted to make contacts for the constitution of an international tendency in the absence of any formulated political divergence with the leadership of the International."
This method of accusing others of the very things which one is doing or planning to do himself, has a tradition, but it is not the Trotskyist tradition. The "constitution of an international tendency in the absence of any formulated political divergence" sounds like a political crime, and that is what it is. And that is precisely what the international combination against the leadership of the SWP, "in the absence of any formulated political divergence" with this leadership, has been.
The policy of the SWP is no secret; it has been expound-

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ed every week in our press. Since the Third Congress the authors of this letter have never once indicated any disagreement with this policy. On the other hand, a revisionist faction in our party attacks this policy — and the whole tradition of our party —on almost every point. Being internationalists — and not since yesterday—we certainly have "wanted contacts" with orthodox Trotskyists on the international field to ask their fraternal help to repel this revisionist attack, and we do not think any orthodox Trotskyist will refuse it.
This procedure is not new for us. We always "wanted contacts" and collaboration on the international field to defend the orthodox Trotskyist line. We never asked anybody's permission to establish such contacts and collaboration in the past, and don't intend to do so in the future. Far from considering such procedure an offense, the "exposure" of which is to be feared, we consider it a virtue —the essence of true internationalism as Trotsky taught it to us. We began this kind of international collaboration while we were still in the Comintern, and have continued it ever since. We always supported the progressive and revolutionary elements in the Fourth International, and in its prior formative period, and sought their support in return. The habit is firmly fixed and will not be changed. We never made any alliances with anybody anywhere on any other basis than agreement on the most important questions of principle, clearly stated. We never made any combinations against anybody anywhere "in the absence of any formulated political divergences."
 3.	The patronizing "appeal to our sense of responsibility," and the hypocritical injunction against factional struggles whose political content cannot at all be seen," might be profitably studied by its author. We have no need of it. For a whole year we had to contend with a faction which refused to disclose its aims. When they were finally smoked out, they proclaimed themselves "Pablists" and claimed his support. No such faction, in this country or in any other country, ever claimed our support without being promptly repudiated. That's why possible misunderstandings about our position never lasted very long. We have always dispelled suspicions by stating clearly and openly where we stood. The example is worth following by those who complain in private letters that they are misunderstood.
 4.	The statement that "the entire international is not witnessing any struggle at the present time," must have been written from the point of view that the SWP is a colony whose statistics are not registered. The fact of the matter is, as the whole international movement knows by this time, that the internal life of the SWP has been disturbed for nearly two years by a revisionist faction which has proclaimed as its slogan, "Junk the old Trotskyism"; which has rallied in one combination all the disgruntled, weak and capitulatory elements who express their personal demoralization in a revolt against the Party, its principles and its traditions; which signed a peace agreement at the Plenum to abandon the factional struggle in favor of an orderly discussion, only to violate the agreement by renewing the factional struggle in intensified form almost immediately afterwards; a faction which has openly discarded the basic Trotskyist analysis of the character and role of Stalinism, proclaimed the theory of its self-reform, and announced their determination  to  fight on  this line under the banner of "Pab-

lism"; a faction which in recent weeks has gone to the point of organized sabotage of party work and party finances.
Such are the facts about the situation in the SWP, which up till now has been considered, in one way or another, as a part of the International movement, even though not affiliated—that same international movement which allegedly is "not witnessing any struggle at the present time". Being orthodox Trotskyists, we have no alternative but to defend the party against this new eruption of destructive and unprincipled factionalism.
The question of whether the struggle in the SWP can be isolated and localized in one party depends not on suspicions, misunderstandings, "exposures of documents", etc., but on a far more important and fundamental question: Does this American brand of revisionist factionalism have any supporters in other parties, or in other sections of the international movement?
If so, they will be obliged to make their position known in the next stage of the forthcoming international discussion, and we will recognize them as political opponents, just as we have recognized similar tendencies in the past. On the other hand, if the claims of the Cochran-ite faction in this respect are unfounded, and the liqui-dationist tendency finds no support in other sections of the movement, that also will soon be made clear. In that case any misunderstandings or suspicions on our part, which may prove in fact and not in mere words to have been unfounded, will be promptly corrected. We haven't the slightest desire to pick quarrels with anybody over trifles.
All obscurities will have to be cleared up in the next period. The question will stand politically, so that nobody can misunderstand it and so that there can be no possibility of barren "factional struggle whose political content cannot at all be seen". We have had more than enough of that already, and we are more than anxious to clear the air and get down to the real issue.
5. The precondition for clearing the atmosphere in the international movement, and eliminating all possible misunderstandings, suspicions and obscure maneuvers, is to formulate the documents for the Fourth World Congress in such a way that there can be no possible misunderstanding as to what they really mean. The movement needs documents which leave no room for special interpretations or conflicting interpretations. This is the way it was in the movement of the Fourth International in Trotsky's lifetime, and we think it is the only correct system.
The leadership of the SWP, for its part, will study all material presented in the international discussion and formulate its own point of view on every question, either in special documents or in amendments to documents presented by others, and will insist this time that its point of view be published and considered before any decisions are taken. We expect all other leading people in the international movement to do the same. This may or may not result in the eventual consolidation of firm agreement on basic documents which mean what they say and say what they mean. But in any case, it is the only way to clear away the poisonous fog of misunderstanding and suspicions generated by special interpretations and allegedly secret meanings.
7.  It  is  precisely  this  state of affairs —entirely  new  in

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the history of international Trotskyism—which has disrupted the "relations of confidence and cooperation" between the leadership of the SWP and some others. The Paris letter of Aug. 10, says —not without a certain justification— that these relations "since 1945 have been at the basis of the reconstruction and reinforcement of the international Trotskyist movement." It is worth recalling that in 1945 the eruption of all kinds of revisionist tendencies had brought us into conflict with numerous people with whom we had previously collaborated — Natalia, Logan, Munis, Morrow-Goldman, the IKD retrogression-ists, the French majority, the British majority, etc., etc.
We took a stand then for orthodox Trotskyism, and sought to "make contact" and establish collaboration with others on that basis. It was on that basis that we eventually got together to reconstruct the international Trotskyist movement and make possible the Second World Congress and all subsequent fruitful work. We have not changed  our  position  on  this basic question of principle

and do not intend to change.
We recognize that post-war developments necessitate broad scale tactical, and even to a certain extent strategical, adjustments. But we are firmly convinced that basic Trotskyist principles, particularly on the nature and role of Stalinism and the role of the Trotskyist parties and the Fourth International, retain their validity. They must be maintained if the Fourth International is to survive and accomplish its historic mission. The proposal to "Junk the Old Trotskyism" and to envisage the self-reform of criminal Stalinism must be categorically rejected.
In the forthcoming discussion we will strive for agreement with international comrades on that basis. Meantime we will do all in our power to keep the SWP what it has always been — a fortress of orthodox Trotskyism.
Fraternally, J.P. Cannon

5. Letter from James P. Cannon to George Novack
Los Angeles, Calif. Sept. 3, 1953 New York Dear Warde:
1. Yesterday I sent you some comments on the Paris letter of August 10. These remarks were not meant as a draft of our formal reply to this provocative threat and insult—that is the last thing we have to worry about — but for the information of our own people. This is by far the most important thing right now. We should move at every step with a fully informed party.
2. Today I received Harry's letter of August30, and took particular note of, (1) the report that J.L. appeared at the Executive meeting with an organized faction and, (2) that he proposed to put Burns "under IS discipline" before the discussion starts. Some of you no doubt will raise your hands in holy horror and say, "I never heard of such a thing." But I have not only heard of it, I have seen it and felt it in my bones, in the Stalinized Comintern.
This little device of putting leaders under committee discipline (national and international) inside the party was one of the principal methods of stifling the internal life of the Comintern and its parties; Of depriving the membership of any real opportunity for the consideration and informed discussion of different opinions among the leaders; and eventually of guaranteeing the complete degeneration of the parties.
The transformation of the parties of the Comintern from the vanguard of the revolution into instruments of counterrevolution and betrayal was not accomplished at one step. It took a long time and a long continued process, which couldn't really begin without stilling the internal life of the movement.

3. I am particularly sensitive to any manifestation of this disease of Cominternism. Some of you will remember how violently I reacted to Clarke's attempt to impose "discipline" on NC members in discussion of the decisions of the Third World Congress after the Congress. I stated then, in the meeting of the Political Committee, that I had had one Comintern and I didn't want another. These words came from the heart, and I still feel the same way about it.
I don't know what I would have said if I had been present at the reported Executive Committee meeting, when it was proposed to invoke "discipline" before the discussion of documents pertaining to a Congress, which is yet to be held. But if I hadn't been incapacitated by a fit of apoplexy, induced by uncontrollable rage, I am sure would have denounced this monstrous attempt to foreclose the discussion before it has really begun. I would have called this proposal by its right name and told its sponsor that he is talking to the wrong party.
4. Secondly, if I were in England, I would recognize the reality of an opposition faction aiming to discredit and disqualify the leadership and to transform the British party into a lifeless puppet. I would recognize further, as all experience has shown, that organized factionalism cannot be outwitted by constructive non-factional work, but must be met on its own ground. In all such cases, constructive work requires the protection of a counter-faction. I would proceed to the organization of a militant counter-faction without delay.
Harry's reference to "the caucus of the majority which is taking shape" is the best news we could hope to hear for   the   prospects   of a favorable outcome in  Britain.  I

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would suggest to our friends there to make this caucus as broad as possible, and to keep its members fully informed of everything.
5. I don't think you should rush to get out a formal reply to the Paris letter. We are under no pressure unless we put it on ourselves through unnecessary nervousness. They may not know it, but the issue between them and us is not going to be settled in Paris —not even with the help of Clarke in person. Our first and foremost task is the consolidation of informed opinion in our own party. The same holds true in England.
Thomas is due in town today and Vincent will arrive tomorrow. I will consult with them and other NC members in the next few days, and we will probably work out a draft of an answer to the Paris letter. I suggest that you do the same, and wait until we have exchanged drafts, and heard any suggestions which other out-of-town NC members might make, before committing the answer to final form. We have plenty of time.
We have to bear in mind that communications between them and us in the present circumstances have a purely formal character. It is not a matter of misunderstanding or a slight difference of opinion, which could be straightened out by explanatory communications back and forth. We are fighting a revisionist opposition in the SWP, and they are lined up against us. Their communication is not meant to explain and convince, but to threaten and intimidate. It is also written for the "record." This is the explanation of its hypocritically innocent form. In our reply — when we get around to it — we can dispense with threats, but we must also write for the record.
6. The essence of the August 10 letter is a declaration of war on us, and a warning of the "gravest crisis" which can follow if we fail to roll over and play dead. Their conduct does indeed precipitate a grave crisis in the world movement; but it is not the first one, and it is not the gravest—and eventually it will be solved easier than some of the others.
It is not as grave, for example, as the criminal split of the Molinier-Frank faction at the time of the French sit-down strikes. It is not as grave as the crisis of 1939, which split the international movement at the beginning of the war, and kept it in a state of suspended animation for a period of five years, with the reinforced assistance of Logan, Munis, Morrow-Goldman, the German IKD-ists and others.
I have confidence that this international crisis will be overcome, primarily because I am convinced that the crisis in the SWP — which is the most decisive sector of the present battle line and the place where the whole thing started — is already under control. We should bear in mind all the time, and never forget, that the value of our contributions

to a progressive solution of the crisis on the international field will depend directly on how firm our control of the SWP is; on how consciously the party supports us. Our words will carry weight if we speak on the international field, not as clever individuals contributing to a discussion— in the French tradition — but as representatives of a party taking sides in a struggle — in the American tradition.
7. I gather that opinion in New York is tending toward the conception of the crisis as an all-out political fight in which the sides will be delineated by conflicting documents. I am not so sure of that. It may come to that in the end; but I don't think we should anticipate it or run ahead to meet it. It remains yet to be demonstrated whether or not agreement can be reached on common documents. We should not take the more drastic course until this possibility has been thoroughly tested.
We don't want to fight over what may be in somebody's head. Our concern is over what is written in official documents. We know that the authors of the Paris letter are hostile to us for reasons which have not yet been explained; and it is reasonable to assume that there is some kind of a political motivation at the bottom of it. This political motivation may be implied in some ambiguous formulations and omissions in the drafts of the two documents presented for discussion, but it is not clearly stated there. We should be careful not to read things into the drafts which are not written there in plain terms.
As in nearly all documents coming from this source, there are formulations which lend themselves to double interpretations; and other formulations which, while more or less correct in themselves, lack necessary qualifications which only a very critical reader might notice. The question is: Do these documents mean what a casual reader, taking everything in good faith, thinks they mean? Or do they mean what the Cochranites will say they mean, in justification of their own less-disguised revisionism?
I think the best way to test this out, in the preliminary stages of the discussion, is to formulate clarifying amendments on every point which appears to be wrong or ambiguous. From this point of view I incline to agree with Harry and Burns. In cooperation with them we should work out the necessary amendments, submit them and see how they are received. Then we can decide whether or not it is necessary to present our views in separate documents.
If we are resolutely determined not to be rushed, crowded or "disciplined" into formal agreement on a hodge-podge, this procedure will work out best in the long run. But in any case, we should take our time in this important matter, and proceed slowly and deliberately, with the aim of getting absolute clarity one way or another. However it turns out, we must lock the door against any more double games of "interpretation."
Yours fraternally, J. P. Cannon

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6. Letter from James P. Cannon to Gerry Healy

September 5, 1953 Dear Jerry:
I just received your letter of August 31. I had already commented on the occurence at your last Executive Committee meeting in a letter written to New York yesterday. I enclosed a copy for Harry and he should have received it by this time.
The attempt to impose hierarchical committee discipline at the beginning of an important discussion is unheard of in our movement. It is the most reprehensible practice imaginable. It is right out of the Stalinist book. I realize that this is a harsh expression, but it is the plain and simple truth and the sooner it is said out loud the better. The system which would impose IS discipline on you in the discussion of new documents before your own national committee presupposes the imposition of National Committee discipline on all its members in the discussion before the membership. This is a sure way to deprive the rank and file of any real opportunity to weigh and consider possibly different opinions, or shadings of difference, and thereby to deprive them of any real opportunity to form their own deliberate opinions before taking a vote.
For you to tolerate such procedure on any pretext whatever would be to betray your duty as a leader of the British movement. It would be a criminal offense against the members who have trusted you to teach them and help them to learn how to think for themselves on the basis of full information on the questions under consideration.
Trotsky once said, "Honest information is the first prerequisite for democratic discussion." One of the most important elements of honest information in a discussion by the party membership consists of the opinions of all the leaders who are more familiar with the questions under consideration. To suppress these opinions at the start of a discussion, especially a discussion which may be fateful for the whole future of our movement, would be a crime and a betrayal.
You are at a decisive turning point in your whole lifetime activity as a revolutionist right now. All the fruits of all your previous work and struggle to consolidate a principled cadre are threatened by this disloyal attempt to intimidate you by pointing the pistol of an opposition faction at your head. You know that the same thing was tried in the SWP, and you know how we responded to it. I most earnestly recommend to you the same procedure, and I assure you that there is no other way.
I know very well that constructive workers, eager to build a movement in open struggle against the class enemy, are always strongly tempted to hope that in the internal situation things will work out for the best; that good faith and good work will prevail; and that factionalism will somehow or other disappear of itself, without taking time out to meet it on its own ground and knock it down. But that is a terrible mistake.
I have given much time and thought, during my past year's  residence in   California,   to  a  review   of the whole

past experience of our movement and of my part in it, as well as to the prospects of its future. I truly believe that the best service I ever rendered to our party, to help prepare it for its great future, was rendered during this past year. And the essence of this service, as I see it, was my determined and unceasing effort to make the party members in general and the leading cadre in particular, understand the mortal danger of permitting an unprincipled faction to grow and develop without forcing it into the open, calling it by its right name, and declaring uncompromising war on it.
The hardest part of all my struggle during this past year, and as I judge it in retrospect the most important part, was my insistent warnings to the constructive elements in the party, in the leadership as well as in the ranks, against the fatal illusion that factional brawlers can be overcome by good works in the class struggle alone. In this connection I earnestly recommend to you and your friends a careful reading of my letter to the Chicago party trade unionists on "Mass Work and Factional Struggle," which begins on page 49 of Internal Bulletin No. 12, May, 1953; and my letter to Ted Grant on "Perspectives of the Struggle," which begins on page 21 of the same bulletin. [These letters appear on p. 302 and p. 256 of Speeches to the Party (Pathfinder Press, 1973)]
The English comrades, who have in recent times enjoyed such a long period of constructive work in an ascending mass movement of labor radicalism, andwhohave witnessed the rich fruits of their labor, may well be impatient with any diversion of energy toward internal disputes and factionalism, It is your foremost duty to convince them, at the cost of no matter how much time and effort, that precisely this illusion can bring all their work to nothing, and in a very short time at that.
It is particularly necessary now for the members of your movement, the newly recruited ones as well as those who come from the past, to recognize that the organization through which they did this work did not fall from the sky. The conditions for all their constructive work in recent times, in an atmosphere of internal unity and harmony, were prepared by your long-drawn-out, exhausting and at times discouraging, factional struggle against the Hastons and others who were not much better than the Hastons. You have a fight on your hands now again. And you will not have internal peace and the possibility to develop another long period of constructive work, unhindered by factionalism, until you have settled accounts with this new faction which has risen up to challenge you.
This faction is a challenge to the leadership of the cadre consolidated by historic struggles. Even more than that, it is a challenge to the right of the British party to select out of its own ranks leaders of its own choosing; leaders who are known to the rank and file members and subject to their constant observation and control. Your friends in the leading circles will have to face this problem squarely, as the leading cadre of the SWP eventually faced it. That, for us, was the beginning of the solution of the crisis. Everything followed from that.
If we can say now with absolute assurance that the crisis which  threatened  the existence of the   SWP during

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the past year has been overcome; and that it is no longer within the power of anyone to wreck the party by a serious split, or even to paralyze its work by further factional struggle —it is due, first of all, to the fact that the leading people recognized the reality of the situation and its necessities, and then resolutely set to work to mobilize the party membership on that basis. I have no doubt that the same results will be recorded in England, if the leading people of your group recognize the realities of the situation in time, and then proceed with a full knowledge of what they want and where they are going.

that agreement on this or that political policy at one time or another made no real difference. The whole Haston system had to be blown up before a genuine Trotskyist organization could get started in England. The saddest part, which is to be regretted to this day, is that the recognition of this simple necessity was so long delayed. If one were to undertake to write the real history of British Trotskyism, he would have to set the starting point as the day and date on which your group finally tore itself loose from the Haston regime and started its own independent work. What happened before that is nothing but a series of squandered opportunities, material for the prehistory of British Trotskyism.

It is not at all a question of a struggle of a national section "against the International." The question is formulated that way by people who have —to speak plainly — a Stalinist conception of the International as something outside of ourselves, as a power giving orders which loyal people have only to obey. The International as we conceive it — as we were taught by Trotsky — is all of us, is all the parties, and all the members of all the parties. When questions are up for discussion, nobody represents the International: all members have equal rights. In the last analysis, every individual member of every party has the right and the duty to form his own opinion and make it known, and in that way to contribute to the collective judgment of the whole movement. This collective judgment, as experience has shown, is far better, and far more reliable, than the arbitrary judgment of a few individuals who may want to give orders and to recognize no control.
It is not a question of a struggle "against the leadership" of the International, as the devotees of the new leader cult represent. What is involved is a difference of opinion within the leadership. For the leadership of international Trotskyism, rightly considered, is broader than a small exclusive circle. It includes the leading people who have distinguished themselves in the work of the different parties and given serious proofs of their capacities and their loyalty.

In my opinion, it would be a mistake to over-simplify matters by passing off the organizational methods employed in the present dispute as simply the instrument of a false political line. No, in this case the authoritarian concept of leadership, and the obscene personal cultism, are wrong in themselves, and would have no justification no matter what political line they may serve at the moment. Democratic centralism is not an empty phrase.
The Trotskyist movement, internationally, could be stifled and eventually smothered to death simply by some of the conceptions and methods of organization and leadership which some people are now trying to force upon it. If I don't think there is any real danger of that, it is precisely because these attempts are going to meet the determined resistance of the SWP, of the British Trotsky-ists,   and  of other  parties when the issue becomes clear.
We are not so apprehensive about a possible "crisis" over this question in the International movement, and we are not even thinking of a split. We are thinking, rather, in terms of heading off a crisis over this question, and of making any talk of a split absurd, by preventing and refusing to tolerate the encroachments of a system of organization and leadership which could do nothing but guarantee permanent crisis and chronic disruption and unending splits.

We don't know yet how serious the present differences will turn out to be, for the discussion is only now really beginning. We do know that on the plane of organizational system and method, as exemplified first in the experience of the SWP, and now beginning in England, the differences are very serious indeed and most be fought out to a definite conclusion. I, for my part, am against the authoritarian system and method and will openly fight against it, regardless of any agreements or disagreements which might obtain among ourselves on other questions.
I know, and have even tried to explain to others more than once, that organizational questions and procedures are subordinate to political considerations, and in the long run can only serve them. But it is no less true that, in certain situations and to a certain extent, organizational conceptions, methods and practices have an independent character and must be dealt with as such.
A shining example of this exception to the general rule was the notorious Haston group itself. Its organizational methods were so false, so incompatible with the functioning of a  democratic  organization of revolutionary workers,

On the side of political differences, we have no way yet of knowing how serious they will be. Judgment on this score can rest only on the basis of written documents when they take definitive form. I indicated in yesterday's letter to New York that I think the extent of the differences should first be probed and tested by amendments to the present drafts.
The attempt to head off the presentation of any amendments, and thereby prevent a serious and honest discussion by invoking an authoritarian "committee discipline," is a rather ominous sign. But this attempt obviously will not work. The SWP will pay no attention whatever to it, and I assume that the same course will be taken by you and the others in England. Then we will get down to the amendments and reformulations themselves and see how they are received.
A discussion is now going on in the ranks of our leading cadre on the nature of these amendments and reformulations. I must admit that I have not studied the documents yet with sufficient line-by-line attentiveness. We do not want

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to reject any of the basic lines laid down by the Third World Congress. But this time, in view of all the confusion and disruption that has been created over conflicting "interpretations," the documents for the Fourth Congress must be amended and reformulated on every point where there is the slightest possibility of ambiguity, double meaning or error.
I personally am inclined to agree with the general line of the amendments drawn up by Tom. But I think the opinion of the SWP leadership will be crystallized in favor of more thorough and extensive amendments and reformulations, without changing or throwing out any basic lines we have supported up to now.
In your place, I would present such amendments as have been clearly formulated already, and reserve the right to add others after further consideration and discussion. Why all this rush and pressure to force a vote and then shut people up? That game is not going to work with the SWP.
One of the most important things to bear in mind in this connection is that we must take time. We must take all the time we need for thorough study and consideration of everything designed to formulate the position of our international movement. We must make it clear that we don't intend to be hustled into quick decisions which foreclose our right to further consideration and to the formulation of new amendments in the course of the discussion. We must take time for a really thorough and democratic discussion, free from any intimidations, threats or resorts to "discipline." The SWP leadership will surely insist on this, and I presume you will do the same.
If the purpose of the emergency meeting in Paris is to launch the crucial international discussion with a scandal, we can leave the initiative to them. You are certainly not called upon to take any responsibility for the letter to Tom, the speech on "Internationalism and the SWP," or any other "document" which may be introduced in evidence against us. Those documents represent the deliberate opinion of the leadership of the SWP, and we are fully prepared to take all responsibility for them. We are not engaged in any conspiracy, and we have nothing to con-

ceal, and no "exposures" to fear.
The most important point involved in the way this "scandal" was presented by the Cochranites in the New York City Convention, and by implication in the Paris letter of August 10, is the assumption that certain personages are immune from all criticism, and that all such criticism is a scandal regardless of its merits. Therefore, we have no right to object to procedures which we consider to be wrong, and to "make contact" with other comrades in other parties and inform them of our opinions.
From all that has been said above on the question of organization, it follows that these Cominternist pretensions must be flatly rejected. The right of anybody in the International movement to criticize another, and to consult anyone else he pleases, must be defended in principle. We, for our part, not only intend to defend this right for others, but also to exercise it freely ourselves to the fullest extent we consider necessary, and without bothering to ask anybody's permission beforehand.
I have no doubt that your position on this aspect of the question — the only one that has any real importance — will be the same as ours. If the "scandal" of these documents is launched in England, in an attempt to stampede the membership —as was tried in the U.S. without success —that is the way to meet it. Your struggle will not be decided in Paris, but in England. If this "scandal" is introduced there, it can become a boomerang, if you meet it squarely and take the offensive along the lines suggested above.
Fraternally, P.S. Since writing the above I just received a copy of W's Sept. 4 letter to you. The line is virtually the same. Some of the suggestions in W's letter, regarding your course in Paris, are more specific and perhaps better than mine. You can use your own judgment. We can discuss among ourselves the one point of difference—amendments or a separate resolution — and come to an agreement one way or another before acting. I agree with the suggestion in W's letter to defer decision until we get your report on the forthcoming Paris meeting.
The most important field of action for you —let me repeat once again — is England. If you succeed with your task there everything else will fall into place.

7. Letter from Gerry Healy to James P. Cannon

September 7, 1953
Dear Jim,
Yesterday I met Pablo and Frank in Paris.
They started out with a "get tough" policy by demanding we put all our cards on the table. I replied by requesting an explanation of their decisions. These are the following:
a.	A letter to Tom (copy enclosed) with an instruction
to me that I place it before my N.C.
b.	A letter to our EC attacking me for asking for a
postponement of the IS. (I did this in order to study the
documents, etc. They say that it is a matter of discipline.)

c.	A letter to the NC SWP foUowing up the August 10
letter. This must have reached you by now.
d.	An instruction that I was to read your letter to Tom
before my EC and NC.
Pablo viciously attacked me, Tom, and yourself. He said he would fight Cannon to the end. He and Frank declared they were going to proceed at once to reply to your speech, "Internationalism and the SWP." They are also going to reply and attack the majority Plenum Resolution on American Stalinism.
The strategy is to launch the discussion with a scandal—your letter to Tom, the speech on Internationalism, ["Internationalism   and   the   SWP,"   reprinted in  Speeches

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To The Party, p. 67 (Pathfinder Press, 1973)], the NC minutes (your questions to Clarke), etc. They also have your letter to Warde in which you comment on their draft. They plan to do the same thing in our section. This has been   arranged   through   their  agent  Lawrence,  already.
Following their opening attempt to intimidate me by the question and answer method, they got "soft" in their approach. They asked me what was my comment on your letter to Tom and I replied that this would be conveyed when I had seen your reply. They then began to tell me what a fool I was to join with you and they promised to withdraw all attacks against me and to restrain Lawrence provided I had a discussion with them politically and came out against you, etc. I was sickened at the whole business which amounted to nothing more than intimidation.
However, I countered by proposing that they should call off all discussion on organizational matters until we could discuss the documents on the Russian question — but nothing doing. They proceed as all their prototypes before them have proceeded —muddy up the political discussion and stampede weak people as much as possible.
We then had some political discussion. Frank is very enthusiastic about Deutscher's book —the only error he can see is that Deutscher does not visualize sufficiently the intervention of the masses and struggles with the bureaucracy (Clarke's line). Both he and Pablo disagreed violently with Wright's article in The Militant on Malen-kov's speech. They say that Malenkov has begun to tolerate some Trotskyist statements of the past and has modified the traditional violence and hostility toward us. They believe that in East Germany large sections of the CP bureaucracy went with the workers. Right down the line, the whole thing amounts to a complete break with our traditional conceptions, leaving the way open for revisionism on all matters. This is the real root of the situation. There is no question but we have to prepare a counter document to their one on Stalinism.  The more I

read it and dissect the formulations, the more I am convinced that the nub of the whole struggle is contained there.
I tried to see Clarke, as I thought it was as well whilst I was at it to have a real day out. However, he was not at his hotel. He is now the guiding man in Paris, especially on organizational matters. He also influences a lot politically. I was struck when speaking to the others and also to Lawrence here, how close they all keep to the same political formulations. Your minority have now the backing of Pablo on the recent Plenum decisions. I asked him a point blank question, if this were so, and he evaded replying by saying he hadn't read the documents. In the same breath he carried on a most violent attack on the position of the majority.
From all these events there is but one conclusion —we are engaged in the greatest struggle in the whole history of our movement to defend our basic principles. It will be a stiff vicious struggle. Our opponents are capable of all sorts of things. It will be up to us to fight it as one and in the end we shall defeat them — of that I am confident.
Pablo attacked your conception of our international with great bitterness. This man proceeds with all the old cominternist vices. His methods sickened me to the point that it almost made me physically unwell. Many things flashed before my mind whilst we talked. They hate the old cadres of our movement. They want an international of spineless creatures who will accept revisionism to the point where they become the left cover for Stalinism. These are hard words, but if you went through what I did, you would, I know, agree.
Please write us here, as we must have an up to the minute contact. As you will appreciate, great care must be taken of this letter.
Warmest regards,
J.

8. Letter from Sam Gordon to Friends in the SWP

September 7, 1953
Dear friends:
This is to acknowledge your letters of August 30 and September 2. A full report from Burns should be under way on his latest trip. I will confine myself only to comments.
It is obvious from the fact that they could not wait for your reply to their August 10 letter and from their liberal citation of statutes all around they are moving, under Livingstone's prodding, to precipitate organizational action. In the best case, this is simply mad on their part; in the worst, there may be some hitherto unsuspected treachery. Assuming the first alternative to be the case, it might be worthwhile to explore their request for a "direct, oral exchange of views" and to make the best propositions in this respect that the circumstances permit In case of the second  alternative,  it is my opinion that we will not

have very long to wait, but must be prepared with a public statement of a clear-cut political nature which can be signed by various organizations and perhaps issued jointly. I believe that modalities for either alternative must be worked out by you. If some time can be gained, it is to our advantage, of course In this regard, assuming that they are just rushing ahead madly but not deliberately— and are really looking over their shoulder now and again — a proposition for joint organization of a representative gathering two or three months hence to settle the crisis on the basis of the true relationship of forces might be advisable. I am for my part convinced that the cadres everywhere will rally overwhelmingly to the defense of the tested program.
The action taken with regard to Tom is really a bit of brazen arrogance which hits a new low. For a year they show no interest in the American at all. Then, suddenly, with unabashed factional brass,  they discover that he is

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not living up to statutes, although they know very well that it is not a matter of free choice with him that is involved at all. It is just another scandalous example of their utter lack of responsibility — there are plenty of others believe me. Why did they pick on him? Apparently because they believe that he is isolated and that they can thus bring pressure on him of the type they seem to be trying all around. In what school did they learn these methods?
In this connection, it seems to me that if the correspondence Bob had with Livingstone prior to the French split over the Yugo affair is available, it would be a good thing to publish it at this time, to shed some light on these methods alien to our movement and to the fact that they did not begin yesterday.
Practically, T. will probably reply with a protest but, in order to see what they have up their sleeve, agree to ask his organization for a transfer as per regular procedure. Meantime, let them think that he is isolated.  They

are making much of an alleged unprincipled combination, but of course the reply to the letter to Tom would reveal along with the rest of the recent correspondence— copies of which are at hand —that there was no more principled behavior anywhere at any time. However, this would not be made public here without your agreement and, if you agree, you can do it yourselves. It is entirely in your hands. (By the way, I notice that Jerome does not offer to make any of his correspondence public.)
The article on Frankel should have been sent to you some time ago in the rough form it has been in since last May, but Burns has been using it educationally. It should reach you soon, "so you will have an idea of how thoughts have been running here, and it will be worked on some more Otherwise, things are moving along smoothly towards the end of the month gathering.
Best regards, Harry

9.    Report from England for National Committee Majority (September 1953)
Our faction fight came to a head here over the September 19 weekend. The NC by 11 to 6 carried a decision to amend the document on the Russian Question. It also reorganized the Editorial Board of the paper to place it formally under majority control.
We utilized to clean up our Editorial Board an article in the paper containing the following paragraph: "And now in Korea, we have seen the shape of things to come. Any future war will be an openly-declared war of ideologies, Communism against capitalism, with the world split into two warring camps. On the side of capitalism will be arrayed all the latest destructive techniques. On the side of Communism above all else will be the power of the idea."
The fight was extremely sharp and fought out to a finish. In fourteen days we decisively wiped up the Pablo faction amongst the leadership. Now it goes to the ranks. We think that we shall also win here eventually.
This is a blow for Pablo. In spite of their surprise factional element we moved much quicker than they thought and conquered the situation politically. The fight will develop from now on very rapidly. We intend moving it into Pablo territory as soon as possible.
We have been threatened with a big struggle and the International intervention on the question of the removal of F.E. [Frank Emmett] from the Editorial Board. F.E. was employed  as circulation organizer and not for edi

torial work as such. Since his appointment, without any consultation with appropriate bodies, he has been unofficially brought on to editorial work as industrial correspondent.
When the NC took the decision to strengthen the Board it was entirely for political reasons. It had every right to do so, and for individuals or minorities to scream "political victimization" is in effect to intimidate the party. There are no "special rights" for employment on our staff.
F.E. has announced that he is going to Paris to see "what his position was" now that he has been relinquished from the post of circulation manager, for industrial work in the factory.
F.E. is employed in London, not in Paris. Does this mean that all our officials are subject to recall by the I.S.? This would indeed be extraordinary. If that is the case then we are certainly going to fight it to the end, and we shall appeal to every section in the International in doing this.
The tight is so sharp here now that you would think we were at the end of a struggle instead of at the beginning. It cannot go on like this much longer. Already here there are differences emerging all along the line — on Britain as well. The whole Pablo crew are capitulatory from top to bottom and there is no use beating around the bush about it

10. Letter from Gerry Healy to Farrell Dobbs
October 9, 1953 Dear Farrell,
I notice that the draft resolutions for the World Congress have now been sent out. The statement "unanimous" approval by the IS is misleading and I would be glad if you would immediately see to it that the following en-

closed   statement  by   me  as  a member  of the IS is sent
to all those who received copies of these documents.
With best wishes, Gerry
Also enclosed translation of Supplement to La Verite des
Travailleurs and letter to NC members.

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11.   Statement  by   Gerry   Healy   on  the Document Rise and Fall of Stalinism"

'The

1. This document was never formally voted unanimously at the IS. The real position is as follows:
a.	The draft in French was read over to me in English
by E. Germain prior to the IS meeting on June 20. It
was impossible to take a decision on such a basis; and
the IS agreed to send it out to all IEC members and call
a further meeting towards the end of July.
b.	Because of technical difficulties in translation, it was
only possible to obtain a rough draft in English before
this second meeting, but it seemed to me that the docu
ment should not be held up any longer (from going out
to the sections, even though I had not completed a tho
rough study of it). Accordingly, I indicated that there was

no opposition to the document going out under the name of the IS provided it was understood that amendments could still be moved right up to the Congress. This was agreed and no formal vote was taken.
2. Upon returning to my section I received a complete translation of the document and gave it the serious study it deserves. Arising from this, I want to declare that I cannot support this document in its present state, and I am taking steps to prepare a written intervention for the IEC accordingly.
Consequently, as a member of the IS I want it to be understood that I do not support this line.
October 6, 1953

SECTION VIII: "IS WORLD WAR III INEVITABLE?" BY JOSEPH HANSEN

[The Pablo grouping based its theories of entryism sui generis and the changing role of Stalinism, on the prediction that a Third World War between imperialism and the workers' states was inevitable in the immediate future. The armistice in Korea inspired doubts in the SWP about

Pablo's prediction. The following articles by Joseph Hansen appeared in The Militant on August 24, August 31, September 7, September 14, September 21, October 12, and October 26, 1953.]

1. Are 50,000,000 Doomed in U.S. by H-Bomb?
Malenkov's announcement Aug. 8 that "the United States does not have a monopoly of the hydrogen bomb" raises once again the question of Wall Street's projected time table for World War III. This question is of intense interest to the generals, capitalist politicians and their billionaire backers. In the opposing class camp, the politically conscious vanguard is even more concerned about the question. It happens to be one ofthemost momentous that has ever faced mankind.
Brian McMahon, chairman of the Joint Congressional Commission on Atomic Energy, observed before his death that a few H-Bombs carried to Soviet cities would incinerate about 16 million people; but the same number dropped on American cities would mean about 50 million casualties.
In addition to 50 million struck down, the inventory of the catastrophe to America would have to list the smashing of the world's mightiest industrial complex.
To think that America can somehow escape such fearful consequences in the projected war between continents is fatuous. The well-known columnist Joseph Alsop revealed July 26 that "evidence is now available" indicating the Soviet Union "has started series production of a six-engine turbo-prop bomber with a round-trip range of approximately 5,000 miles." The bomber is more modern than the B-36. This means that every "American target will be within round-trip range of the Soviet advanced bases in   Kamchatka and  on  the Arctic fringe." He adds that

American defenses against such long-rangebombers loaded with atom or hydrogen bombs are not as effective as Soviet defenses.
If nothing worse happened, it is clear that the opening day of World War III might well go down in history as the opening day of a new barbarism for America.
But even worse might happen. Leading atomic scientists warned us some years ago that if the H-Bomb were developed, it would then be technically feasible to include certain materials, which, on dissipating in the atmosphere after the explosion and diffusing from pole to pole, would destroy all life — at least life in its higher forms.
I am not among those who hopefully believe that such horrors are beyond the capacity of human nature and that not even a capitalist ruler could bring himself to push the button that would entail such results. A class facing loss of its ruling position is capable of anything. That is the lesson of history.
Nothing in Hitler's course, for example, gives us much cause to consider that the lesson has been outmoded. The McCarthy type and the billionaire rulers that foster the McCarthy type are not essentially different in outlook from Hitler and his sponsors. Faced with the continued rise of revolutionary forces intent on replacing capitalism by a better economic system, these paranoiacs may decide that no matter what the risks, the war they have blueprinted offers them the only out.
How can they be stopped? How can their will be paralyzed? How can the power of deciding America's fate be taken from  them? The answers  to these questions hinge

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upon the capacity of the American working class to take the road of political action without much delay and build a mass revolutionary socialist party. It hinges upon what each one of us, particularly the political vanguard, does toward furthering this development. Truly, the American workers might say that never before have such terrible problems and fateful decisions rested with an oppressed class in the hour when they were called on to carry society forward to a higher stage.
Is it still possible for the American working class to stay the suicidal plunge into another world conflict? I think so. First of all, no automatic process is at work that will push the American capitalists into war, no matter what the forces arrayed against them, at a pre-determined date.
It has been clear since shortly after the close of World War II that the tempo of preparations for another holocaust is far swifter than was the case after World War I. In 1945-46 Washington set its first bracket for possible war as early as 1949-50. But the world war did not break out in that period although at times it was perilously close, especially with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. Before the deadline was reached, the time table was changed, first to around 1952, then as 1952 neared, to 1954. Now it has been postponed again, this time indefinitely, if we are to believe Eisenhower.
The several postponements demonstrate in themselves that Wall Street's date for the fatal plunge is not rigidly fixed. A certain flexibility has been maintained. The reasons for this are clear enough. The Wall Street masters of destiny would prefer to win their desperate gamble. Consequently, they estimate world political forces, calculate the probable consequences of policies, take into account new developments —many of them surprising and unforeseen to them — and have shown that they are capable of making considerable tactical adjustments.
They continue to view war as inevitable, of course; and this determines their strategic course. But they also consider that the initiative and therefore the timing rests in their hands. This, they feel, gives them a measure of control. Through that control they hope to lower the risks and strengthen the possibilities of coming out on top.
However, from another point of view, this flexibility amounts to hesitation, indecisiveness and even procrastination. Tactical adaptation at a certain point affects the strategic aim, can even undermine it and prove to be the Achilles heel of the war plotters. With each postponement the question arises—has not the strategic moment been missed? Have not the odds risen so high that war means a more swift and certain doom than temporization?
2. H-Bomb and Wall Street's War Schedule
The news that the Soviet Union has the H-Bomb is still reverberating in the press. Wall Street cannot guarantee immunity to American cities in its projected third world war and this fact has proved sobering. Many editors and columnists can expect to be among the 50,000,000 American casualties predicted for the first day of conflict. Some of them are now highly critical of Eisenhower's defense plans,  stressing that home shelters  are inadequate,  that

city shelters might prove to be death traps under the rubble of skyscrapers and factories and that there's no way of getting out of range in time.
As a final macabre touch, Prof. George Gamow of George Washington University, a leading nuclear scientist, reminded the world Aug. 12 that besides the various kinds of bomb there is an even deadlier threat. "Biological warfare would be worse. In sheer destructiveness, a little bottle of germs could do more damage than an H-Bomb."
It is obvious to every thinking person that civilization has never faced such peril as exists today. American Big Business and the Stalinist bureaucracy have destructive powers at their disposal transcending the wildest dreams of previous rulers. To take the power of decision away from them has become a matter of life and death.
The question at once arises: How much time is granted the working class to perform this task? The answer is: Not long if we look at the rising curve that marks the tempo of war preparations and compare it with the tempo between World War I and World War II, but longer than might have been expected if we look at Wall Street's blueprint. The fact is that American Big Business has shoved the projected date ahead several times.
This postponement appears strange if we recall that the main intended victim, the Soviet Union, was devastated at the end of World War II while the United States emerged from the war far stronger than at the beginning. Add to this that the U.S. had a monopoly on the Atom-Bomb from 1945 to 1949. Why didn't American ,Big Business move in for the kill then?
It might be argued that "we" had illusions about the Kremlin, that "we" hoped for an era of peaceful co-existence and that it was not until Stalin knocked these into a cocked hat that "we" were provoked into rearming. This is lying propaganda as can easily be proved.
The ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had not yet lost their radioactivity in the fall of 1945 when Gen. George C. Marshall issued his Biennial Report to the Secretary of War. In this report, which I analyzed in the Oct 20, 1945 issue of The Militant, Marshall derided the possibilities of peace. He revealed that the Pentagon was already constructing superweapons for another war.
He said that "With the continued development of weapons and techniques now known to us, the cities of New York, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, or San Francisco may be subject to annihilation from other continents in a matter of hours."
The General declared that there is no effective defense except the "power of attack." Men are needed to come to "close grips with the enemy and tear his operating bases and his productive establishment away from him. ..."
That was a clear enough statement of intentions for The Militant to warn that "The Third World War is already in the blueprint stage."
Since they were fully aware that their economy at a certain stage requires war if it is to avert depression, what stopped the Wall Street bankers and Pentagon brass from following through when they had the clear advantage?
One of the clues lies in the General's statement: Men are needed to come to "close grips with the enemy and tear his operating bases and his productive establishments away from him. ..."

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The General appeared to have the men —some 10,000,-000 of them in the armed forces and tens of millions more working overtime in the war industries to supply them with all the necessary means, including long-range planes and the Atom-Bomb. Why weren't they used?
Something happened — something perhaps unforeseen and unexpected by Wall Street. Politics intervened.
I don't mean that "spies" or "communist agents" wormed their way into key government positions and sabotaged policies, as the McCarthyites try to make out I mean political intervention in the sense of human will imposing itself and shaping events. And this will was not that of the small clique of capitalists controlling the government, but the will of the American people.
Within a few short months after Marshall had bared the Pentagon's plans, American troops around the entire globe began demanding immediate return home. Their demands were not uncertain in tone. Meetings including as many as 20,000 troops were held. The soldiers sent a flood of protests home at being held overseas. They protested intervening in the affairs of other countries. They collected money for advertisements stating their position in U.S. papers. They even elected joint committees in many areas to fight for a "Get-Us-Home" program. They staged militant demonstrations. And here in the United States their folks backed them up wholeheartedly.
In face of such a rising tide, could Wall Street dream of launching a successful war on the Soviet Union? The American people were busy dismantling the forces needed to carry on a new war. The soldiers needed to "come to close grips with the enemy" were shaking themselves free from Wall Street's own grip.
To have ordered an Atom-Bomb attack at that time would have meant nothing but swift and certain suicide for America's 60 ruling families.
Moreover, the "Get-Us-Home" movement was not all that crossed the war plans of the giant corporations. Even before the troops began their stormy demonstrations around the world, the factory workers had launched a symmetrical movement for higher wages. The auto workers hit the bricks, then the steel workers, and along with them countless others. January 1946 saw the opening of the most powerful strike wave in the country's history.
That movement could easily have turned into a radical political development with the most far-reaching revolutionary implications had American Big Business decided to fly in the face of it and launch another war right then and there. The wiser heads knew they had enough to chew on for the time being.
Those two events, the 1946 strike wave and the "Get-Us-Home" troop movement, have haunted the capitalist war-mongers ever since. When the truce was signed in Korea, one of the first fears expressed by the capitalists and their agents was that another movement might flare up to "Bring the Boys Back Home." And the labor movement, 17,000,000 strong and ready for battle at any major threat to living standards, hangs over their calculations like a nightmare.
In 1953 they must still ask themselves the question that was posed in 1946. What happens if we start another war without first arriving at a more favorable position in relation to the forces of the American working class?

It is quite true that they have been working at this knotty problem since 1946 and have made considerable headway, as we shall see next week, but it is far from solved. They could make no worse error than to think the American workers will go quiescently into another slaughter. And they know it. We may deduce from this that they might have decided to postpone the H-Bomb holocaust just a little longer in order to complete certain essential political chores first.
3.  Wall   Street's Drive to  Sell the   U.S.   on Another War
The "Get-Us-Home" movement of the American troops at the end of 1945 and beginning of 1946, together with the powerful strike wave that swept the country at that time, forced Wall Street to postpone the date for the Third World War which it had projected at the close of World War II. As I pointed out last week, the American people dismantled the forces needed to carry out a successful attack on the Soviet Union when it stood weakened and devastated from the Nazi assault.
Wall Street had to make a fresh start. First of all, it had to secure its home base. This meant above all convincing the American people of the necessity of going to war against the Soviet Union. To win a war of such scope, the minimum requirement is a people thoroughly convinced of its justice and inevitability. If possible, their enthusiasm must be aroused. To drive the American people into such a conflict would most certainly prove suicidal. They must be led. This was the major problem facing America's 60 ruling families.
The capitalist class in our time, however, is capable of leading only a certain kind of people — a people that is thoroughly housebroken. They are not able to lead masses accustomed to think for themselves, concerned about preserving their liberties and willing to fight for their rights. In fact, to the capitalists, masses of that cast of mind are not only thoroughly undependable in wars of conquest but a deadly danger, particularly if they have powerful organizations such as trade unions.
Thus to overcome the unfavorable position they found themselves in in 1946, the strategists of the capitalist class set out to achieve two main goals in the United States: (1) Try to convince the American people that the Soviet Union is an aggressor power like Nazi Germany, plotting to attack America; (2) Try to stamp out freedom of thought and hamstring the unions.
The first aim dovetailed with a vast armaments program, which in turn could help stave off depression. The second aim, of course, fitted in neatly with the open shop sentiments of the big corporations. And both aims coincided with the need to satisfy the ravenous hunger for profit-taking with which the capitalists were troubled after feeding at the public trough during the war years.
Anti-union legislation culminated in the Taft-Hartley Law and an epidemic of similar slave-labor measures on the statute books of the states. The drive against freedom of thought began with Truman's "loyalty" decrees and rapidly mushroomed into the worst witch-hunt America has ever seen. The end result was the ominous rise of McCarthyism.
Truman's   "loyalty"   order   was   promulgated  in  1947.

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For six years the drive on civil liberties has continued. It has made deep inroads into freedom of thought in America but has not yet succeeded in its final aim of breaking up the independent outlook of the masses. The Taft-Hartley Law likewise has made organizing difficult, particularly in the South, but the unions still remain intact. In fact they now have a membership of some 17,000,000.
The corporations have made impressive gains in imposing the speed-up, containing the struggle for better living conditions, hounding the militants, and so on. But accounts have not yet been settled with the unions. Big Business now appears to think that it may take more than the witch-hunt and union-busting legislation to discipline the union membership and make the country safe for another war. It may take a bit of depression and an accompanying strong-arm assault. But to engage in that battle with labor —a most dangerous battle for the capitalists— would require postponement of World War III.
The alternative is to try to buy off the union leadership and a considerable segment of the working class as Roosevelt did in World War II. That course, however, seems to have been ruled out by the Morgans, Rockefellers, etc. That was one reason why they wanted Eisenhower in the White House instead of Stevenson.
Let us now turn to the effort to enthuse the American people with the prospect of an atomic war on the Soviet Union. The principal vehicle for this has been the powerful propaganda machine at the disposal of the capitalist class. The warmly praised ally of World War II was converted into "the enemy." The crimes of Stalinism, accommodatingly covered up during the war years, were hustled into the limelight. The press, the radio, the pulpit and later TV began an even more sustained campaign than that waged against Nazi Germany. The moralists joined in the attack —many of them with what turned out to be the best credentials, former sycophancy in the camp of Stalinism.
The grist for this mill was provided by the State Department. Rejecting all overtures of the Kremlin for a deal, it abruptly cut off lend-lease to the USSR despite the desperate needs of the Soviet people. Winston Churchill, then the most admired and respected statesman of the western capitalist world, was brought to Fulton, Missouri, where in March 1946 he laid down the line against the Soviet Union in a saber-rattling speech.
Provocative actions were organized, such as maneuvers by the armed forces in Antarctic and Arctic under conditions obviously simulating those in the Soviet Union in winter. A whole series of diplomatic incidents were touched off, all designed to display the Soviet Union as an "aggressor" power, although it is not, since its economic foundations do not require it to follow the policy of imperialist expansion at all.
With the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the "cold war" opened up full scale, with occasional scares of possible hot war as in 1948 at the time it appeared the   Communist   Party   might win the elections in  Italy.
All this led up to June 1950 when civil war broke out in Korea. The Truman administration seized on this pretext to plunge America into the conflict

The Korean war appeared to give American Big Business the final clinchers in its war preparations: an excuse to convert a huge sector of the economy into war production, an excuse to vastly expand the armed forces and stockpiles of armaments, an excuse to get into a conflict which had every prospect of expanding into a general conflict in which the Soviet Union would be sucked in.
Above all, it seemed to be a perfect means for finally convincing the American people about the justice and inevitability of war with the Soviet Union.
But this war, which appeared to offer such a favorable opening for carrying out the sinister plans of American Big Business, turned into its opposite.
The fighting capacity of the North Koreans shocked America's rulers. And when the Chinese Armies took up the challenge that Gen. MacArthur flung at the Yalu river, it quickly became apparent that Wall Street had taken on far more than it bargained for. Truman's "police action" turned into a war of completely unexpected scope. In another article we will discuss the forces American imperialism ran into; right now we are interested in what happened to the effort to use Korea to psychologize the American people about fighting abroad.
Korea turned out to be the most unpopular war in American history. This is admitted by every serious observer. It became a key issue in American politics. It helped bring a landslide defeat to the Democratic Party.
One of the big factors in Eisenhower's victory was the hope many people had that he would bring the fighting to an end, a hope that was fostered by Eisenhower's promise to go to Korea personally. No doubt at that time, Eisenhower and his backers had already considered the advisability of ending the Korean adventure.
Even Stevenson had to recognize on the eve of the election that it was necessary to say something about ending the war in Korea. Of course, what he said was too little and too late to save the Democrats.
The popular opposition to the war in Korea is a tremendous new fact in American politics. The Pentagon and its spokesmen indicate their awareness of it by their openly expressed fears about a new "Get-Us-Home" movement among the American troops.
The Korean war, which was undoubtedly a long step toward World War III, thus had contradictory effects. While enabling Wall Street to step up its military preparations for global conquest, it ended by inducing war weariness at home. The grass-roots bitterness over this "police action" is a new complication that America's capitalist rulers dare not overlook in deciding whether to start World War III soon or to postpone it.
4. What Audience Is Dulles' Propaganda Aimed At?
Woodrow Wyatt, a British Labor Party member of Parliament, assailing John Foster Dulles Sept. 6, said that never before had a man "spent so long in preparing himself to be Foreign Secretary and made such a fool of himself and his country when he finally got the job."
This impression of the head of the State Department is fairly widespread, not only in Europe but also among liberals in America. Dulles seems to act more like a bull in a china  shop than  a smooth diplomat trying to win

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friends and influence people abroad. For instance, in a single press conference Sept. 3, he said things that ruffled feelings in Italy, Germany and Japan.
Dulles' course can be dismissed as a consequence of stupidity, or a manifestation of colossal boorishness, which is another form of stupidity. However, it is dangerous to underestimate a foe, particularly a class enemy. Before we write off Dulles' speeches as nothing but a typical symptom of the lack of regard American Big Business has for the feelings of its allies abroad, which only hurts Wall Street, let us once again check the diplomatic problems faced by Truman and now Eisenhower.
Wall Street's major line of world strategy since the close of World War II has been the preparation for World War III, as I have indicated in previous articles. Part of the preparation has been the building of the most gigantic military coalition ever seen. It includes the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe and the Mediterranean, and the Pacific from Japan to Australia.
If you assume, as it seems only common sense to do, that the major diplomatic problem facing the capitalist class in the U.S. is-to arm, inspire, and lead this vast coalition into war on the Soviet Union, China, and the colonial countries that are now seeking freedom from imperialist domination, the State Department's course since 1948 and even earlier seems irrational.
It has provoked one diplomatic crisis after another with the Soviet Union, truculently rejected all overtures for a deal with the Kremlin, everywhere taken the initiative in one form or another to stir up trouble, and has thus succeeded in proving itself in the eyes of the world to be the aggressor. Even Hitler tried to avoid getting into such an unfavorable diplomatic position by making disarmament proposals, in accordance with the standing rule of capitalist diplomacy to try to appear to be seeking peace when you are preparing for war.
On top of this, the State department seems to pay no attention to the complaints of its allies about this uncomfortable state of diplomatic affairs. Instead, Dulles, as before him Acheson, gives them stern lectures about speeding up their rearmament.
I repeat, this course seems irrational—if you consider that the State Department's major problem is to lead its tremendous coalition of powers into war under a plausible diplomatic cover. But it happens to face a bigger problem — the problem of convincing the American people they should fight another war and submit to the lowered standard of living, loss of freedoms, bitter sacrifices, frightful bloodshed and destruction, and even danger of total annihilation that this war entails.
Just how crucial this problem is, is not generally appreciated even by those who pose as experts on such things. To grasp it, you have to understand the weight of the American people as a force in world politics.
In the last century, Karl Marx made the rather startling statement that the sparsely settled United States was actually more populous than teeming India. He explained this assertion, which seems to fly in the face of the facts, in the following way: Populations, viewed from the standpoint of economics, must be weighted by relative development of their industries. That this is a correct way of viewing   populations  is  dramatically shown when coun-

tries go to war. If political factors do not intervene, the war boils down to a conflict between their relative industrial powers. Thus, in Marx's view, the high level of American transportation, agricultural and industrial production even in the last century gave the U.S. a greater population than India.
It was on the basis of such considerations that Trotsky could say in 1929, "... in the last historic analysis all the problems of our planet will be decided upon American soil."
The preponderance of the United States by the end of World War II could be expressed in two graphic sentences: "Three-quarters of the world's invested capital and two-thirds of the world's industry were concentrated inside the United States. The other third of industry was shared over the other 95% of the earth's inhabited surface." (Howard K. Smith in "The State of Europe.")
If we translate this into terms of population, as Marx viewed it years ago, then so far as industrial power is concerned, two-thirds of the world's population is concentrated inside the United States. The other third is spread among the other countries of the world.
The face of the power-sensitive State Department is turned toward this two-thirds. It is with this two-thirds that it sees its major diplomatic problem.
The problem has two sides. If the American people can be cajoled, frightened, bamboozled, psychologized — in brief, hypnotized and high-pressured into going willingly, even enthusiastically, to war, then the world's most colossal force has been successfully lined up behind Wall Street's banners. American capitalism then has fair chances of getting a new lease on life by conquering vast new areas for exploitation. If, on the other hand, the American people remain unconvinced, disquieted, potentially ready to turn on Wall Street, then war can mean the quick finish of capitalism — the definitive finish on a world scale.
That is why what Dulles does in public is calculated above all for its effect on the American people. The State Department, so far as its public declarations are concerned, has really been converted into a government propaganda department aiming primarily at the American audience.
The provocative diplomacy abroad is designed to furnish one incident after another to inflame public opinion in America. The high-handed attitude toward the allies is likewise designed for its effect on the public at home. The witch hunt with its spectacular raids, trials and spy scares is part of the pattern.
Demagogues like McCarthy and others in the most reactionary wing of the Republican and Democratic parties take advantage of this for their own ends — appearing as powers holding a club over the State Department. But the real club is the need the State Department feels to convince the American people that the "reds" are a genuine danger against whom we must go to war no matter what the cost.
Dealing with the mightiest power on earth — the American people —Wall Street understands very well that to simply launch World War III without adequate preparation could prove the shortest way to suicide. Precisely because of the power involved, it must move cautiously, test the ground again and again; not only advance when possible, but be

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prepared to make detours and even retreats if the advance proves to have been too precipitate. Dangerous as retreats may be, Wall Street feels it cannot afford to lose this game and a costly retreat is better than a suicidal advance.
Hence the hesitations and postponement after postponement of World War III despite a diplomacy that has breathed fire and smoke and rattled atom bombs since 1945 and even tried to use the civil war in Korea as a possible opener. Hence also the cease-fire in Korea.
The American people are proving hard to mold according to the blueprint laid down for World War III, but Wall Street dares not let its impatience run away with its better political judgment. America's ruling 60 families see the main danger and therefore the main problem not abroad but here at home. And in this they are right.
5. How Revolutions Abroad Can Slow War Timetable
The United States emerged from World War II with such crushing preponderance of industrial power that no combination of countries matched it. Since industrial strength can prove decisive in a war where the political factor does not intervene, it seems strange at first sight that Big Business has not yet launched the war it projects on the Soviet Union. It is particularly difficult to understand if you view Ameria as homogeneous — as a monolithic force without fissure.
However, if you look at the internal divisions, the separation of the country into opposing classes, then you can see that the colossal power of the U.S. also measures the power' of the American working class and therefore the degree of its political explosiveness. The American working class, viewed politically, is like an H-Bomb lodged in the economic base that gives Wall Street its imposing world strength.
In previous articles we saw how the assertion of the will of the American people compelled Wall Street to postpone its war plans immediately following World War II when it had a monopoly on atomic weapons and when the Soviet Union lay weak and devastated after the invasion by German imperialism.
And we have seen how strenuously the capitalist class has tried since 1945 to convince the American people to go to war against the Soviet Union, even plunging the country into an undeclared war in Korea as part of the preparations — again with consequences, above all in America, that has brought about another postponement of World War III.
Besides the domestic reasons, other considerations of a weighty character have forced Wall Street to revise its timetable of war. While it has constructed an interlocking system of military alliances such as the world has never before seen, it has not yet been able to complete the consolidation of its two main bases: Japan and Western Europe.
In both areas, following World War II, American Big Business had the immediate problem of forestalling revolutions, bolstering the native capitalists and restoring the economies ruined by war. Much of this has been accomplished, thanks primarily to the helping hand of the Stalinists  and  the Social Democrats, but in neither place has

rearmament really got under way. In fact it took from 1945 until the victory of Adenauer in the recent election to prepare the base for the rearmament of Germany, the key sector of Europe. The most crucial stage still lies ahead.
In Japan, reports indicate a considerable growth of anti-American sentiment, a desire by the Japanese capitalists to engage in trade with China, and a fear of the consequences of participating in another war. These feelings will not prove easy to overcome even under the terrible pressure of Wall Street's urgent prodding.
Meanwhile in France, the greatest general strike in the nation's history shows that this essential base for the projected war on the USSR is, from the viewpoint of Wall Street, far from secure. Indeed, drained white by the attempt to reconquer Indo-China, shaken by revolutionary fevers, the capitalist France of today scarcely resembles the kind of power Wall Street would consider placing under the additional stress of atomic war, at least for the moment.
The problem of Germany, Japan and France indicates in a dramatic way what Wall Street faces in all the countries brought into its far-reaching military alliances. None of them wants war. Even the various bourgeoisies, who are closest to America's 60 ruling families, shrink at the fearful perspective they are ordered to face. This inertia acts like sand in Wall Street's war machine.
One of the major causes impelling Wall Street to make haste in launching World War III is the development of revolutionary movements abroad. Thebig corporations feel toward them much as they felt toward unions in the days of the open shop — nip them in the bud. However, the experience in China, Korea, Indo-China, and in fact throughout the colonial world, shows that these elemental forces have gathered such headway that they cannot easily be stopped. They are capable of sustained, tough, exhausting war.
If the conflict were to remain on the strictly military plane, perhaps the United States in combination with the other imperialist powers could beat them down —at the risk of bringing down civilization at the same time and perhaps precipitating the use of atomic missiles that could destroy mankind.
But this counter-revolutionary war constantly risks touching off a force far more potent than military conflict. This force is revolutionary politics on a mass scale. One successful socialist revolution in any major industrial country could cancel out completely Wall Street's industrial supremacy, could in fact, through a political chain reaction, turn it against Wall Street by bringing into play the revolutionary political power of the American workers.
This possibility has long been known in theory. For example, in 1853 —exactly a century ago —Karl Marx observed: "It would be a curious spectacle, that of China sending disorder into the Western World while the Western Powers, by English, French and American war-steamers, are conveying 'order' to Shanghai, Nanking and the mouths of the Great Canal."
This concept recurs in the writings of Trotsky. In the period of the death agony of capitalism, Trotsky was of course   able   to   give   it  much  greater concreteness  than

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Marx could. Here is an example, written in 1928:
"... It is precisely the international strength of the United States and her irresistible expansion arising from it, that compels her to include the powder magazines of the whole world into the foundations of her structure, i.e., all the antagonisms between the East and the West, the class struggle in Old Europe, the uprisings of the colonial masses, and all wars and revolutions.
"On the one hand, this transforms North American capitalism into the basic counter-revolutionary force of the modern epoch, constantly more interested in the maintenance of 'order' in every corner of the terrestrial globe; and on the other hand, this prepares the ground for a gigantic revolutionary explosion in this already dominant and still expanding world imperialist power. The logic of world relations indicates that the time of this explosion cannot lag very far behind that of the proletarian revolution in Europe." ( Third International After Lenin, p. 8)
If we bring Trotsky's metaphor up to date, we can say that Wall Street, in extending the frontier of the United States to the 38th parallel in Korea and up to the Iron Curtain in Europe, has included the atom bombs that can trigger the political H-Bomb represented by the American workers.
Faced with such possible consequences, it might seem that America's 60 ruling families would prefer to retreat, withdrawing from overseas and converting North America into an island fortress. But this is not economically feasible. American capitalism is the heart of a world-wide system. Cut it out of that system and it will soon stop beating.
Besides, to retreat would precipitate a depression that would make the 1929 crash and the stagnation of the Thirties look like a war boom by comparison. That, too, would have most unhappy results politically so far as the giant corporations are concerned, for the American workers, looking at the idle factories — shut down for lack of war orders — would not be long in deciding to put an end to the insanity of capitalism.
6.   Will Eisenhower Offer the Kremlin a "Peace"Pact?
In the Jan. 12 Militant, in an article written several weeks before Eisenhower took office, I called attention to the fact that the "logic of the international situation . . . calls for a turn in the diplomacy of the State Department."
Having inherited a bad diplomatic situation from the Truman administration, one of the problems facing the new Eisenhower regime, I said, was how to change this — to wipe out the impression "that Washington wants war" and to "appear in the international arena as the advocate and champion of peace."
Gen. Eisenhower, I observed, "in hastening the preparations for war will certainly raise the defense slogan of peace . . . and may well go quite far in 'peace' gestures." Hitler himself, I noted, had found it advisable to follow such a policy in getting ready for World War II.
Dulles' main course up to now as Secretary of State might seem to have shown this analysis to be wrong. The Stalinists in particular paint Dulles as the main villain in the Eisenhower administration whose principal concern   is   rattling  the saber.  And  if we were to let the

headlines impress us too much, we might feel compelled to say that the diplomacy of Dulles is nothing but a simple continuation of the diplomacy bequeathed to him by Dean Acheson; namely, the brass-knuckles-and-blackjack attitude associated with the Korean war.
It is quite true that Dulles has deliberately contributed to this impression. After the Republican election campaign picturing the State Department .as under the influence of "Communist spies," he could not afford for a time to engage in diplomacy that might appear "soft." Moreover, he is under compulsion to convince the American people of the inevitability and justice of a war on the Soviet Union. That requires war-mongering and inflammatory incidents and fear propaganda.
But this is only one side of the street. The other side must be worked too. It is necessary to create the illusion that "the enemy" is the aggressor and "our side" the peace-lover. Otherwise it is not possible toimbuepeople with even a semblance of feeling that the war they are asked to fight is morally right. And of course among the allied powers, where the people are war-weary and already convinced in large numbers that only socialism offers a way out, the capitalist rulers feel that such a turn by the State Department is imperative.
The evidence now indicates that the top councils of the Eisenhower administration feel such a shift must be attempted.
At the beginning of September, the well-informed correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Joseph C. Harsch, observed a "curious dualism" in Eisenhower's foreign policy. It has been reported, he said Sept. 3, that the Dulles-Lodge team "seriously contemplates the possibility that the Korean peace conference will lead to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations." "On the surface this would sound almost incredible," yet Harsh offered as evidence "the actualrecord" in the Far East where instead of widening the war as many expected when Eisenhower took office, Dulles actually followed a policy of "disengagement," leading to the Korean truce.
Five days later, this same correspondent reported that "German and British and other diplomats are giving their first attention to ways and means of reassuring Moscow that it can become more 'secure' through a negotiated settlement with the West. . . ." This would involve among other things a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany. In return for this, the diplomats "are prepared to pay a substantial price. . . ."
Harsch recognized that "to American ears" the "very idea of security for Soviet Russia sounds either fantastic or nonsensical." However, far more influential figures than the Monitor's correspondent seem to consider such a diplomatic move neither fantastic nor nonsensical.
On May 11, British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill suggested that the ideas contained in the Locarno Treaty might well be applied today to guarantee the present frontiers of Europe and thus ease the anxiety of the Kremlin about the aggressive intentions of the western powers.
The Locarno Treaty of 1925 was essentially a promise by England to help France if she were attacked by Germany or to help Germany if she were attacked by France. In  the present situation a new edition of Locarno would

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mean a promise to come to the defense of the Soviet Union in the event Germany launched another invasion on Russian soil. Such a pact would, of course, have about as much value in preventing World War III as the Locarno Treaty had in preventing World War II.
Churchill's proposal did not seem to meet with any response in Washington at the time. But this may be ascribable to an accidental gap in Anglo-American team work due to the temporary removal of Churchill and Anthony Eden from public activity, and the illness and death of Senator Taft. (Churchill suffered a stroke and Eden underwent a serious operation.)
Then Stevenson returned from his world tour. On Sept. 15 he urged ^Eisenhower to take the initiative in new peace talks that would consider disarmament and "durable assurances" for the Soviet Union of "non-aggression." This statement was in effect a political announcement that the Democrats would support Eisenhower in any moves along these lines. What is especially significant is that such a diplomatic demarche (change of direction) would mark an about-face from the policy followed by Truman.
Two days later, Dulles followed up with an important speech in the United Nations. The core of it was "The Russian people, like the French people have not forgotten what their nation suffered from Hitlerite Germany during the Second World War. They expect, and they are entitled to, assurance against a repetition of such events."
As if to demonstratively emphasize that bipartisan agreement had been reached on the line of diplomacy, Eisenhower arranged to have Stevenson "brier him on his world tour. Stevenson told the press Oct. 1 that he had advised Eisenhower to meet Soviet fears of military encirclement by guarantees that they have nothing to fear from us. It would certainly clarify the atmosphere somewhat if the guarantees were offered and rejected." In response Eisenhower told Stevenson he was giving careful consideration to the proposal.
Following Dulles' UN appearance, capitalist statesmen took up the theme in a series of declarations. Lester B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, assured the Soviet Union Sept. 23 that the West had no plans to undermine the security of the Communist part of the world. Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, on the following day "arrayed Britain beside the United States and Canada in an effort to reassure the Kremlin. ..." On Sept. 25, Maurice Schumann, France's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, likewise assured Moscow that the West was willing to consider plans for guaranteeing Europe's present borders. And on Sept. 28, Churchill indicated that he favors a Big Four Meeting.
Dean Acheson came out of retirement to say Oct. 1 that negotiation with the Soviet Union "is possible, is desirable, and may — but only may—be productive."
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, reputed to be especially close to Eisenhower, said Oct. 2 that the State Department has under active consideration a non-aggression pact between the West and the Soviet Union.
How have these moves been interpreted in the capitalist press? Here are some typical reactions:
Representing liberal opinion, the New Republic said Sept.  28: "All  signs  point to  a meeting of the leaders of

Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the U.S."
The conservative Business Week said Oct. 3: "For the first time since the start of the cold war, world events have reached a stage where there's a possibility of a negotiated settlement between East and West."
And finally, the New York Times, which is the voice of authority for many editorial offices, said Oct. 4: "American thinking has taken the direction of offering the Communists 're-assurances' — not only by conciliatory words, but concretely in the form of non-aggression pacts, both in Germany and Korea. . . . The reasoning is that if the Russians will agree to non-aggression pacts, then real negotiations can take place and a settlement may follow. If they do not accept them, then all their charges of 'aggressive intent' on the part of the U.S. will be exposed as a sham and a stalling tactic. Moreover, any Soviet refusal to the U.S. proposals, it is held, will at least have the positive advantages of demonstrating that it is not the U.S. that is inflexible; of uniting the West, and of raising American prestige in the neutral Asian countries."
7. Is   an   Eisenhower-Malenkov   "Peace" Pact  in   Cards?
To readers of the Militant, Secretary of State Dulles' announcement to the press Oct. 6 that a "nonaggression pact between the United States and the USSR" is "being studied" among the Western powers came as no surprise. The probability of such a turn in diplomacy was forecast by the Militant as long ago as last January —some weeks before Eisenhower was sworn into office.
Even the Wall Street Journal now admits that "In some form or other, a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union is clearly becoming an integral part of American foreign policy." (Oct. 9.)
But it is one thing to offer such a pact —quite another to actually sign one. It takes two to make a bargain, as the old saying goes. What are the chances of our actually seeing "a kind of peace treaty for the cold war," to use the formula of the Wall Street Journal?
First of all, I do not know of a single serious political observer who believes a long-term pact is in sight. Such a course, advocated by Wallace in 1946-48, was ruled out by Truman under the pressure of Big Business. The reason for this was that the capitalist tycoons who are the real rulers in America require world domination to maintain their economic system. They need colonial areas for investments, raw materials and cheap labor power. By taking these and also smashing the Soviet Union, they could gain a new lease on life for their profit system. Being realists of a kind, they knew that the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union would not voluntarily commit suicide, and therefore they projected the new world war for which they are now preparing.
Their main strategy is designed to further this objective.
But what about a short-term pact? Here the possibilities, in my opinion, are far from ruled out. They hinge on Wall Street's timetable for war and on the advantages such a pact might offer in preparing for the conflict We should not forget that Hitler, too, in readying his invasion of the Soviet Union found it advantageous, some two years before he sent his panzer divisions into the Ukraine,

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to sign and seal a non-aggression pact with the Kremlin.
As I have pointed out in previous articles, Wall Street has postponed the scheduled outbreak of hostilities several times. Eisenhower last spring cancelled all projected dates. Charles E. Wilson, head of the Defense (formerly "War") Department, recently saw a "three-year" period at least "before the Soviet would be ready to attack," which is the formula generally used for the projected date.
American Big Business needs this time (1) to complete the rearmament of Japan and German, (2) to wipe out the worldwide impression that it wants war, (3) to tame the American workers, possibly through a "small" depression.
Wall Street is especially concerned about knocking out the opposition to the war within the labor movement by stepping up the witch-hunt still more and dealing some paralyzing blows to the unions.
A temporary pact with the Kremlin could facilitate achievement of these ends. Just as the Stalinists painted up the Stalin-Hitler pact as a great achievement for peace, thereby helping to lull workers everywhere into a false sense of security, so a Malenkov-Eisenhower pact would be pictured by the Stalinists as a new guarantee of peace. The intended effect would be to divert workers from taking the only possible road to enduring peace, that is, the road to socialism.
While the Stalinists are thoroughly discredited in the American labor movement and consequently have little influence in this country, in other places such as France and Italy where they head the bulk of the labor movement, they could play a most perfidious role.
In the Aug. 22 Nation, Mark Gayn suggests some of the counter-revolutionary services the Kremlin might perform for American Big Business in return for a pact: "... we might find Moscow and Peking ready to sacrifice the Communist regimes in East Germany and Indo-China, as Stalin once sacrificed the Communist rebels in Greece. . . And a Communist pledge to still the spirit of revolt and conspiracy in the more turbulent segments of the non-Communist world might prove a better incentive to American investments than an uncertain stability based on our threats. A time of peace is also a time when our best allies, Japan and Germany, France and England, can regain economic health through worldwide trade."
Of course, it is another question whether or not the Stalinists can deliver the goods. But in combination with direct force applied by the U.S., Great Britain, France, etc., a Stalinist betrayal might prove decisive. In Indo-China, for example, French troops supplied from American arsenals might prove sufficient to put down the freedom-seeking movement if the Stalinists cooperated with a stab in the back.
Dulles, representing the interests of American Big Business, naturally seeks other concessions from the Kremlin in addition. The Oct. 7 Wall Street Journal reports that in return for the projected non-aggression pact, "Russia would be asked to agree to a unified Germany, a unified Korea, and to a peace treaty for Austria." In addition, the Kremlin would "have to agree to withdraw their troops from Germany, Austria, and Korea; the U.S. and its allies would promise to do likewise."

Eisenhower-Churchill may only be probing, hoping that the Malenkov regime may be so interested in gaining time to take care of a precarious domestic position that it will grant unexpected concessions. The Western powers may settle for less. In any case, they count on coming out in these maneuvers with the aura of "peace-lovers."
As the Wall Street Journal puts it, "So State Department officials figure they can't lose. At the least, if the Russians reject the pact, the U.S. will have made a gesture calculated to help cement relations with its Western allies. At the most, the U.S. will have won important concessions in three hot spots: Germany, Austria, and Korea."
Far from the impression that the press may have given recently, the negotiations are not out in the open. William R. Fay of the Christian Science Monitor reported Oct. 8 in relation to the Korean conference that an American message "needs to be read ... in the context of private negotiations which have been taking place both among the western nations and indirectly between East and West in recent days."
Why certain of the negotiations are held in secret is quite clear. Main victims of the pact would be the insurgent colonial peoples and working people of the entire world. The common -understanding between Western imperialism and the Kremlin would be reached at their expense. It would be a united front against mass up-thrusts that could unseat either of these counter-revolutionary forces.
It is noteworthy that in the June uprising in East Germany, the Western powers refrained from giving any serious aid to the insurgents. By their course they demonstrated their capacity to give tangible support to the Kremlin against a common foe.
By way of reciprocity, in the August general strike in France, the Stalinists refrained from guiding the most promising movement since 1936 toward government power, thereby demonstrating their capacity to give tangible support to Wall Street against the class they both fear.
These reciprocal stands of Wall Street and the Kremlin in East Germany and France are in the pattern of a tacit understanding. This pattern could simply be extended, and it could turn out that a non-aggression pact might not actually be put down on paper but just go into effect as an uneasy and unstable "gentlemen's agreement." Such an accord would be in keeping with the traditions of capitalist diplomacy.
The lesson to the working class of these "peace" maneuvers can be summed up briefly: No confidence whatsoever in the intentions of either Wall Street or the Kremlin. Even if a "peace" pact were signed, it could prove only shortlived. At most it would turn out to be not much more than the lull before the storm of World War III. To save civilization from the threat of atomic war, it is necessary to take the revolutionary road to socialism.
To interpret the postponement of war — with or without a pact—as the opening of a prolonged period of peace would prove fatal. The task is to take advantage of the difficulties Wall Street faces in plunging our planet into another war. That means utilizing the breathing space to fight for the establishment of a Workers and Farmers Government in the United States. There is no other way to win enduring peace.

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SECTION IX: PREPARING AN INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE

[A September 23, 1953, letter from Pablo's International Secretariat to Healy barred him from opposing the line of the pro-Pablo majority of the IS until the world congress. In addition, he was ordered to cease all collaboration aimed at organizing a tendency or faction. Healy was informed that the minority of the section was no longer bound by the section's discipline. This letter (which appears in Part 4 of this series) made it clear that Pablo was prepared to recognize a minority as the "real" section should Healy continue to oppose Pablo's proposals for the Fourth World Congress.
[Pablo's actions speeded up the process of organizing an open anti-Pabloist faction. It caused leaders of the SWP to propose that the orthodox Trotskyists form a public faction,   since  it  appeared  that Pablo was ready to expel

his  main opponents rather than risk losing the vote at a democratic world congress.
[This suspicion was given further confirmation when the pro-Pablo minority of the SWP boycotted the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration of The Militant. This clearly indicated that the target of their factional activities was not the leadership but the party itself. The SWP majority recognized from the British experience that the Pablo faction would not tolerate any disciplinary measures against its disloyal American allies, but would use such measures as a pretext to cut the American Trotskyists off from fraternal collaboration with the world movement. Under these circumstances, the Cochranites were suspended from membership while the leaders of the party prepared to call for the formation of a public international faction.]

1. Letter from James P. Cannon to Farrell Dobbs

Los  Angeles,  Calif. September 18, 1953 New York Dear Farrell:
I received your letter of September 16, reporting on the discussion in the New York group. Your thinking seems to have paralleled ours on every point, including the next steps to be taken. Vincent and I have been talking about the question a great deal and had come to identical conclusions as to what to do next.
These proposed steps presuppose a fundamental decision by the party leadership, to be taken with a full comprehension of all the implications. It must be clearly understood, before we start, that the new actions do not signify simply a continuation of the struggle with the Cochranite minority. They require a new decision on a new plane. It is a far more serious decision than the one we took in launching the open struggle against the Cochranites, and it is not the same kind of a decision.
The open break with the Cochranites did not signify a break-up of a previously existing coalition or alliance in the leadership. Contrary to what some may have thought at the time, the Cochranites never played any really essential, to say nothing of any indispensable part, in the actual leadership of the movement. This has been demonstrated to the hilt by the course of the leadership since the open break with the Cochranites last January.
There was a little change from previous times, but as far as the making of political decisions and the direction of party work are concerned, the change was something like the "click" one hears when a railroad car passes from one rail to another. Moreover, the Cochranites never played any indispensable role in the division of labor among the leadership, or even in the general work of the party, as some may have thought. That has been demonstrated to the hilt too, especially since the organized campaign of sabotage proved its futility.

The situation on the international field is quite different. There we have had an actual alliancein the most important political work, and a division of labor too. From this point of view an open break with the Paris leaders will be comparable to the big shake-up in 1940. The split with the Shachtmanites disrupted a long-standing coalition as well as a division of labor, and required a complete reorganization. We have to see clearly that there can be no other possible outcome of an open break with Pablo and Co.
I am not citing these consequences as an argument against the steps you propose to take. On the contrary, I am more and more convinced that this course is unavoidable. But before we start, all concerned should weigh the full consequences of the actions, as the Paris leaders apparently have already done for their part. All doubts and hesitations must be left behind them when the open warfare begins.
I doubt very much whether a modus vivendi can be reestablished on the old basis, once the fight gets out into the open. The barest possibility of this will depend upon the relation of forces established in the open fight. As far as the SWP is concerned, the fight is practically over in this respect. The most favorable relation of forces we can expect in the next period has already been established. If the same success is recorded in England, the international battie will have already turned in favor of orthodox Trotskyism.
Vincent and I fully agree with the three proposals:
 1.	An appeal to all sections for solidarity with the SWP Majority in our fight against the Cochranite revisionists.
 2.	Preparation of a separate document on the international questions.
 3.	A Plenum of the Majority NC members soon after the drafts are ready to ratify the basic decision.
I think we can have this special gathering without too much   expense.   Since   all  the  NC  members  on  the West

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Coast have already discussed the whole problem fully during the past week at the L.A. Summer Camp, it would probably be agreeable if I came alone to represent the whole group. Since Vincent has participated in all the discussions here, and is already in agreement with all the   decisions   contemplated,   I might also  act as  proxy

for him —if the matter of expense is important.
We are having a full meeting of the L.A. NC group with Vincent next Sunday. I will write you further after this meeting.
Fraternally, J.P.   Cannon

2.   Agreements   Arrived   at at London Meeting,   October 3-4, 1953
 1.	The delegates declare their political agreement on the international perspective on the character of the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinism. They decide to undertake together the defense of Trotskyism against Pablist revisionism and the struggle against the liquidation of the Fourth International.
 2.	The English comrades will prepare a counter-document to the resolutions for the Fourth World Congress, which will   have   to   be   ready   before   the tendency conference.
 3.	The French comrades will edit a history of the struggle of the PCI against Pablism and the conditions of their exclusion.
b. A study on the development of Pablist revisionism since the Third World Congress by means of documents.
 4.	The different participants will make a public criticism as far as possible in the press of the practice of Pablism, taking account of the specific situation.
 5.	A meeting of the international tendency will take place at the end of October, in reality at a further date of the meeting on November 1 of the Provisional Committee.

 6.	A provisional committee is designated for coordination composed of the English, Swiss and French sections. Each section will have two members. Its headquarters will be in Paris.
 7.	Regular international contributions will be sent to the provisional committee.
 8.	All parties supporting the provisional committee will give a contribution to be fixed by the committee.
 9.	Immediate organization of contacts: Germany, Austria, Italy, Bolivia, Ceylon.

 10.	The struggle ought to come to a conclusion for the IEC in order to impose the changing of the agenda and the changing of the leadership.
 11.	The English will prepare a draft of the modification of the statutes.
Signed:
For France— Renard, Bleibtreu
For England —Jerry
For the Swiss— Emile
Individually —Jo

3. Letter from George Breitman to James P. Cannon
Newark, N.J. Oct. 7, 1953 Dear Jim:
There is some information available that I regard as significant, which I'd like to pass on to you. (You may already have it, but I got it so tardily and accidentally that you may not; I am not sure if all the other comrades attach the same significance to it that I do. We discussed it for the first time last night, and I'm telling you about it on the chance that it may be lost in the rush of other news passing back and forth.)
Some time ago (during the last month, I assume) a "naive" rank and filer was holding a discussion with Sid Winn, a leading Cochranite (formerly on the City Committee). This comrade assumed that a majority of the International was with us, and said so. Winn's reply was approximately as follows (and remember I have this fourth- or fifth-hand): Yes, it's true you have a mechanical majority of the International, but we have a majority of the ideological leadership, and so on. He also said, in passing, that because of the peculiarities of the voting there, we (the majority) have the West German party with us.

Dave Weiss got a report about this discussion. About two weeks ago, or maybe less, Monroe, the Flint Cochranite, came to town and Dave ran into him. In the discussion Dave decided to use the approach of the "naive" rank and filer and boldly told Monroe that of course we have a decisive majority of the International with us. Monroe's reply was very much like that of Winn's.
Was Winn expressing ideas of his own? It's hardly likely. Was Monroe's reply like Winn's merely because of coincidence? That's even less likely. The minority is a very tight caucus. Its members would not have such ideas unless they had received them from their leaders, whom they surely have been asking questions about the international relation of forces. Also, the minority, I am sorry to say, is better informed about these matters than we are, if only because Pablo is in a better position to know where the different parties tend to stand.
Thus, with what you call my customary restraint, I have come to certain conclusions: The minority does not think it has the support of a majority of the International. Its estimate must be supported by information that we do not have available (the news about West Germany certainly falls into that category). Perhaps some of us have

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been unduly pessimistic about the outcome of an international showdown —with less cause than the minority has to be pessimistic.
At the meeting last night it was also reported that Bar-tell, in his discussion with Steve Roberts, had spoken in a derogatory manner about the size and influence of the International (the same kind of thing he started doing about our own party after he saw they were in a hopeless minority here). This is not the way he would talk about the International if he thought they had the majority; on the contrary. Also, it was reported that at a social last week members of the minority were speaking in a belittling manner about the Ceylon party.
Doesn't this tend to explain the hysterical and almost desperate tone of Pablo's recent letters and statements? Would he write that way unless there was a good psychological-political reason for it?
Also: we have been talking about the behavior of the Pabloists, which to some has seemed possibly motivated by a desire to force some kind of showdown before the Congress takes place. Can it be for the aforementioned reason? Why should they risk a possible split before the Congress if they thought they'd have a majority there?
Then there is the argument about "why don't you accept the same discipline in the International that you want the American minority to accept in the American party?" It seemed for a time that this was going to be a big pitch on their part, but it has been muted for the most part; certainly not put forward full-scale. Myra observed that she noted Pablo's answer to you on internationalism placed this argument within the framework of the past and present, rather than the future; there was no bold statement about letting the Congress decide. (I haven't

checked this point myself yet.) This too fits in with the premise that they don't have a majority, and know it. And isn't it possible also that this premise has something to do with Pablo's repeated requests for a "face-to-face" talk?
I won't go on further along this line. But it seems obvious to me that we ought to reflect on it carefully. It not only throws light on their tactics, I believe, but it must be weighed in formulating our own tactics. I will not enter into that myself, because I am not much of a tactician, but I believe it will have to condition our attitude to the Congress and our statements about the Congress. (Of course we can probe the tiling further if that seems necessary.)
Comradely, George Breitman P.S. Have you noticed that Pablo, in his article of Sept. 9, answering your speech on internationalism, finds it necessary for some reason to say in his opening line that he did not see the text of your speech until Sept. 5? What in the world is the reason for that, or the significance he places on it? The IS letter of Sept 3 makes clear reference to the speech in its sixth paragraph, even using quotation marks around certain words. How could they quote from it without having seen it? Furthermore, what is he trying to say by pretending that he hadn't seen the speech before Sept. 5 — that Clarke didn't show him the speech when he arrived in August, or mail it to him even earlier when he got it (in July, and possibly even in June)? Has he trapped himself through some over-use of duplicity? (These are rhetorical questions, and I don't want any answers; I just call it to your attention as a 16th rate matter that may possibly be of interest to you.)

4. Letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry Healy

New York, N.Y. October 25, 1953 Dear Jerry:
We have received your letter of October 12 and the discussion article by Tom, which we are putting in the bulletin. We are still awaiting your view on the memorandum on the "Rise and Decline of Stalinism." It seems best that this document not be circulated beyond the leading people of your own group until after our Plenum.
Since Jim's arrival in New York, we have been reviewing the trend of the international struggle and assessing the latest developments. We have read attentively all of your letters and they have had a profound influence on our thinking on the international question.
Most sinister* of all is Pablo's ultimatum to you signifying his intention to move in and help the revisionist minority overthrow the majority in your party. We note that while launching this vicious attack on you, he remains much more cautious in his attitude toward us. There is a reason for that. He wants to keep us immobilized on the international arena and preoccupied with the struggle against our own revisionists to whom he has given only clandestine support, while he tries to cut to pieces, one at

a time, your group and other orthodox Trotskyist groups.
We think the best service we can render the international movement is to cut through the whole web of Pabloite intrigue with an open challenge of their revisionist-liquida-tionist line. We think the time has come for an open appeal to the orthodox Trotskyists of the world to rally to save the Fourth International and throw out this usurping revisionist clique. The movement must be put on guard against the Pablo tactic of splits and expulsions, against his abuse of administrative control in an effort to repeat on an international scale their trick in France of overthrowing a majority with a minority.
In line with this decision to pass over from the defensive to the offensive, we are changing the whole character of the draft appeal we sent you. That draft limited itself to a description of revisionism in our party and Pablo's support of the revisionists, with an appeal for the aid of world orthodox Trotskyism in our fight. We now intend to issue from our Plenum an open manifesto totheworld movement sounding a call to arms against the Pabloites on the international field.
The manifesto will take as its point of departure the criminal policies  of Pabloism with regard to the revolu-

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tionary events in East Germany, France, Iran, and the new developments in the Soviet Union. We will demonstrate that the lines of political cleavage havebecome so deep and the Pabloite organizational methods so alien to our movement that a modus vivendi is no longer possible. The conduct of the Pabloites shows they disdain the real relationship of forces in the movement They act as though Pablo and his coterie own the international. The orthodox Trotskyists must kick out Pablo and the whole clique around him who leave no room for a modus vivendi apart from complete submission to their criminal line.
It is necessary to recognize that a showdown cannot wait until the next Congress, as many had previously expected. The Pabloites have already shown by their actions in France and their movements and threats against you in Britain that they will not permit a democratic Congress. Their plan is to get rid of the orthodox Trotskyists before the Congress ever convenes. We must act now and act decisively. This means we must launch a counter-attack without delay. We can have no illusions that there can be a peaceful settlement or compromise with this gang.
This change in tactics, which has been unanimously decided on here, has arisen particularly from our deliberations of how we can best help you in your fight. As matters now stand, you are caught in a web of slanders and trumped-up legalisms that keep you on the defensive. You are compelled to fight on Pablo's ground with inexperienced comrades who can be taken in by his sowing of political confusion and his use of organizational intrigue.
A direct and open political challenge of Pablo by our Plenum turns everything around, cuts through his con-fusionist strategy and provides an excellent basis for you to pass over from the defensive to the offensive in support of our manifesto. You can thus quickly mobilize and arm for battle all the orthodox Trotskyists.
The fight we are now up against is no less vital and decisive for the future than the great battles waged 25 years ago, in which the original Trotskyist cadres were assembled. In the face of these political imperatives, petty scandals and organizational maneuvers pale into insignificance. Through an uncompromising political challenge you will quickly weld your forces together in a faction which will become the future movement in England.
If we permit the fight to be conducted much further on the present level, you run the unavoidable risk of having demoralization and confusion disrupt your movement And that is what we fear most at the present time.
We had a preliminary test of the effectiveness of this change of tactics at an internal debate on the French general strike here in New York last Thursday night. In this discussion for the first time we opened up on the sacred cow, Pablo. The Cochranities seemed surprised and shocked that we dared to do so, while our own forces were elated that the war with Pablo is finally out in the

open. The Cochranite surprise at our slashing attack on Pablo tends to confirm our estimate that he thought we were afraid to join open battle with him. He thought that by playing a crafty double game with us, he could keep us immobilized in the international fight until he had finished doing a French job on the British party.
The most decisive factor about the debate was the eagerness with which our rank and file responded to the signal that we are opening war on Pabloite revisionism and liquidationism in the world movement We think this healthy reaction will be duplicated everywhere in the movement among those who have not forgotten what Trotsky taught them and who, as you have mentioned several times, have been waiting for the SWP to speak. Our movement everywhere was brought up on the teachings of Trotsky. As Morris said in our discussion yesterday, they have all read the same books we have read and they know just as much as we do. As you indicated in your recent letter, there are manifold signs of uneasiness throughout the movement over the revisionist line of Pablo.
For all these reasons, we are absolutely confident that once the open challenge is made we will rapidly mobilize a decisive majority in the world movement for the defense of our orthodox principles. But to do so, the time has come to call everything by its right name, to speak out openly and that without delay.
By adopting an open manifesto against Pablo at our Plenum, we will be putting the gun to the head of his Cochranite supporters in our party. This means that the de-facto near-split that has existed in our party for the last several weeks will quickly be transformed into an open break. For our part, we have absolutely nothing to lose from it and everything to gain. We do not contemplate any future reconciliation with these people.
A number of actions will naturally flow from this basic decision that is going to be made by our Plenum. We will work these out as we go along. The main line of them is already clear. The gist of it is that we are not going to be trapped in any legalisms by this usurping clique. We are going to have an open fight for control of the world movement.
Immediately after the Plenum, we must establish close organizational and consultative relations with orthodox Trotskyists everywhere, including those who have been unjustly expelled. We think a coordinating committee must be set up without unnecessary delay. We will send someone right after our Plenum to discuss this problem with you directiy.
Comradely yours, Farrell Dobbs P.S. There is going to be a lot of material in our paper which will be most useful to you in your fight. If you will send us a list of all your people whom you want to get our press — either single copies or bundles — we will put them on our mailing list

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5. Letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry Healy

New York, N.Y. November 3,  1953
England
Dear Jerry:
We have your letters of October 25, 26 and 28.
From the Ceylon report it would appear that they are fighting along our general line and that we can expect support from that quarter in defense of orthodox Trotskyism.
There is a new situation here. As you will see from the enclosed letter, the Pablo-Cochran faction organized a complete boycott of the 25th Anniversary Celebration in New York. In our opinion this definitively consummates the split this disloyal faction has long been preparing. At the Plenum we intend to suspend from membership all of the Pablo-Cochran faction leaders and members who participated in the organized boycott of the New York meeting, or who refuse to repudiate in good faith this strikebreaking action. An immediate reorganization of all party branches will be carried out accordingly. The Marcy tendency has manifested a party-loyal attitude in opposition to the splitters.
The Pablo-Cochran faction claim they have a majority internationally, your party included, and are demanding to know if we will abide by majority rule as laid down by the 13th Plenum. It is clear that the Pablo clique would rather end up claiming their minority is the International than to be a minority within the International.
We think it would be a tactical mistake to attend their rigged IEC meeting which is obviously intended to further their tactic of splits and expulsions. We think the correct tactic to follow is to by-pass the IEC meeting and set up an International Committee of the Fourth International (Trotskyist) as against the IS Pablo clique.
The struggle should no longer be waged within a Pablo-rigged common center, but as a battle between two centers for the allegiance of the sections. We will come out in support of the orthodox Trotskyist center in our press and hammer away at the Pabloites. There should be no more common publications or internal bulletins with them. On the contrary, we should have our own internal bulletins, nationally and internationally, for discussion among genuine Trotskyists. What we have to say to the Pabloites should not be placed in an internal bulletin but published in our press in the form of public attacks.
We urge that the contact committee you have already established constitute itself as the International Committee and proceed to function as the center of the Fourth International (Trotskyist). This committee should not wait for the sanction of any broader meeting before establishing itself as the formal leadership of the orthodox Trotskyist center. The International Committee is itself the result of an emergency gathering which has already changed the leadership. It should announce as one of its plans the organization of an honest discussion among genuine Trotskyists   to prepare for  an   honest   and   democratic

congress.
This tactical course would exclude any idea of presenting a counterresolution at the Pablo-rigged IEC meeting. Instead our document attacking the IS resolutions could serve as a counter-political declaration against the Pabloites by the orthodox Trotskyists who will rally around the center established by the International Committee.
We will strengthen the attack on paragraph 15 of the IS resolution, as you suggest. In our view, it is not in order at this juncture to speculate about different wings in the Soviet bureaucracy in our polemic with the Pabloites. The restorationist tendency is determined sociologically. That is, the bureaucracy in its rise and in defense of its privileges has overthrown all conquests of October, except that of changed production and property relations. Accumulation of wealth in the hands of individual members of the bureaucratic caste imposes upon the bureaucracy a tendency to safeguard that wealth. They have thus introduced an inheritance law into the Soviet constitution, permitting wealth to be passed on. Ultimately the only safeguard for them would be the overthrow of property relations. But they have stopped short of that because of the resistance of the working class within the Soviet Union, the pressure of world revolutionary developments, and the decay of world capitalism.
This, in brief, is our point of view with regard to the question of the restorationist tendency. We are, of course, open to discussion on the subject among orthodox Trotskyists as to how different sections of the bureaucracy will line up in a crisis. But the polemic against the Pabloites we think goes much deeper. At the heart of their line lies their falsification of the world objective situation, attributing to it an automatism which allegedly transforms the bureaucracy and even creates within it an ever-growing section with revolutionary potentialities. Their paragraph 15 is in our opinion a derivative of this general proposition rather than the theoretical keystone of their position.
It is our intention to send someone to consult with you as quickly as possible after our Plenum. However, we note by the latest Labor Action that Shachtman has been refused a passport after months of delay. This tightening up of the regulations may make it difficult or even impossible for us to send someone as quickly as we would like. In any case, bear in mind that Joe is fully authorized to represent us in all respects. His own inability to travel may necessitate holding important meetings at a place where he can be present Or if you find it impossible to meet at a place where Joe can attend, he can designate a proxy to act with full authority. This procedure should reassure the comrades involved that they can count on our support
We are taking steps to provide you all possible financial aid. If you are at present hardpressed, we suggest you arrange to borrow temporarily what funds you may need for emergency purposes.
Best regards, Farrell

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6. Resolution of the 25th Anniversary Plenum of the SWP
On Friday, October 30, the New York Local of the Socialist Workers Party held a public meeting to celebrate the 25th Anniversary of the founding of the party, and combined this celebration with a windup rally in the New York municipal election campaign. A minority faction in the party, which had been carrying on a disloyal program of sabotaging party work and party finances for several months, culminated this disloyal course with an organized boycott of the 25th Anniversary celebration in New York.
This treacherous, strikebreaking action constituted, in effect, an organized demonstration against the 25-year struggle of American Trotskyism, and at the same time, an act of objective aid to the Stalinists who expelled the initiating nucleus of American Trotskyism in October 1928.
The organized boycott of this meeting was, in effect, a demonstration against the campaign of the Socialist Workers Party in the New York municipal election.
All who participated in this treacherous, anti-party action have obviously consummated the split which they have long been preparing and have forfeited all right to membership in our party. Formally recording this fact, the 25fh Anniversary  Plenum  of the Socialist Workers Party

therefore resolves as follows:
 1.	The minority members of the National Committee who organized the boycott of our 25th Anniversary celebration in New York, namely: Cochran, Bartell, Frankel and Andrews, together with National Control Commission member Gold, are hereby suspended from the party.
 2.	All other minority members and alternates of the National Committee who fail to disavow and condemn the strikebreaking boycott of our 25th Anniversary celebration, are likewise suspended from the party.
 3.	The Local Executive Committee of Local New York is instructed to reorganize and re-register all members of the New York Local individually, excluding from membership all those who participated in the boycott of the 25th Anniversary meeting, unless they individually disavow and condemn it.
 4.	All other branches of the party containing members of the minority faction are instructed to take similar action. In any case where the majority of the branch refuses to do so, the loyal party members are instructed to withdraw and reorganize themselves as a loyal branch of the party.

7. Letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry Healy
New York, N.Y. November 18,  1953
Dear Burns:
We have your letters of November 9, 12 and 13. We realize that you are now engaged in a fast-moving showdown struggle in which you will need all the help you can get. We have not yet broken through the legal entanglements in our efforts to send someone to consult with you, but be assured we will keep working at it. In the meantime, we will do the best we can by mail.
You seem to think that our tactical proposals set forth in my letter of November 3 would speed up things too much in regard to your internal situation. You state you are not yet in a position to come out openly for a rival center to challenge Pablo's Comintern-like center, but you will work in that direction across a period of time. You agree with our proposal not to attend the Pablo-rigged IEC and urge that we join you in issuing a call for an early Emergency Conference of all who participated in the Third Congress, including the French. By projecting such an Emergency Conference at which you say the political line would be decisive, you seem to feel that we would avoid organizational snares and place ourselves on the offensive with a positive proposal.
Although we agree with the broad tactical objectives you obviously have in mind in making this proposal, our analysis of the present situation leads us to the conclusion that a call for an Emergency Conference at the present time would enable Pablo to lay a new trap for us of the same kind he had planned for the IEC. The lines of division are not yet clearly drawn internationally;

not everybody knows the score. Too many people are still susceptible to being duped by Pablo. The open confrontation of orthodox Trotskyism against Pablo's re-visionist-liquidationist line is only just beginning. It has not yet reached a point where fundamental political issues can fully and clearly break through the web of Pablo's intrigue. Thus, if an Emergency Conference were held at the present stage, Pablo would be in a good position to rig it like he has done with the IEC, keeping his grip on the administration and continuing the stab-in-the-back policy he has been using against orthodox Trotskyists, at least since 1951.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that it would be wrong to call for an Emergency Conference or an early Congress. What is needed above all right now is to expose Pablo's politics and organization methods while we carry on an honest discussion among genuine Trotskyists. In this way we can prepare for an honest and democratic international gathering under the aegis of genuine Trotskyists and out of which a genuine Trotskyist international leadership will be created, a leadership that will defend and apply the orthodox Trotskyist principles of the movement. To achieve this objective an orthodox Trotskyist center must be openly created to contest the Pablo faction for allegiance of the sections. Although this has to be done soon, we do not insist it be done at one stroke. It can be done in stages. You don't have to call it a center. The name International Committee of the Fourth International (Trotskyist) should be adequate for the creation of an actual center without formally proclaiming it as such.
It could be developed, for example, something like the

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CIO developed from within the AFL. The CIO did not immediately proclaim itself a rival organization to the AFL. It fought from within the AFL for a policy of organizing industrial unions in the basic industries. However, the CIO did not hesitate to organize its own center inside the AFL in opposition to the craft union center of the old-line bureaucrats; and the CIO openly contended for the allegiance of international unions and even launched an organizational drive in basic industry, remaining all the time within the AFL and fighting for the adoption of an industrial-union policy by that organization. The question of who would split or be expelled was not at all settled in advance. By pursuing this policy, the CIO gathered around itself most of the viable forces within the AFL, got a good start in organizing the unorganized before the break came, and in the end the AFL craft union bureaucrats were branded the splitters of the union movement.
This method is similar to the tactics we recommend in the present fight. We do not propose that orthodox Trotskyists break with the Fourth International. On the contrary, the task is to remove the revisionist-liquida-tionist Pabloite administration and replace it with an orthodox Trotskyist administration. The declared objective should be to preserve the orthodox Trotskyist program of the International and continue a true revolutionary course in the present complex world situation. To do so, it is necessary for the orthodox Trotskyists to move systematically and decisively toward the creation of their own center, with the same boldness that the CIO moved against the AFL craft union bureaucrats. Our battle cry should be: No concessions to Cominternism! We intend to organize a democratic discussion among genuine Trotskyists in order to prepare an honest and democratic Congress, and in order to restore a genuine Trotskyist administration to the International. This cannot be done without an International Committee publishing its own bulletin.
As we see it, the problem for you within your party is not so much to find an organizational device with reference to the international battle but rather to make a concerted attack on Pablo's political and organizational methods. The Pabloite scandal-mongering and their organizational maneuvers pale into insignificance before the vital and decisive political issues involved in the present great international controversy. We want to do everything we can to help you convey this understanding to your membership in order to harden and prepare them for the split that is bound to come in your party just as it came in ours.
You will have received by now the full text of our Open Letter to the Trotskyists of the World. Let us know what you think of it. We believe you will find helpful its restatement of Trotskyist fundamentals and its attack on Pablo's revisionism as manifested on East Germany, France, etc. In addition, the final draft of our criticism of "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism" is now being mimeographed and will be forwarded to you within a day or two. An article by us on East Germany in the issue of Fourth International now on the press should also be an aid to you.
We   realize   the   Open   Letter  will   come as  a shock to

many comrades in your organization. But that is not at all negative. It will compel every comrade to ask himself what is happening to the International under Pablo's leadership. Each comrade will be compelled to raise himself above the low level of Pabloite chatter, gossip and scandal-mongering, and ask himself some very serious questions. Has the 25-year record of the SWP leadership shown them to be lightminded with regard to the world movement? Or have they been firm and consistent supporters of the world movement, sensitive to its needs and problems? Does not the 25-year record of the SWP leadership make it objectively necessary for the comrades to carefully study the questions raised in the Open Letter before they permit themselves to be influenced by the Pabloite school for scandal? We think that a strong statement in this vein by yourself and other leading comrades as to why our Open Letter should be supported would be helpful.
You and other leading comrades are no doubt already telling your own story as to why you have broken with Pablo and what you think should now be done to prevent his unprincipled faction from breaking up the International.
We think it would also be a help to you if you would see Peng as soon as you can and get from him the whole story of the Pabloite intrigue against the Chinese. The appeal from Shanghai and Peng's open letter to the Chinese CP, which we recently printed in the paper, had been bottled up by Pablo since last spring. We learned of the existence of these documents only when we received them from Peng last month. The Pabloites over here are trying to defend the shameful suppression of the Shanghai appeal on the ground that it was "poorly written." The whole brutal tale of Pablo's treatment of Peng and the Chinese should be told to your membership. It will be most revealing to them. All indications are that Peng is completely with the orthodox Trotskyists as against the Pabloite revisionists and liquidators. We think close collaboration with him should be established.
In addition to the bill of indictment contained in our Open Letter, you might also tell the British comrades about Pablo's attempts to gag our press and impose his false line upon us. In his letters to us, Pablo has attacked the articles in our paper and magazine on the Beria purge, East Germany, etc. as "based on schemas and old reminiscences." He has demanded that the line set forth in "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism" be followed in our press. We have been told that any objections we may have to his line should be confined to internal discussion.
Pablo thus tries to set himself up as the fount of all wisdom in interpreting events and determining the policy of the movement on a day-to-day basis. If anybody disagrees, he says, put it in the internal bulletin, but follow my line in your press. Then he tries to put a gag on the leading comrades in the internal discussion by means of the "IS discipline" trick that he tried to pull on you and with which you are entirely familiar.
We read with interest the letter from Germain which you seem to think indicates he is wobbling. We are more inclined to the view that he is still straddling or trying to straddle. But it is too late for that. He has to make up his mind one way or the other, just as everyone else must

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now do. If you talk with him, we believe you should make that unmistakably clear to him. However, if you can't succeed in getting him to join us now, you may be able at least to neutralize him. This is Pablo's battle, not Germain's. If he is not prepared to join us, he should stand aside.
In the final analysis, Germain and Pablo must come to a break. Germain's tendency is toward orthodoxy. His spirit, however, was broken by Pablo and Clarke in 1951. Joe can tell you about this. It was in January of 1951 when Clarke informed us that he and Pablo were preparing a break with the French and Germain. We protested against this and stopped it for the moment Later Germain became taken in by them. The real problem for Germain is to regain his equilibrium. If he fails to do it now, he may do   it later.   He sought to arrange a talk with us

during his recent trip. We indicated our readiness to see him and even offered to help finance his trip, but apparently Pablo succeeded in short-circuiting the project.
There is little for me to add concerning our Plenum which you do not already know from my previous report from the information in the paper, and from the criticism of "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism," which will be sent to you soon. Right now we are in the process of7 ironing out, branch by branch, a few minor problems created by the split Our ranks have taken the break in their stride and are everywhere manifesting an eagerness to go forward with party-bunding work.
Yours in solidarity, Smith

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